Technology and Tradition: Jewish Bioethics in the Age of Genetics by Fey, Toby Lee
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School
8-2001
Technology and Tradition: Jewish Bioethics in the
Age of Genetics
Toby Lee Fey
University of Tennessee - Knoxville
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more
information, please contact trace@utk.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fey, Toby Lee, "Technology and Tradition: Jewish Bioethics in the Age of Genetics. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2001.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/2056
To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Toby Lee Fey entitled "Technology and Tradition:
Jewish Bioethics in the Age of Genetics." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for
form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Philosophy.
Dr. Glenn C. Graber, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Dr. Mary Ann Handel, Dr. Jonathan Kaplan, Dr. Betsy Postow
Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
To the graduate Council:  
 
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Toby Lee Fey entitled “Technology 
and Tradition: Jewish Bioethics in the Age of Genetics.” I have examined the final 
copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a 
major in Philosophy. 
 
Dr. Glenn C. Graber 
Major Professor 
 
 
 
 
We have read this dissertation 
and recommend its acceptance: 
 
Dr. Mary Ann Handel 
 
Dr. Jonathan Kaplan 
 
Dr. Betsy Postow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accepted for the Council: 
 
Dr. Anne Mayhew 
Interim Vice Provost and  
Dean of the Graduate School 
 
 
 
 
(Original signatures are on file in the Graduate Student Services Office.) 
TECHNOLOGY AND TRADITION: 
JEWISH BIOETHICS IN THE AGE OF GENETICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented for the 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Degree 
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Toby Lee Fey 
August 2001 
  
  
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 While everything we do and everything we say reflect our connection with 
others, some projects attest to that interconnectedness more than others – and this is 
one such project. I am grateful to many people for making this work possible. The 
faculty of the Philosophy Department at the University of Tennessee continued to 
challenge me as a philosopher and helped me to develop the skills that I will carry 
with me throughout my work. When their challenges got particularly trying, Ann 
Beardsley and Marie Horton were always there with words of encouragement and 
solutions to (often incredibly tedious) logistical problems.  I am also grateful to the 
University of Tennessee for awarding me the Yates Dissertation Fellowship for 
assistance in completing my dissertation this year. 
 I owe a special debt to Glenn Graber, my dissertation chair, for reading 
countless drafts of this work, for offering comments and suggestions, and for putting 
up with my endless emails expressing concern and frustration. Glenn was always more 
than willing to meet, both in person and “virtually,” and chat about the project and its 
direction. Glenn was also a great help in securing my first official employment, and 
for his suggestions and encouragement I will be eternally grateful. 
 This work is also a reflection of the detailed comments and suggestions offered 
by the remainder of my committee: Mary Ann Handel, Jonathan Kaplan, and Betsy 
Postow. There is no question that the project is more focused, more accurate, and more 
clearly expressed because of their input. 
  
  
iii 
 A special thank you also goes to Charles Reynolds in Religious Studies.  
Charlie was always there with words of encouragement and suggestions for how to 
just “get it done.” His confidence in me inspired confidence in myself, and I truly 
appreciate all of his efforts on my behalf. 
 The greatest debt is the one that I owe to my friends for listening to me 
complain, empathizing with the dissertation-writing process, and encouraging me to 
continue. Anne Kummer Wells was an invaluable friend to me from the very 
beginning of this program and continues to be important in my life.  Alissa Garber 
Putman, while in a different doctoral program, has always been ready to listen to and 
commiserate with my frustrations.  Annette Mendola, Carolyn Ells, and Jim Okapal 
have always been ready with encouragement and advice when I was in danger of 
faltering.  Mandy Foster has helped me to put the tasks in which I am engaged into 
perspective and has been unfailingly encouraging -- for her friendship I will be forever 
grateful.  Similarly, David Reisman has often lent me a sympathetic ear, and has 
offered wonderful distractions from the pressures of academia.  I have known Devora 
Shapiro only for a relatively short time, and yet my debt to her is large, for being a 
good friend when one was desperately needed.  And most importantly, Barbara 
Russell has contributed to the completion of this work in many ways – from not letting 
me give up to reminding me that there is a reason that only a few cross the finish line 
in this important race.  The debt I owe to her for her encouragement and friendship is 
immeasurable, and I can only hope to repay such kindness with support of my own. I 
  
  
iv 
wish her, and all of my friends, happiness, love, and success in whatever arena they so 
choose. 
  
  
v 
ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis that I defend in this project is that utilizing a care ethic is helpful in 
understanding the decisions reached by the observant Jewish community regarding 
medical care and the influence of genetics on those decisions. Previous analyses, as 
forms of “traditional” Jewish bioethics, have focused exclusively on the religious laws 
and principles that determine right action for this group.  But it seems to me that 
identifying other patterns and core elements specific to this group will further 
illuminate and clarify the decision-making process.  Specifically, the importance of 
relationships, especially family, is a pattern that must be addressed when analyzing the 
concerns of this community.  Refocusing the discussion on relationships, on the “web 
of interconnectedness” that joins all the members of this community (and these 
members to other communities as well) will allow us to both make sense of some 
disparate decisions regarding genetic screening and information, and will allow us to 
make predictions about future responses this community might make.  Hence, in order 
to understand or even predict the responses that this community will have to issues 
involved with genetic screening, we will need to understand the application of the 
relevant religious laws and principles in terms of the community’s emphasis on family 
relationships.  I discuss three particular diseases that have a genetic component, Tay-
Sachs Disease, breast cancer, and colorectal cancer, in order to demonstrate the 
traditional approach and its shortcomings.  I will show that augmenting traditional 
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Jewish bioethics with an ethic of care is actually not a new element, but instead 
describes the process that has been occurring all along.  
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PREFACE 
 Judaism is more than a religion; it is a culture, a tradition, a people.  The rich 
history shared by the members of this community binds them together, as do the 
rituals that have evolved to remember and sanctify those events.  Jews fast on the 
anniversary of the destruction of the Temples and rejoice on the day the Persian king 
spared the lives of his Jewish subjects.  None of these celebrations or lamentations are 
conducted in private; rather, Jews gather with family and friends in times of joy as 
well as in times of grief.  The celebration of Passover is commemorated by a glorious 
feast where, together with family and friends, Jews recount the story of God’s wonders 
in Egypt.  And at the loss of a loved one, a formal period of mourning for seven days 
is observed, during which time those whose lives the individual has touched come by 
to console and to grieve with the family.  Even at the most personal holiday, Yom 
Kippur, where Jews must individually atone for their sins and ask for forgiveness from 
both God and those whom they have hurt, they assemble together with their 
community in the synagogue, in recognition that each individual is about the same 
task.  
They pray together, laugh together, cry together, and live together. 
It is this notion of togetherness, of community, which is so fundamental to 
understanding the Jewish people.  It is a shared history, but it is so much more: shared 
work, shared worship, shared life.  In this interconnected community, what happens to 
one happens to all.  A death in one family means a meal preparation and a shiva call 
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for another. The birth of a son to a young couple means attendance at a brit milah for 
all. 
Nothing in this notion of community and interconnectedness changes when we 
shift our focus to the medical sphere.  Rather, any medical decisions made by 
members of this community are affected by this interconnectedness.  Clearly 
principles and religious obligations will play a role in determining what the right 
action is for this group of people, but so will the emphasis on family and community. 
Only by understanding this background can we make sense of the choices made in a 
medical context. 
For the purpose of this project, I am interested in analyzing a specific area in 
the medical realm, that of advances in genetic medicine.  Concentrating on genetic 
medicine will allow us to see the influence of this phenomenon of interconnectedness 
even in the newest, most advanced medical fields.  As we as a society move 
increasingly towards using genetic technologies, we are faced with a growing number 
of questions in relation to the use of those innovations.  Questions about who to screen 
and when to screen, in addition to ascertaining what we should be screening for, are 
surpassed only by those questions that ask us to evaluate what indeed we plan to do 
with the information that these procedures produce.  I will begin this project by 
looking at the moral questions regarding genetic testing and screening as generally 
understood.  To that end, I will give a brief analysis of issues such as what knowledge 
is gained from genetic tests, who is and should be privy to that knowledge, what risks 
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are associated with such testing, who is affected by the decision to undergo or not 
undergo testing, etc.  An important focus will be on the risks associated with the 
information-gathering aspects of genetic screening, since issues of privacy and 
confidentiality, as well as other corresponding duties of health-care workers, have 
become increasingly relevant.  Another important point will be to recognize that issues 
will be framed differently in different contexts or from different perspectives.  
In order to narrow down these issues, I will concentrate on a specific example 
of each of three different kinds of genetic traits.  The overarching issues previously 
discussed will apply to all of these traits to varying degrees, and yet the differences 
among these traits will become important later in the project.  I will begin by looking 
at Tay-Sachs disease, which is important for two major reasons.  First of all, Tay-
Sachs results in certain death of those affected.  The cause of Tay-Sachs is relatively 
well understood by scientists, but a cure is not yet available.  The disease is apparent 
from early on in life, and typically causes great anguish not only to the child suffering 
but to her family and support system as well.  The second reason why Tay-Sachs 
disease is particularly important for this analysis is because this is an instance of a 
vastly successful screening program; hence it may give us some clues to help us 
duplicate the success for other traits.   
The next trait I will discuss are the two prominent genes associated with breast 
cancer, known as BRCA1 and BRCA2.  By no means does the presence of a mutation 
in one of these genes result in certain death, as is the case with Tay-Sachs disease.  
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Rather, the presence of one of these mutations indicates that the patient has an 
increased susceptibility to developing breast cancer.  It is estimated that 1 in 8 women 
(12% of women in the population) will develop breast cancer in their lifetimes, but 
only 5-10% of those cases are inherited. 1   The major risk factor for breast cancer is 
simply age; 80% of breast cancers develop in women over the age of 50.  However, of 
the 5-10% of cases that are of the inherited variety, researchers estimate that 30-70% 
of those cases develop because of mutations in either BRCA1 or BRCA2. These 
mutations do alter the woman’s risk for developing cancer, as 50-85% of the women 
with these mutations will develop breast cancer.  So although having a mutation in one 
of these genes increases a woman’s susceptibility to developing breast cancer, it is still 
possible that one might have these mutations and never develop breast cancer at all.  
Hence, there is little certain knowledge that is gained from the information that one of 
these mutations is present or absent in the patient.  The wrinkle that gets added to this 
story is the variable success of prophylaxis; some women with these mutations have 
substantially reduced, but not eliminated, their risk of developing breast cancer by 
having bilateral radical mastectomies.  Hence, the overarching issues about screening 
(who to screen, when to screen, etc.) and about the use of information will be relevant 
here, as will the health professionals’ obligations regarding privacy and 
confidentiality. 
                                                 
1 All of this subsequent data are from Fact Sheet 3.62 of the National Cancer Institute, 
June 30, 1999. <http://198.77.70.12/3_62.htm>. 
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A final interesting genetic trait will be one that falls between the above two 
cases -- something that does not lead to certain death in affected patients, but 
something that is more than a susceptibility trait.  We may have found such a trait in 
recently discovered colon cancer genes, where the prevalent mutations may not be as 
penetrant or as lethal as in Tay-Sachs, but also may give affected patients a greater 
degree of risk than the susceptibility of BRCA1 and BRCA2. 
There is, of course, another reason why these three traits have been selected.  
These traits all are particularly prevalent in the Ashkenazi Jewish community.  For 
example, 2.5% of those of Ashkenazi Jewish descent will have a mutation in the 
BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene, as compared to 0.1% in the general population.  There are 
both scientific and social reasons for this: this is a community that has predominantly 
married and procreated amongst itself, so any mutation that may have been introduced 
into one or a few members gets propagated throughout the masses.  But in addition to 
the prevalence of these traits, this is also a community that has certain religious beliefs 
and traditions that will be interesting to analyze in terms of the genetic traits that affect 
them.  For those within this community who are observant to the tenets of Judaism 
may face some challenges when making decisions about genetic screening.  There 
seem to be conflicting duties to heal the sick and preserve human life, on the one hand, 
and perhaps to refrain from interfering in God’s domain or to respect the sanctity of 
procreation on the other.  Indeed, by exploring the values and priorities held by this 
community we will be able to understand just where the tension lies.  In order to 
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facilitate that analysis, in chapter three I will discuss how the scholars in Judaism have 
approached information about new reproductive technologies.  There is some 
agreement about the acceptability of procedures such as in-vitro fertilization (IVF) and 
artificial insemination (AI), and that seems to be relevant here.  A discussion of the 
Jewish views on abortion also seems pertinent, as this will clearly relate to the 
relevance of the information gathered in such screening, for example, in the case of 
Tay-Sachs disease. 
The overarching claim I wish to defend is that writers have misunderstood the 
rationale behind this group’s acceptance or rejection of genetic screening.  Only by 
looking at the decisions reached by this community in terms of a care ethic will we 
truly understand how and why certain conclusions are reached.  This is because the 
care ethic allows us to adequately take into account the emphasis on family and 
community that is the backbone of this tradition.  What I want to emphasize in the 
discussion of this community is the realization that there are real people who are being 
tested for these genetic traits: real people with families, with values, with lives and 
livelihoods.  Weighty decisions such as these are not made in isolation.  It is true that 
often authority figures in Judaism are consulted for guidance on these matters.  But it 
is just as important to remember that this is a community that is really interconnected; 
decisions made are discussed with family and friends, and these decisions then have 
an impact for the whole community.  The role of nurturing in this community is quite 
large; parents are responsible for ensuring that children grow up with a certain respect 
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for themselves, each other, and the sacred traditions of which they are a part.  A 
decision about whether or not to be tested for Tay-Sachs, or whether or not to have a 
prophylactic mastectomy, is not and cannot be made in isolation between the patient 
and her physician.  Rather, just as she relies on the community for support in raising 
her children and nurturing their spiritual lives, so does she rely on them for advice and 
support in making these sorts of decisions. 
Hence, refocusing the discussion on relationships, on the “web of 
interconnectedness” that joins all the members of this community (and these members 
to other communities as well) will allow us to make sense of some disparate decisions 
regarding genetic screening and information. Previous analyses have focused 
exclusively on the religious laws and principles that determine right action for Jews.  
But it seems to me that to focus exclusively on the application of rules to a given 
situation is to miss a core element of this community: the importance of relationships, 
especially family.  Hence, in order to understand or evaluate the responses that this 
community will have to issues involved with genetic screening, we will need to 
understand the application of the relevant religious laws and principles in terms of the 
community’s emphasis on family relationships. 
By analyzing the various priorities and values of the observant Jewish 
community and those of the medical establishment and science, we may be able to 
achieve some reconciliation of goals or to explain the levels of agreement or 
disagreement among those goals in terms of a differing focus: that of the care ethic.  
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Of course this will require an exposition of the care ethic itself, as well as a defense of 
why this is the appropriate framework to use for this discussion, both of which will be 
forthcoming.     
One final note relates to my intended audience with this work.  Part of what I 
hope to do here is to facilitate communication between three distinct groups: (1) the 
medical professionals who care for patients from within the Jewish community and 
who engage in the research that furthers the science; (2) the rabbis and authority 
figures from within Judaism who explicate traditional responses to these dilemmas and 
whose task it is to determine the (im)permissibility of engaging in new procedures; 
and (3) the observant Jewish community itself, whose members are to some degree 
committed to the tenets of Judaism and at the same time are confronted with the reality 
of the possibilities of genetic medicine.  I hope that this work illuminates the decision-
making process in a way that is useful to all of these groups. Families will find this to 
be a way to understand how their multiple allegiances – to Judaism and to each other – 
can be an asset in decision-making, rather than a hindrance.  This work will benefit 
rabbis and authority figures in Judaism as it provides a way to describe their guidance 
process as one that is both richly informed and responsive to current medical trends. 
Finally, this project will be useful to clinicians and general practitioners who are often 
confronted with Jewish patients who are struggling with these kinds of dilemmas, or 
for individuals who are curious about how to reconcile apparently disparate goals and 
values. While the arguments offered here are likely too detailed to serve as a quick 
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guide for clinicians who need an immediate answer about how to approach an issue or 
a patient, this work will be helpful to providers who have some time to devote to the 
study of the issues discussed here. 
Because I envision this work to have relatively broad appeal, I have written it 
in such a way that members of all of these groups should be able to understand the 
material provided.  I do not assume in-depth familiarity with genetic medicine or 
Judaism, but instead assume the reader has a general familiarity with both of the 
concepts.  Since the care ethic, unlike genetics or Judaism in general, is rarely 
discussed in popular culture, I do not assume that the reader has any familiarity with 
that whatsoever.  I present enough detail of the ethic of care and of the other important 
claims to make this work able to stand alone, while suggesting other means of 
investigation if the reader has those correlative interests. 
The purpose of this project is to offer a new way to think about issues linking 
Judaism to genetic medicine.  Previously, scholars of Judaism have applied rules and 
principles or the notion of duties exclusively to determine the ethically correct or 
consistent choice, given a particular medical context and the values and priorities of 
observant Jews.  What I hope to show is that these values and priorities themselves 
more naturally lead us to a care ethic, and in fact many decisions have, perhaps 
unwittingly, been made according to this theory in the past.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent announcement of the completion of the “rough draft” of the human 
genetic code has engendered much excitement in the medical field.  Mapping the 
human genome promises to lend scientists and physicians new information useful for 
the treatment of illness and disease, as well as to give individuals a greater opportunity 
to understand some of the causal mechanisms that account for some of their 
constitution.  As the role of our genes in determining our characteristics becomes 
clearer, the interaction between genetics and environment will be elucidated.  Once we 
learn about the limitations of one, we will have more information about the influence 
of the other.  This may lead to better interventionist strategies on the part of medicine, 
as researchers and physicians utilize this newfound knowledge of patient care. 
While these developments in genetics are exciting and promising in terms of 
patient care, they are not unproblematic.  Many aspects of the new genetic age raise 
ethical challenges.  For example, the increased information that will become available 
to individuals about their genetic makeup will create related ethical issues in medicine.  
Genetic information about me, for example, has direct implications for my immediate 
family: knowledge that I carry the mutation responsible for Huntington’s Disease 
indicates that my sister and brother are also at risk.  Issues related to privacy and 
confidentiality are certainly not new with genetics, but now may assume a different 
form.  Patients may be interested in keeping such information private for a variety of 
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reasons, and yet there may be an obligation to disclose this knowledge to those whom 
it affects so that they can seek treatment, make plans, etc; family members may, in 
fact, have a right to this information.  Hence, the arguments regarding disclosure of 
information may in some way parallel the discussions regarding transmission or risk 
of communicable diseases like tuberculosis or even HIV infection, where the safety of 
potentially affected individuals may override the individual patient’s right to privacy.  
Granted, the parallels will not be exact, but “social risk,” I would argue, may be 
interpreted in a number of ways.  Depriving individuals of their liberty because of 
considerations of others is a social issue, and has features that may parallel the 
deprivation of liberty that is justified in other areas of health care. 
 There are other interested parties regarding such information, specifically 
third-party payers, for whom genetic information may mean something entirely 
different.  Insurance companies may exclude coverage for certain disorders for which 
genetic screening is available on the basis of it being a “preexisting condition,” 
regardless of the fact that the individual may be asymptomatic.2  Alternatively, such 
organizations may raise the premiums of those who are found to carry a genetic 
mutation on the grounds that they may elevate the cost of the plan.   
Genetic discrimination is not limited, of course, simply to the realm of paying 
for medical care.  Employers, despite legislation to the contrary, may find some way to 
discourage hiring individuals who carry genetic predispositions to certain traits for 
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fear that this may, at some point, impact the individual’s job performance or – again, 
the financial consideration – it may cost the employer more to provide health care for 
her employees on account of this information.  Perhaps public schools will begin using 
genetic information to group students according to ability very early in their 
educational career, rather than waiting to sort them according to demonstrated ability 
later in life.  We already see some movement in this direction, as we test children 
before they enter kindergarten to see if they “qualify” for special programs.  Imagine 
how much easier – and less subjective – this would be if it could be accomplished by 
simply analyzing a blood sample. 
 Apart from these considerations is the question of how the information itself 
benefits certain individuals.  Certainly the information may assist researchers in 
developing cures and interventions for certain diseases, for example, by identifying 
candidates for a clinical trial.  That is, individuals who may not have known they were 
genetically predisposed to a particular disease, or who would be victims of a late-onset 
disorder, might be identified through such a process.  If experimental (preventative) 
therapy was in trials, then, these individuals would seem to be good candidates for it.   
The use of the information for particular individuals seems less clear.  
Knowledge that an individual carries a certain lethal allele may encourage her to make 
different reproductive decisions than she otherwise would.  And knowledge that one  
                                                                                                                                            
2 See Mary Briody Mahowald, Genes, Women, Equality (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 196-197. 
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has a genetic predisposition or susceptibility to a particular affliction may increase her 
vigilance for signs of the development of the disorder.  But since at present there are 
few genetic diseases for which cures are available, and limited treatment interventions 
for many others, the benefit of receiving such information is debatable.  There has 
been some limited success with gene therapy – in cases of ADA deficiency, for 
example – but the best “therapeutic” option available for most genetic disorders is the 
prevention of their transmission by altering reproductive choices.  Even when there are 
such choices, often the side effects are sufficiently bad to warrant an individual to 
make a real assessment of her risk prior to proceeding with therapy.  Hence, the 
intervention that is possible is problematic. 
On the other hand, many would argue that simply having this information is 
important: knowing that my reproductive options ought to be limited is significant.  
Yet with this information may also come psychological stressors: knowing that one 
has a higher susceptibility to breast cancer may be more of a burden than a benefit, 
given the limited therapeutic options available.  The opposite is possible as well: some 
individuals find relief in “simply knowing” their specific genetic risk.  Similar 
problems arise with screening for other sorts of genetic traits: suppose the man I want 
to marry is a carrier for trait X, like me.  Since I am opposed to abortion and 
desperately want children, does that mean we should refrain from marriage?  Should 
we adopt? Should we chance it? 
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 It is at times such as these, in instances of indecision regarding real moral 
dilemmas, that individuals may turn to their spiritual guides to assist them in making 
tough choices.  Deciding whether or not to undergo genetic screening and what to do 
with the information garnered from such procedures are issues that must be addressed.  
It is at times of such uncertainty when religious affiliations enter the discussion.  Many 
religions have weighed in on issues in medical ethics (the abortion debate is 
particularly noteworthy for such participation), and in light of the new challenges 
raised by genetic medicine, it seems likely that sources of authority will weigh in on 
the debates at hand. 
 Studying the interplay between medical decision-making and Judaism 
specifically will be particularly interesting for a number of reasons.  Since Judaism is 
one of the world’s oldest religions, it is illuminating to study the ways in which 
ancient Jewish texts and sources are utilized by contemporary thinkers to directly 
address the ethical challenges that arise out of advances in medicine.  In the field of 
genetics, however, Judaism becomes particularly interesting.  A specific group of Jews 
known as Ashkenazim, who trace their ancestors back to eastern Europe, have been 
found to be carriers of the mutation responsible for Tay-Sachs disease, an affliction 
that results in early death of children born with two copies of this gene.  Recently 
researchers also identified three specific mutations responsible for a genetic 
susceptibility to breast cancer that has a high incidence in this particular population.  
As many genetic traits are concentrated in specific populations (for reasons to be 
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explained later), understanding certain aspects of the decision-making process for 
specific groups of people will be quite useful.  And since this particular religious 
tradition has specifically addressed the issue of genetic screening regarding one of 
these traits, this is an excellent place to begin our discussion of genetics.  Hence, this 
community is a particularly rich one for study. 
 Underlying the discussion in the subsequent chapters is an understanding of the 
actual practice of individuals. That is, just as I am concerned about the new challenges 
that advanced medical technology has presented for Jewish medical ethics, I am also 
concerned about how contemporary Jews work an understanding of Jewish legal 
prescriptions into their daily lives. Hence, I will not focus on theoretical applications 
of principles and rules, but rather on actual practice.  An analysis of the practices of 
members of this community has led me to conclude that the traditional schema cannot 
stand alone.  Instead, for this group, the most consistent ethic in the age of genetics is 
one that combines the traditional approach with an ethic of care.  This is the thesis that 
I will defend in this project.  
The remainder of this chapter serves as an introduction to the issues and 
themes that I will discuss at greater length in the subsequent chapters. In chapter two I 
focus on three specific genetic diseases – Tay-Sachs disease, breast cancer, and 
colorectal cancer –  and I identify some general ethical issues involved with each one. 
This helps to set up the problem for Jewish bioethics by indicating the issues that a 
framework for decision-making must address.  In chapter three, I detail the rules and 
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principles in Jewish bioethics that relate to the issues I suggested in chapter two in 
order to accomplish two things: (1) to demonstrate how issues in medical ethics have 
been addressed in Judaism, and (2) to extrapolate about how scholars could 
consistently apply this reasoning to the genetic issues that were introduced in chapter 
two.  At the end of that chapter, I discuss why the traditional approach is 
unsatisfactory.  Chapter four contains the heart of my argument, where I describe and 
defend two claims: (1) the care ethic is an appropriate orientation for this group, and 
(2) the care ethic is a better decision-guide than traditional Jewish bioethics.  I then 
make some suggestions about how to incorporate a care ethic with the traditional 
principled approach. Hence, I defend a care ethic as an important element for moral 
decision-making for members of the committed Jewish community, and also suggest 
that neither it nor traditional Jewish bioethics ought to stand alone as a decision guide.  
Finally, in chapter five I analyze the values and priorities of those who would be 
affected by my suggestions, and compare those to the values and priorities that come 
out of genetic medicine. 
Jewish Medical Ethics: Past and Present 
It will be illuminating to ascertain how discussions of Jewish medical ethics 
occurred prior to the advent of genetic information in order to understand how 
individuals involved in moral quandaries were aided by consultation with Jewish 
sources.  Prior to the middle of the twentieth century, discussions in Jewish medical 
ethics proceeded along the same lines as other matters that required textual 
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interpretation; medical ethics was not a discipline of its own, but was rather another 
facet of the complex intellectual culture.  Judaism is a tradition with a certain reliance 
on authority, both for scriptural interpretation and spiritual guidance. Jews rely on 
three major texts for guidance.  First there is the Torah, which comprises the first five 
books of The Hebrew Bible, and contains the Decalogue and other important laws and 
regulations by which Jews are to orient their lives (e.g. dietary restrictions).  Then 
there is the Mishna, which “is both a law code and textbook, collecting together the 
orally transmitted teachings and legal traditions….” An important source in Judaism is 
what as known as the Talmud, which is a “commentary on, and supplement to, the 
Mishna.”3  There are also collections of codes of law – the most complete and famous 
of which is the Shulkhan Arukh – which specify the legal requirements for proper 
Jewish living.  
In addition to these texts, Jews rely on rabbis, learned in both law and tradition, 
to interpret the works, as well as to guide passage through these difficult texts to the 
relevant midrashim (stories or parables) or halakha (law).  These stories are found in 
the texts previously mentioned, and have been interpreted by various authorities. 
Hence, the rabbis do take into account the ways in which their predecessors 
understood the passages and stories, and how subsequent rulings were made.  It is 
from this process that precedent is formed, much like in a secular court of law.  The  
                                                 
3 David J. Goldberg and John D. Rayner, The Jewish People  (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1989), 84. 
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rulings that the legal experts hand down become part of the source material the next 
time a similar case arises. That is not to say that the rabbis always follow the guidance 
given by other rabbis, however.  In fact, some famous debates emerged from instances 
where two different rabbis interpreted the same passage differently,4 and such dissent 
is how new precedent emerges.  However, the interpretations offered and the rulings 
set by the rabbis previously are considered by contemporary sources, whether or not 
they are accepted. 
These ancient religious laws and customs deal not only with medical ethics, of 
course, but with all facets of Jewish life: “…kosher food laws, business dealings, 
marriage, divorce…”5 etc.  And so the questions with which the rabbis were entrusted 
were answered in the same way: according to religious law, precedent, and ritual or 
custom.  Problems or questions were addressed on an individual basis, where the 
learned individual would consult the sources for the relevant laws and precedent about 
a specific question, and make decisions from there.  This system operated for 
thousands of years – well before bioethics emerged as a unique academic discipline. 
The change to a separate – but perhaps not entirely separable – discipline apart 
from other issues in Judaism occurred when Immanuel Jakobovits wrote his doctoral 
                                                 
4 See the discussion of abortion in chapter 3 for an example of this. 
5 Velvl Greene, “Ethical Issues in Community Health,” in Science in the Light of 
Torah, ed. Herman Branover and Ilana Coven Attia (Northvale: Jason Aronson Inc., 
1994), 149. 
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dissertation on the subject of Jewish medical ethics.  Its publication in 19596 signaled 
an important milestone in the field: for the first time, an authoritative work, including 
relevant history as well as law and doctrinal interpretation, presented the traditional 
Jewish perspective on ethical issues in medicine.7  In this work, not only does 
Jakobovits offer an overview on the Jewish perspectives on health and medicine, but 
he also catalogued positions on specific topics such as abortion, euthanasia, and 
palliative care.8  Subsequent to the publication of this treatise were a number of other 
forays into Jewish medical ethics, in both monograph and article forms, which 
attempted to augment and modify Rabbi Jakobovits’ work.   
As the field of bioethics emerged in the secular sphere in the 1970s, the study 
of Jewish medical ethics was also coming of age; Jakobovits’ book had its second 
printing in 1975. The new edition included a section on “recent developments in 
Jewish medical ethics,” in which he discussed issues of contraception, organ donation, 
and human experimentation, among others.  1978 saw the publication of 
Contemporary Jewish Ethics edited by Menachem Marc Kellner, and in the next few 
years many other books were published in this new field.9  In addition, books devoted 
to specific areas of interest within this larger discipline became common.  Jakobovits 
                                                 
6 Immanuel Jakobovits, Jewish Medical Ethics (Bloch Publishing Company: New 
York, 1959). 
7 Yoel Jakobovits, “Lord Immanuel Jakobovits,” in Pioneers in Jewish Medical 
Ethics, ed. Fred Rosner.  (Northvale: Jason Aronson Inc., 1997), 131-133. 
8 Immanuel Jakobovits.  Jewish Medical Ethics.  Bloch Publishing Company: New 
York, 1975. 
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himself refers to David M. Feldman’s Birth Control in Jewish Law (1968).10  In 1983, 
the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy devoted the entire August issue to “medical 
ethics from the Jewish perspective,” and the 1980s saw a huge proliferation of texts in 
this area (especially noteworthy are David M. Feldman’s Health and Medicine in the 
Jewish Tradition, 1986, and, in the same year, Fred Rosner’s Modern Medicine and 
Jewish Ethics, 1986).  The trend towards specialization also flourished in the 1980s, 
where Fred Rosner, for example, authored a number of articles in the specific areas of 
genetics and new reproductive technologies.11  There were also many articles that 
appeared in religious (as opposed to strictly academic) journals on these subjects, as 
well as the material published in Hebrew rather than English.  Suffice it to say, then, 
that the field that Rabbi Jakobovits pioneered has developed into a rich and complex 
area of study. 
In the recent Pioneers in Jewish Medical Ethics, Fred Rosner identified four 
specific individuals who helped shape the field of Jewish medical ethics.  It is useful 
to spend some time describing the work of these individuals to demonstrate how 
scholars in the field of traditional Jewish bioethics have focused their time and energy.   
                                                                                                                                            
9 See the preface (specifically p. xi) of Fred Rosner, ed. Pioneers in Jewish Medical 
Ethics (Northvale: Jason Aronson, Inc. 1997). 
10 Immanuel Jakobovits, Jewish Medical Ethics, enl. ed. (New York: Bloch Publishing 
Company, 1975), 252. 
11 See Fred Rosner, “Test Tube Babies, Host Mothers and Genetic Engineering in 
Judaism,” Tradition 19, no. 2  (Summer 1981): 141-148; Fred Rosner, “Medical 
Genetics: The Jewish View,” The New York State Journal of Medicine (August 1982): 
1367-1375 for examples. 
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These individuals have all been influential in the field, and hence even a brief 
description of the history of Jewish medical ethics would be incomplete without an 
account of them.  A more detailed account of some of their specific rulings will be 
discussed in chapter three. 
First among these pioneers is Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, the predominant scholar 
in America in this field.  He spent most of his life in the United States as the head of 
Yeshiva Mesifta Tiferet Jerusalem in New York.12  Some of Feinstein’s more 
noteworthy contributions were the definition of death as the cessation of brain stem 
function and the (correlative) argument for the permissibility of organ donation.13  
Also, Feinstein was one of the few authorities who argued for the permissibility of 
artificial insemination with donor sperm (AID) from a gentile sperm donor, and he 
received much criticism for this opinion.14   
Next among Rosner’s pioneers was Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, a life-
long Israeli who sought little attention for himself but was nonetheless very influential 
to thousands of his followers.15  He disagreed with Feinstein’s definition of death, and 
instead proposed that a person was officially dead only when there was a complete and 
irreversible cessation of all brain cell activity.  And since (at least at the time of this 
writing) we have no test to allow us to determine this accurately, organ donation is 
                                                 
12 Rosner (1997), p. 56. 
13 Ibid., 61-67. 
14 Ibid., 95. 
15 Ibid., 99-100, 125-126. 
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prohibited until such time as we are able to “…ascertain with absolute certainty the 
complete and irreversible cellular death of the brain.”16 
Immanuel Jakobovits (whom we already mentioned) was Rosner’s third 
pioneer.  Jakobovits was the Chief Rabbi of Ireland when he undertook his doctoral 
studies in Jewish medical ethics at the University of London.17  Perhaps the 
noteworthiness of his work results from its historical approach and comprehensive 
nature.  But just as interesting was his inclusive language and form.  As Jakobovits’ 
son, Yoel, wrote in Rosner’s book, “My father’s chief focus…[was] to proclaim Torah 
values in contemporary language and current frames of reference that are convincing 
and attractive to modern men and women, whether committed to Jewish practice or 
not.”18  Dr. Jakobovits stressed that his father intended his application of Torah values 
to medicine to be relevant “in their universal context, as well as in their more confined 
Jewish sphere.”19  So in addition to its comprehensiveness and its publication in 
English, one might argue that Jakobovits’ inclusiveness also contributed to the large 
impact his work enjoys.20 
Rosner’s last pioneer was Rabbi Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg, an Israeli who 
continues to write on the subject of Jewish medical ethics.  He is the most prolific of 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 109. 
17 Ibid., 132. 
18 Ibid., 136. 
19 Ibid., 137. 
20 Ibid. 
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any halakhic authority, and his references are extensive.21  Waldenberg deals with 
issues that have arisen in contemporary medicine in no less detail than the classical 
issues, and might be considered progressive by some regarding his arguments for the 
permissibility of abortion, for example, in certain situational contexts.22 
The final chapter in Rosner concerns “contemporary specialists in Jewish 
medical ethics,” where Dr. Nisson M. Shulman, who was the head of the department 
of Medical Ethics for Britain’s Office of Chief Rabbi, gave a short biography of seven 
current pioneers who specialize in medical ethics.  They are, in alphabetical order: 
Abraham S. Abraham, David J. Bleich, David M. Feldman, Mordechai Halperin, Fred 
Rosner, Avraham Steinberg, and Moshe David Tendler.23  Each of these authors has 
multiple books and articles in the area of Jewish medical ethics, and each of them 
extensively refers to their contemporaries and predecessors for additional foundation 
in their work.  With the exceptions of Abraham and Rosner, all of the contemporary 
pioneers are Orthodox rabbis, whose understanding of Jewish law and tradition extend 
far beyond the scope of medical ethics.  Abraham and Rosner are both physicians, 
whose area of interest is the connection and tension between medicine and halakha.   
Despite the proliferation of texts and the increased number of participants in 
the discussion, an interesting point to note is the similar approaches with which the 
authors discussed the topics in question.  All seem to (in no particular order): (1) Get 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 165. 
22 Ibid., 179. 
23 Ibid., 203. 
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the relevant facts about the medical situation in as much detail as possible.  (2) 
Determine what principle(s) and corresponding duty, obligation, or responsibility from 
halakha is (are) relevant to the situation.  (3) Apply this principle to the situation at 
hand.  But as previously mentioned, the tradition dates back long before Jakobovits’ 
work.  Rather, when a question about medical ethics arises, a rabbi will consult ancient 
sources and an expert in Talmud in order to make a practical decision. That is: 
…the Jew depends on a responsum from a qualified 
rabbi, one expert in Talmud, the legal codes, and the 
responsa that have been handed down over the 
generations.  The Talmud provides the philosophical and 
theological foundations, the codes provide the legal 
systematics, and the responsa are the precedents.  Based 
on these sources, a God-fearing posek (adjudicator) will 
derive a practical answer acceptable in Jewish law as a 
continuation of the halakha (law) that originated with 
the Almighty’s instructions to Moses.24 
 
From this process, we clearly see the individual nature of the discussion: first, a 
particular question will result in the rabbi searching out specifically relevant responsa 
and textual passages.  Only with this background in hand will a rabbi advise the 
patient or physician about the ethically permissible course(s) of action.  Furthermore, 
one should not underestimate the influence of this process.  Greene states: “Halakhic 
decisions rendered by the unqualified are the equivalent of brain surgery performed by 
the untrained.  In Jewish tradition, the responsa become a part of Torah and represent 
                                                 
24 Greene, 149. 
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divine instruction.”25  Greene later suggests that it is precisely because of this import 
that most texts on Jewish medical ethics will include some disclaimer to the effect that 
the information covered should not be used in lieu of a discussion with a “qualified 
rabbi.”26 
Clearly, this process did not begin with our contemporary field of bioethics, 
and Greene acknowledges this history.  He further argues, however, that “[a]fter 
centuries of responsa, certain principles can be derived.”27  Similarly, in the entry on 
“Judaism” he authored in the 1978 Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Rabbi Jakobovits 
argued that there are five fundamental moral or religious principles with which we are 
to assess dilemmas of a medical character: (1) the duty to preserve life and health; (2) 
the sanctity of human life; and principles concerning (3) the limits of life; (4) the 
generation of life; and (5) the conclusion of life.28  These principles have developed 
from a combination of interpretation of ancient law and the precedent that previous 
interpreters have set.  So, for example, by appealing to the principle of the sanctity of 
human life, we are to conclude that from a Jewish perspective, “…a physically or 
mentally handicapped life, in whatever state of debility, is worth no less than a full and 
healthy life.”29  This precept is presumably addressing the quality of life issues that so 
often come to the forefront when we discuss patients who have medical limitations of 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 150. 
27 Ibid., 149. 
28 Immanuel Jakobovits, “Judaism,” in Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Vol. 2, ed. Warren 
T. Reich. (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1978), 791-802. 
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some kind.  Jakobovits argues that applying these principles and their accompanying 
duties and obligations will give us the ethically permissible action (or range of actions) 
according to Jewish law. 
Other authors argue similarly.  For example, when discussing the 
permissibility of using contraception, Rabbi Feinstein allows the temporary use of oral 
contraceptive pills when a woman has both a boy and a girl and “…would have a 
difficult time raising more children until the first two were somewhat older.”30  There 
are two halakhic principles applied in this case: the first is that since the couple 
already has a boy and a girl, they are considered to have fulfilled the commandment to 
procreate.31  Secondly, since there will be no physical barrier to the husband’s semen 
with the use of this method of contraception, it does not “…violate the prohibition of 
emitting semen for naught.”32  In this example, then, one requirement was fulfilled and 
another was not violated, so the action was deemed ethically permissible. 
In his article on euthanasia in volume one of Rosner’s Medicine and Jewish 
Law, Abraham S. Abraham begins by stating the three principles fundamental to 
understanding the impermissibility of the action: (1) We are only permitted to kill 
another human being when an innocent person is in mortal danger from a rodef, or 
pursuer.  (2) Our body was given to us by God and it is His alone to take away.  (3) 
                                                                                                                                            
29 Ibid., 794. 
30 Rosner (1997), 91.  
31  David M. Feldman, Health and Medicine in the Jewish Tradition  (Crossroad: New 
York, 1986), 70. 
32 Rosner (1997), 91. 
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Life is of infinite value.33  After coming to an understanding of these principles, he 
applies them to the issue of active euthanasia and concludes that any such action is 
unequivocally forbidden according to Jewish law.34  Again, the approach here is the 
application of halakhic rules or principles to a particular situation. 
The Tragic Flaw:  Individuals and Communities 
It is precisely this approach that has been applied to issues of genetic 
screening, as is evidenced by the response from the observant Jewish community 
regarding Tay-Sachs disease.35  The determinations of the requirements of the patient 
and the physician, as well as other relevant principles (such as the sanctity of human 
life) were applied to determine a morally correct course of action.  It is the contention 
of this work, however, that despite its longevity, this method of moral reasoning is 
fundamentally flawed.  One problem with this form of reasoning may be evidenced 
from the following case: 
Deborah Schwartz has been actively involved in her synagogue 
since early childhood.  This involvement has taken many forms, with one 
major area of emphasis involving programs of health promotion.  As a 
laboratory professional she has encouraged and assisted in the 
organization of blood pressure screening, diabetes detection, cholesterol 
checks, and general fitness evaluations.  As a result of her efforts, a 
significant level of health consciousness has developed among members 
of the congregation. 
Following the unfortunate death of a young child with Tay Sachs 
disease, the community health committee of the synagogue voted to 
                                                 
33 Abraham S. Abraham, “Euthanasia,” in Medicine and Jewish Law, Vol. 1, Fred 
Rosner, ed. (Northvale: Jason Aronson Inc., 1990), 124. 
34 Ibid., 125-128. 
35 The history of decisions regarding Tay-Sachs disease in the Jewish community will 
be discussed in detail in chapter three. 
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initiate a Tay Sachs screening program.  This program was designed to 
offer testing to all pregnant women and all couples planning marriage.  
The discussions and vote on this program occurred while Ms. Schwartz 
was on vacation. 
Upon learning of the plans for the screening program, Ms. 
Schwartz immediately began to raise questions.  She learned that pregnant 
women with positive tests would be counseled to have abortions and 
engaged couples would be advised to avoid having children.  Ms. 
Schwartz was philosophically against this component of the screening 
program.   
With a personal family history of victims of the Holocaust, 
Deborah Schwartz was raised to believe in the sanctity of life and the need 
to preserve the Jewish faith through continual creation of new lives.  This 
program was being developed in a manner that was the antithesis of her 
beliefs. 
As a health professional, Ms. Schwartz supported the concept of all 
people knowing as much as is feasible about their own bodies and health.  
She could not, however, participate in a program that violated her 
religious beliefs.  Her dilemma was whether to actively oppose the 
implementation of the program because of her uncertainty about which 
belief was of a higher order.36 
 
The dilemma Ms. Schwartz faces is a common one: she is having difficulty 
understanding her role at the conjunction of multiple communities.  She is 
simultaneously a member of the scientific community, the specific synagogue 
community, and the larger Jewish community.  And as the values and priorities of one 
community conflict with those of the other(s), Ms. Schwartz finds herself not knowing 
what the morally right thing is to do.  As a member of an observant Jewish 
community, she is concerned with how the Jewish legal rules apply to her situation.  
Yet her multiple community affiliations cause some conflict for her.  
                                                 
36 Case taken from Robert M. Veatch and Harley E. Flack, Case Studies in Allied 
Health Ethics (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1997), 166-167. 
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I contend that the dilemma in this case arises from the network of relationships 
in which she is involved.  As we are all multiply committed, her problem is 
representative of moral agents in general. The question seems to be one of balance; an 
assessment of the morally justifiable action must include an acknowledgement of the 
often contradictory tenets that we hold. A satisfactory moral theory will include a 
method by which consistency in our moral action can be obtained. 
It is not clear that applying the traditional methodology of Jewish bioethics will 
adequately accomplish this goal.  Ms. Schwartz is already familiar with many of the 
relevant principles and duties that relate to this case: in fact, it is those principles and 
duties that serve as the foundation of the problem, when combined with her fidelity to 
the tenets of the other communities.  Any decision that Ms. Schwartz arrives at will 
inevitably affect others around her, and her deliberation must take this into account.   
The morally appropriate role of the individual in the community cannot be taken for 
granted here or in any other dilemma, and yet this is what the traditional approach 
seems to assume.  Relevant duties and principles that have some bearing on the 
particular situation can certainly be identified and usefully applied,37 but it is unclear 
that this application alone will suffice to form an action guide for moral agents. 
Suppose that we change the case a little and now assume that Ms. Schwarz is not 
in doubt about the religious proscriptions.  Even if it were clear to her that Jewish law 
prohibited abortion counseling, for example, there would still be limited courses of 
                                                 
37  The specific sorts of rules and principles will be specified in chapter three. 
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action available to her. She is deciding whether or not to “actively oppose” the 
implementation of the screening program. Even if she were successful doing so, this 
would likely not prohibit couples from getting screened; they would simply need to 
choose an alternative location or source.  While I do not intend to underestimate the 
possible hardship involved in such a consequence, it is important to recognize that Ms. 
Schwartz’s values will influence the community, but will be unlikely to bind the 
community to her priorities in any meaningful way.  Fully informed individuals may 
choose to agree with her and hence curtail their options, but others may not.  Part of 
determining her moral responsibility to the community might involve Ms. Schwartz 
engaging in such opposition in order to inform her fellow community members of the 
relevant Jewish law.  The community members are then free to do as they choose: to 
abide by the legal principles, to seek more information, or to act in opposition to the 
law.    
This problem of multiple commitments – social commitments as well as 
ideological ones – is not unique to the field of genetics, but it is brought into specific 
relief in this area.  Consider somatic cell gene therapy, for instance.38  Relevant duties 
of the Jew may include the duty to seek treatment, a physician’s duty to heal, the  
                                                 
38  For review articles on the goals, procedures, and products of gene therapy, see 
W.G. Kerr and J.J. Mule, “Gene Therapy: Current Status and Future Prospects,” 
Journal of Leukocyte Biology 56, no. 2 (August 1994): 210-4; J.H. Wolfe, “Recent 
Progress in Gene Therapy for Inherited Diseases,” Current Opinions in Pediatrics 6, 
no. 2 (April 1994): 213-8; I.M. Verma and R.K. Naviaux, “Human Gene Therapy,” 
Current Opinions in Genetic Development 1, no. 1 (June 1991): 54-9. 
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sanctity of human life, etc.  But the (im)permissibility of gene therapy must be 
considered on a more fundamental level: on the level of what it is to be a person.  It is 
clear that Jews reject the notion of genetic determinism, but it does not follow that 
changing our genes has no effect on our identity whatsoever. Perhaps the larger 
concern is with the issue of personal identity, as gene therapy may alter something 
essential to us.   If the discussion moves then to germ-line gene therapy, as is often the 
case, the issues become even more complicated since changes in the germ cells will be 
passed on to future generations.  Jews are commanded to continue the work of creation 
with their Creator in the making of children, and this principle has led many sources to 
discuss the permissibility of some forms of assisted reproduction.  When coupled with 
our duty to heal, a case could be made for supporting such a practice.39 Yet the 
implications from such action are far from clear: we are participating in creation in a 
way we have never been able to before.  
 Few would question the assertion that the community is the fundamental unit in 
Judaism.40 Because of this, an individual’s actions must be considered in light of the 
effects such an action may have on others around her, as well as regarding the 
                                                 
39 …that is, once the techniques are sufficiently perfected. For a sampling of the 
literature on the Jew’s participation in medical experimentation, see : Laura Jane 
Bishop and Mary Carrington Coutts, “Religious Perspectives on Bioethics, Part I,” 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 4, no. 2 (1994): 155-183; Immanuel Jakobovits, 
“Jewish Medical Ethics--A Brief Overview,” Journal of Medical Ethics 9, no. 2 (June 
1983): 109-12; Fred Rosner, “Human experimentation and Clinical Trials,” Israel 
Journal of Medical Science 31, no. 9 (September 1995): 580-2. 
40 …unless, of course, it is by those who claim that the family has primacy.  But since 
the family is, after all, a special kind of community, the point still stands. 
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implications that those decisions may have for others.  It is not clear that the 
applications of principles and duties alone will serve as sufficient action guide in the 
face of genetic medicine. The requirements that we have to others, as well as the 
acknowledgement that we are all fundamentally related to others, is a complexity of 
life that an ethic composed exclusively of principles and rules fails to appreciate.  This 
claim will be further explored in chapters three and four.   
The paradigmatic cases that serve as the cornerstone of casuistry and find 
similar company in Jewish bioethics are also of little help, since there are no 
precedents based on contexts alike enough in kind to the debates about genetics.  The 
cornerstone of casuistry is the creation of a “moral taxonomy” of similarities and 
differences among cases.41  With the advent of genetic medicine, the morally relevant 
features of the situation create a preponderance of differences without accompanying 
similarities.  Hence, there are no relevant precedents to serve as a guide to moral 
decision-making. 
Of course, an objector might argue, there has to be a starting point; new 
precedent is created by making decisions in uncharted territory.  It is unclear, 
however, that Jewish bioethics contains within it enough of a framework to make such 
assessments.  The moral question in these particular cases is not, as Jonsen and 
Toulmin remark,42 a debate about the universal principles; everyone might agree that 
                                                 
41 Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988). 
42 Jonsen and Toulmin, 6-7. 
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the Jewish physician has a duty to save a life. The moral question comes in applying 
those principles to the particular situation.  The woman faced with a decision on 
whether or not to undergo genetic screening for the genes responsible for certain types 
of breast cancer does indeed have a responsibility to the community to consult the 
relevant sources for guidance to be sure that she understands the traditions and 
customs of the group.  Yet she has other responsibilities as well, it seem.   Her 
responsibilities to her first-degree relatives, who may also gain information about their 
own health from the information that she receives, may conflict with her right to keep 
information about her health private.  Her responsibilities to those she cares for and to 
those who care for her who may also be impacted by this information, as she may 
choose actions based on this information that otherwise would not appeal to her, etc.  
It seems to me that it is here that we must assess the responsibilities that the 
community has to the individual: to respect her autonomous decision making, to 
support her in the decision she makes, and to serve as a resource for the process.  The 
biggest challenge that faces the traditional approach to Jewish bioethics is that it does 
not capture the web of relationships that is so central to Judaism: it takes the 
community and the family as primary, but fails to appropriately consider the moral 
agent’s role in such a capacity.  What I am alluding to here is an internal contradiction 
within Jewish medical ethics: Judaism views the family and community as a priority, 
and yet fails to carry this priority through in its decision guides.  A further analysis of 
the values and priorities of the community will help to make this clear, and this is the 
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task I undertake in chapter five.  Regardless, it seems that what Jewish bioethics 
needs, is a way to capture this focal element of the Jewish tradition.  
Reconciliation: Caring and families 
Throughout this work, I will argue that by incorporating an ethic of care and 
responsibility, where families and relationships (communities) are considered as part 
of the process of moral reasoning, a Jewish bioethic can indeed be sustainable in the 
genetic age.  Much of the debate surrounding issues of genetics occurs precisely 
because of the connectedness of the information (information about my health may 
give me unwanted information about my sister’s health as well), and recognizing this 
in the course of deliberation will augment the precedent and principles and serve as a 
more useful action guide for the contemporary patient.  I will argue that the two 
approaches should be combined, and in chapter four I suggest both the grounds for 
such a combination as well as a model for their incorporation. 
Briefly put,43 an ethic of care has both a different starting point and a different 
methodology from that of traditional Jewish bioethics.  As previously mentioned, the 
role of the rabbi in decisions of medical ethics is to apply the appropriate principle(s) 
from the myriad of sources to facilitate decision making for the problem at hand.  
Selecting the appropriate principle or duty and/or adjudicating among conflicting 
duties are the modus operandi.  These principles, of course, originate from the sacred 
texts, traditions, and precedents that have been established over time by the sages. 
                                                 
43 A detailed discussion of care ethics can be found in chapter four. 
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An ethic of care and responsibility, on the contrary, derives its origin from a 
realization that “…morality arises from the experience of the relationship.”44  The 
relationship referred to here may be any one of a number of relationships in which we 
find ourselves: that of a family member, a neighbor, a teacher, a friend.  In fact, in her 
well-known discussion of care ethics, Carol Gilligan claims that “…morality lies in 
recognizing connection” among individuals, and that “…morality…[is] contingent on 
sustaining connection.”45 It is this focus on “…keeping the web of relationships intact” 
that serves as the foundation for morality.46 
What is present in relationships and yet lacking in principle-based ethics, often 
referred to as ethics of justice, is the “relation of natural caring” that is the hallmark of 
relationships.47  One cares for others and is likewise cared for by the recipient, so that 
the exchange is mutual.  This is not to say, of course, that the exchange must always 
be equal, as can be seen in the paradigmatic relationship of friendship.  Sometimes our 
friends need more from us and sometimes we need more from them.  Regardless, 
being a friend involves both caring and being cared for.  The same is true for the 
parent-child relationship: inherently unequal relationships also include both caring and 
being cared-for.  “Our motivation in caring is directed toward the welfare, protection, 
                                                 
44 Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 
57. 
45 Ibid., 59. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education 
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or enhancement of the cared for….To act as one-caring, then, is to act with special 
regard for the particular person in a concrete situation.”48 
In order to do this, of course, the one-caring will need a precise and detailed 
accounting of the actual situation at hand.  Only by understanding what is truly at 
stake in the dilemma will the one-caring be able to make a decision that preserves the 
crucial relationships.  Hence, the importance of a “sensitivity to contextual detail” 
cannot be underestimated.49  Such attentiveness to detail is in some senses lacking in a 
principle-based ethic such as traditional Jewish bioethics.  Context may be important 
in the initial recounting of the moral problem, but soon afterwards the moral question 
is “boiled down” to a (series of) rule(s) or principle(s) as interpreted from the ancient 
sources.  In the traditional schema, it is the task of the rabbis to identify the rules and 
principles that apply to the situation that will serve as guidance for the patient.  
Ascertaining according to which principles the individual is required to act or refrain 
from acting is the extent of the guidance offered. 
I contend, however, that in the observant Jewish community, whose primary 
unit and focus is the family, that such context is crucial for decision making.  Given 
the focus on the family, from which many claim we first experience caring, it seems to 
me that in order to provide an appropriate action guide for individuals, Jewish 
bioethics must take account both of this relationship and this affective response, as it is 
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from here that ethical behavior is derived.50  Being in a family where we not only 
experience caring ourselves, but also witness caring for others, we learn about 
appropriate modes of behavior. This is why society blames the family when troubled 
children do not seem to have learned “right from wrong” or “know how to act” in 
public: because an important function of the family has not been fulfilled.  
Recognizing the feelings we have for one another, and gaining the ability to decide on 
appropriate outlets for those sentiments, is the beginning of moral education.   
It is important to be clear here: I do not contend that the family or larger 
community is completely missing from current patterns of Jewish bioethics.  On the 
contrary, one striking feature of this perspective is its inclusive nature: neighbors are 
considered more than friends, but as brothers.  Yet by focusing exclusively on the 
duties of individuals (physicians, patients, and others) in order to determine the 
appropriate course of action in a medical context, important moral insights are 
ignored.  Furthermore, while a woman may have duties to God, to herself, and to her 
family, there does not seem to be a clear way to adjudicate between these conflicting 
duties from the traditional perspective.  This problem with adjudication is 
characteristic of principled approaches generally.51  In fact, often the priority that the 
authority figures place on these duties may conflict with the priorities that the woman 
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herself gives to the varying roles in which she participates, and hence may lead to 
heightened moral conflict rather than resolution.   
An ethic of care, on the other hand, treats these important relationships – the 
relationships with family, with friends, with those for whom we care – as primary.  It 
recognizes that the dealings we have with one another profoundly influence the 
choices that we make and, in some sense, serve as the justification for such 
decisions.52  “What we do depends not upon rules, or at least not wholly on rules – not 
upon a prior determination of what is fair or equitable – but upon a constellation of 
conditions that is viewed through both the eyes of the one-caring and the eyes of the 
cared-for.”53  The decision about whether or not to be screened for a breast cancer 
mutation has implications for my family as well as for me, and this must be part of the 
decision-making process.  A care ethic will avoid the need for higher-level 
adjudication that is a problem for principles because of the differences in priority: the 
right action to perform is the one that, on balance, seems to preserve or maintain 
relationships.  There are no rules that might conflict. There is, however, a possibility 
for conflict in the schema that I suggest: one might envision a course of action that is 
justified by care ethics might be prohibited according to Jewish law. In chapter five, I 
argue that such conflicts can be resolved by both appealing to the level of commitment 
of an individual and by understanding the fundamental notions that the principles of 
Jewish bioethics preserve.   
                                                 
52 This claim will be justified in chapter four. 
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The emergence of new genetic technologies is truly a double-edged sword: it 
gives us new tools by which to plan our lives and our futures, and yet brings with it 
new dilemmas for which there are no easy answers.  Only by employing a form of 
moral reasoning that similarly encompasses the complexity of actual life will these 
dilemmas be able to be addressed adequately, and augmenting traditional Jewish 
bioethics in this way does just that.   
Limitations and Definitions: A Particular Community 
Not every Jew-as-patient or Jewish family, however, will be discussed in this 
work.  As was previously mentioned, when a question of medical ethics arose, rabbis 
dealt with it in a very individualistic manner.  But as the tradition continued, certain 
principles were derived that served to guide the authorities regarding new questions.  
And as these more general ideas developed, it stands to reason that more people would 
be affected by these decisions.  That is, originally an individual person or family 
approached a rabbi when she/they were faced with an ethical dilemma.  Using various 
sources and precedents, the rabbi was able to discern the ethically permissible course 
of action for the participants.  Of course, this decision then becomes part of the 
precedent to which the rabbis will appeal for future decisions by being recorded in 
writing or by being passed down from one authority figure to another.  And insofar as 
others are affected by this particular decision in this way, the answer no longer simply 
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applies to a particular family in a particular situation; it applies to all who seek counsel 
about this issue. 
This may become clearer with an example.  Suppose that Sue, an otherwise 
healthy woman in her mid-thirties, is in a serious car accident and suffers major head 
injuries. The physicians tell her family that there is no hope that Sue will ever regain 
consciousness, and her physical functions are being entirely sustained by artificial 
means.  The staff recommends to the family that they say their good-byes to Sue and 
allow the staff to withdraw or remove the life-sustaining equipment.  The family then 
seeks out the assistance of a rabbi to discuss the permissibility of such an action from 
the perspective of Jewish law.  In his section on “The End of Life” in Modern 
Medicine and Jewish Ethics, Fred Rosner discusses how questions of this type have 
typically been handled: first, certain Biblical passages are considered relevant.54  Then 
Talmudic sources are consulted.55  Then one investigates the various passages in the 
codes of Jewish law.56  But the most interesting process to note is what happens when 
the rabbis reach the “precedent” stage.  While questions regarding the removal of life-
sustaining treatment are relatively new from the perspective of Jewish law, rabbinic 
authorities have been quick to respond to these challenges.  Regarding this issue, for 
example, the sources make three critical distinctions: (1) between initiating such 
treatment and removing it, (2) between the presence and absence of “independent 
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brain function or spontaneous cardio-respiratory activity,” and (3) between “hastening 
death” and “prolonging dying.”57  The point here is that as these specific cases 
developed in medicine, the authorities used the ancient texts and principles to decide 
the (im)permissibility of particular actions.  And while initially these decisions only 
applied to particular individuals in specific cases, as the issues became more common 
the appeals to these decisions became much more frequent.  So an initially narrowly-
applied decision ends up affecting many, many people. 
Of course, the group that is affected by these decisions will be limited to those 
who consult rabbis or various other Jewish authorities when such questions arise, or 
those who hear about them in some other way.  Yet not all of these individuals will 
consider such rulings in their decision-making process.  The group of those who do 
could be as wide as the entire Jewish community, and could be as narrow as a select 
handful of ultra-Orthodox groups within the larger community.  Rabbi Jakobovits, 
whose appeal is at least partly derived from the inclusiveness of his focus, states that 
the principles of Jewish medical ethics apply to all Jews.  As his son writes: “…he 
[Rabbi Jakobovits] does not distinguish between Orthodox and non-Orthodox.  All 
Jews have the obligation to accept, and become familiar with, our heritage.”58  All of 
the “pioneers” that Rosner mentions are Orthodox Jews, and one could argue that their 
responses are also intended for all Jews.  However, insofar as it is (most?) often 
                                                                                                                                            
56 Ibid., 206-208. 
57 Ibid., 209. 
58 Yoel Jakobovits, 136-137. 
  
  
33
Orthodox Jews who consult rabbinic authorities about such issues, one might argue 
that these rulings apply specifically to them.  By “Orthodox” here we refer to those 
both self and externally identified as strict adherents to the body of Jewish law.  In 
some senses, restricting the applicability of these responses to Orthodox Jews makes 
sense: only if one considers obeying Jewish law as morally required will one be 
motivated to act according to the decisions of religious authority. 
But limiting the scope of applicability in this way is problematic on a number 
of fronts.  First, there is the problem of theological justification.  The entire procedure 
previously described assumes that these particular individuals have an authority that 
others do not; that somehow these individuals are closer to the Truth than their less 
observant counterparts.  For when rabbis who are not Orthodox investigate these 
questions, there may be an entire additional body of precedent to which they will 
appeal on account of a different interpretation of textual sources, for example.  To 
privilege one set of responses over another is clearly a value judgment that 
presupposes other moral principles not overtly discussed. 
Second among the problems with the limitation of scope is the very confusion 
of the terms, particularly if we focus on American Jewry.  There are synagogues that 
belong to organizations of “Orthodox Congregations” and whose members are then 
labeled “Orthodox” Jews.  Then there are those who are members of what are often 
called “ultra-Orthodox” communities: the Lubavitcher Hasidim are an example of this.  
Add to this mix “Modern” Orthodoxy, which couples an awareness of secular progress 
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with adherence to this historic tradition.  Jack Wertheimer discusses this phenomenon 
in his book A People Divided.59  “…Orthodox Jews do not share a clearly articulated 
theology, let alone movement ideology.”60  Wertheimer quotes Charles Liebman, who 
categorizes Orthodox Jews a bit differently.  Liebman divides the group into the 
“uncommitted Orthodox,” the “modern Orthodox,” and the “sectarian Orthodox.”61  
As Wertheimer interprets this distinction: 
The first [uncommitted Orthodox] were East European 
immigrants who, out of inertia rather than religious 
choice, identified as Orthodox, or they were individuals 
who had no particular commitment to Jewish law but 
preferred to pray in an Orthodox synagogue.  The 
modern Orthodox ‘seek to demonstrate the viability of 
the halakha for contemporary life…[and also] 
emphasize what they have in common with all other 
Jews rather than what separates them.’  The sectarians 
are disciples of either roshei yeshiva (heads of yeshivas) 
or Hasidic rebbes, whose strategy it is to isolate their 
followers from non-Orthodox influences.62   
 
So exactly what we mean when we use the terms “Orthodox Jew” is contentious, to 
say the least.   
 Yet it is not clear that even if we could adequately define the terms that we 
would want to limit the application of responsa in this way.  In a footnote in his article 
on his father, Yoel Jakobovits discusses this very issue: “My father stresses his dislike 
of the term ‘Orthodox.’  There is only one body of Jewish law.  The different 
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‘branches’ within Judaism more properly classify Jews in accordance with their 
varying shades of belief in the enduring, binding character of the law and their 
differing degrees of fastidiousness in the application of its principles to the modern 
era.”63  In addition to recognizing the problem of the application of particular terms, 
Rabbi Jakobovits also seems to indicate another related issue: the implication of 
contemporary society.  As we see from Liebman’s classification, Orthodox Jews 
themselves differ on the role Judaism must play given the changing nature of modern 
life.  In fact, Wertheimer claims that within Orthodoxy itself, “ [t]he critical 
fissure…is between Orthodox Jews who accommodate to modernity and those who 
resist it.”64  If the Orthodox community, however we construe it, is internally divided 
to this degree, then the question of theological justification once again becomes 
relevant.  Certainly varying interpretations of sources will be affected by these various 
commitments to “modernity” as will the application of principles and precedent.  But 
it is not just in relation to modernity where we see the rabbis disagree.  As we will see 
when we get to the section on abortion in chapter three, there is a famous 
disagreement between two ancient sources, Rashi and Maimonides, regarding the 
status of the fetus in relation to the mother’s mental health.  Hence, there is evidence 
of internal dissent regarding the (im)permissibility of certain actions from Orthodox 
sources.  It seems reasonable, then, to take the process one step further and state that 
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different, but equally ethically permissible, decisions will be reached by those who 
have a different set of commitments outside of the Orthodox community – by Reform 
Jewish authorities, for example.  That is, decisions may be reached that coincide with 
the general rules and principles that are specified in Jewish law, and yet are applied 
differently to individual cases on account of additional commitments (or the absence 
of commitments): for example, out of commitment to personal autonomy, or a 
commitment to the “living nature” of the law.   
 Certainly this obscurity of terminology is not exclusive to the Orthodox Jewish 
community; all established “branches” of American Jewry will have similar 
identification problems.  Are Conservative Jews only those who currently belong to a 
synagogue which is affiliated with a Conservative Jewish organization and whose 
rabbi was ordained at the Jewish Theological Seminary?  What about those individuals 
who do not currently belong to any organized congregation but were raised according 
to traditionally Conservative precepts?  What about those who faithfully attended 
(Conservative) Camp Ramah every summer? 
 And while these questions clearly identify the problem of classification, they 
also indicate another interesting phenomenon.  We might call all of the 
aforementioned groups “religious” or “observant” in a particular way.  Certainly, 
parents to whom Judaism is important enough to dictate the summer camp choice for 
their children are “religious” in a sense of the word, just as are members of a 
Conservative synagogue.  After all, they chose to so affiliate and channel certain 
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resources in that way from among various other options.  Sending one’s children to 
Boy Scout camp, for example, indicates certain commitments on the part of the 
parents: they are committed to having their sons learn how to survive in the 
wilderness, for example, or to obey authority, or to get along with other children.  
Sending one’s children to a religiously-affiliated camp suggests that the parents are 
committed to exposing their children to particular religious activities or a way of life.  
Our choices do demonstrate commitments.  Granted, there are (perhaps many) 
members of synagogues who send their sons or daughters for Bar or Bat Mitzvah 
lessons and never step foot into the building again after the ceremony, but the fact that 
this rite of passage was a priority for them at all is significant.  
 When we change our focus to a medical context, this point becomes much 
clearer.  Often people “find” their religion during times of crisis, when their world has 
somehow been thrown off kilter and they need assistance in helping it to once again 
make sense.65  We see this in a medical context as much as in any other: families often 
consult clergy members when faced with a traumatic, end-of-life sort of issue like the 
one described with Sue’s family earlier in this chapter.  But the crisis need not involve 
death.   
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After all, clergy members regularly make rounds in hospitals to visit the sick, not just 
the dying.  This must be at least partly justified by the fact that people want them to be 
there.  After all, if everyone consistently reacted negatively to visits from these folks, 
the practice would have evolved differently.  (Perhaps they would only come when 
called by the patient or family, rather than visit people as a matter of routine.)  And it 
is not just the so-called “religious” individuals who welcome such visits.  Rather, 
given that the context of medicine and hospitals is so foreign to many people, finding 
reassurance from the familiar sources (whether it be familiar from my childhood or by 
virtue of being part of my parents’ narrative, for example) often serves an important 
role.  It is clear that some people – many of those who are very active in their 
synagogue’s religious life, for example – will likely welcome the advice of their rabbi 
on many matters, those medical included.  What is not clear is who else might 
welcome such advice.  Maybe a woman facing an end-of-life treatment decision for 
her husband who has not stepped foot in a Jewish building in 40 years would decide 
that she needs information from Jewish law to help her make her decision.  Even if 
this woman would not be particularly inclined to “follow orders” when she learns of 
what the tradition dictates, she still may include this information as a part of her 
mostly-independent decision-making.  Maybe a couple who is very active in the 
Jewish community will decide that in-vitro fertilization is the correct reproductive 
option for them, regardless of the tenets of Judaism. 
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 The overall point here is that limiting the scope of the applicability of responsa 
in Jewish medial ethics to Orthodox Jews is not only difficult, but is also ill-advised.  
Rather, by evaluating these decisions from a variety of perspectives we will be able to 
assess the impact of these decisions.  It is for this reason that in this project I will not 
limit my discussion to the Orthodox Jewish community, or in fact to any one 
“community” at all.  Rather, when discussing questions of Jewish medical ethics, I 
will include any individuals who would seek out the advice of Jewish sources (rabbis, 
texts, other authorities) when trying to make decisions in medical contexts.  This will 
most likely include individuals from all four recognized “branches” of Judaism – 
Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, Reconstructionist -- as well as many individuals 
who do not affiliate in this way at all (or who have multiple and sometimes conflicting 
affiliations).  For the sake of simplicity, I will call this collection of diverse individuals 
“committed Jews,” which signifies that all of these individuals have some sort of 
commitment to Judaism or Jewish law that will result in them searching out these 
sources for assistance in medical decision-making.  However, it is important to keep in 
mind that this group is heterogeneous, unified only by a commitment to some aspect 
of Judaism. 
 One might wonder, if this group is already so heterogeneous, why I do not 
include all Jews in my analysis, but instead limit the group under discussion.  In 
principle, I construe this group very broadly indeed.  And in principle, I suppose I 
could include all Jews in my analysis.  But it seems to me that the most interesting 
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cases will arise when we discover conflicts between halakha and medicine, and this is 
the focus of chapter five.  These conflicts may involve fundamental differences in 
goals or values or priorities among the medical/scientific community and what I am 
calling the “committed” Jewish community.  Or perhaps halakha dictates a course of 
action simply not recommended by medicine.  Regardless of the specifics, instances of 
conflict – both real and apparent – will be most interesting to analyze from this 
perspective.  My suspicion is that if we imposed no limitations on our group but 
instead included “all Jews,” we would not as readily identify these instances of 
conflict.  This is because the Jews who fall outside of the “committed” group by 
definition will not consult Jewish texts or authorities for guidance in instances of 
medical decision-making.  So they will either appeal to strictly secular considerations 
(admittedly, no small task) or will consult some other tradition or framework.  And 
since the focus of this project is to develop a framework for medical decision-making 
from a Jewish perspective, consideration of those who fall outside of the group will 
yield little of interest. 
 One final word is necessary regarding the large community on which we are 
limiting our focus.  The group of “committed” Jews is admittedly heterogeneous, and 
really quite diverse.  Because of its varied nature, one would naturally expect to 
uncover some (or maybe quite a lot of) disagreement within this group, in addition to 
outside of it.  That is, it is not just the medical establishment and Jewish law that may 
be at odds, but rather different Jewish frameworks may be at odds themselves. (E.g. 
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The Conservative Rabbinic Assembly may argue for the virtually blanket permission 
for abortion of a fetus carrying Tay-Sachs disease, while we may uncover the rejection 
of such permission by some Orthodox authorities.)  Hence, the impact of internal 
dissent of this group must be assessed. 
 While I grant that this point is significant, I will argue that there are two 
unifying factors that will help us to reconcile this disparity.  First is the point we have 
previously discussed in the form of this group’s definition: these diverse people are 
unified by their commitment, in whatever fashion that commitment manifests itself, to 
seeking guidance from Judaism and Jewish law when making decisions of a medical 
nature.  Granted, the answers may differ given the particular source or authority 
appealed to, but all will appeal nonetheless. 
 The second, and more fundamental, unifying feature of this group is the very 
process of decision making itself.  I will argue in this project that when we look at the 
way people actually make decisions in this community, we will see that it involves 
much more than an appeal to authority and an application of principles.  It also 
involves an actual consideration of context, of the real people who will be affected by 
these decisions, and of the relationships and lives that will be altered as a consequence 
of these actions.  Only by augmenting the traditional perspective with an ethic of care 
and responsibility will we take account of the richness of moral life and hence reach 
satisfactory conclusions regarding the ethical permissibility of genetic screening, 
testing, and therapy. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
GENETICS 
 
 
 In order to begin the discussion of augmenting the framework of Jewish 
bioethics with an ethic of care, it will be useful to discuss three specific diseases that 
have a genetic component and that are of particular interest for the Jewish community.  
All of these diseases have a prevalence that is higher in this group of people than it is 
in the general population, and for that reason these diseases will be relevant for an 
analysis of moral decision-making in this community.  All three of the diseases to be 
discussed, Tay-Sachs disease, breast cancer, and colorectal cancer, have the hallmarks 
of what are commonly referred to as “genetic” diseases, and yet the genetics behind 
each affliction are importantly different.  This difference in biology may lead the 
observant Jewish community to make different decisions regarding intervention and 
therapy.  And as the difference in biology also leads to different ethical concerns, 
ethical issues will be explored as well. 
Tay-Sachs Disease 
Descriptions of the Disease 
 Tay-Sachs disease (TSD) was first identified in 1881 by Warren Tay, an 
ophthalmologist who reported a “cherry-red spot” in the macula of the eye in a child 
who suffered from degeneration of the nervous system.  Six years later Bernard Sachs, 
a neurologist, described the clinical nature of the disease and its pathology. Sachs 
noted that the disease tended to run in families, and was characterized by rapid 
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neurological degeneration.  He initially called this disorder “amaurotic familial 
idiocy.” 66 It was later renamed “Tay-Sachs Disease” in honor of its discoverers.  
 TSD is an autosomal67 recessive disorder. This means that in order to be 
affected, an individual must possess two copies of the affected gene.  The only way 
that this can happen is if both of an individual’s parents donate his or her copy of the 
affected gene to the offspring.  This means that the parents of a child with TSD are 
carriers of the disease, since they each “carry” one copy of the mutation.  Such 
carriers, who have one mutated gene and one normal copy of the gene, are known as 
heterozygous for the allele in question.  Individuals who are homozygous for the 
allele, by contrast, carry two copies of the affected gene.  Hence, all children born with 
the trait are homozygous for the gene.  Every individual has 46 chromosomes, and on 
each chromosome are thousands and thousands of genes.  Half of these chromosomes, 
23, come from our mother, and the other half come from our father.  Our parents also 
have 46 chromosomes, or two copies of each.  Hence, there is a 50/50 chance that a 
carrier will pass the affected chromosome to her offspring (and a 50/50 chance that 
she will not).  If both parents are carriers, then, there is a 1/4 chance that the child will 
receive both affected copies of the gene.  Because the disease requires two copies of 
the affected gene, carriers are not clinically affected.  In fact, prior to the large-scale 
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44
screening programs instituted in the 1970s, many couples discovered their carrier 
status in reverse: they gave birth to a child afflicted with TSD, which meant that both 
parents must be carriers of the alleles. 
 Children with TSD appear normal for the first 4-6 months of their lives, after 
which time the neurologic degeneration becomes apparent.  The specific cause of this 
disorder is an absence of the enzyme Hexosaminidase A (Hex A).  The function of this 
enzyme is to break down GM2 gangliosides, a specific lipid, and in the enzyme’s 
absence this fatty material accumulates in the neurons to such a degree that life’s 
functions are impaired.  Specifically, children develop “…progressive mental and 
motor deterioration, blindness, paralysis, dementia, seizures and death” usually by 3-5 
years of age.68  There are many clinical variations of the disease, some of which will 
be discussed later in the chapter.  Typically, “[t]he severity of the disease…correlates 
with the level of residual Hex A,”69 and since Hex A is completely absent from 
individuals with the infantile form of TSD, the clinical manifestation is regularly 
severe.   There is no known therapy for this disease.  
 What makes this disorder particularly interesting for the Jewish community is 
the frequency of its occurrence.  “Approximately 1 in 3,600 Jewish children born is 
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afflicted with this condition as compared with 1 in 360,000 non-Jewish births.”70  
While less than 0.3% of the general population are carriers for TSD, 3% of the 
Ashkenazi71 Jewish population are carriers.  Hence, the disorder is 100 times more 
common in this population than in the international society-at-large. 
There are two rival (but not mutually exclusive) hypotheses as to how the 
frequency became so concentrated in this relatively small community.  The first 
hypothesis, advocated by Gary Chase and others, accounts for the frequency according 
to the founder effect and genetic drift.72  Because of certain religious prescriptions that 
require Jews to marry other Jews, and because of the geographical and social isolation 
(both from coerced and voluntary sources) of many subsets of this community, mating 
tended to occur within this population, making them a genetic isolate.  If the founder 
members of such a community had a genetic mutation, the frequency of these 
mutations would be higher than in the general population, where mating with non-
carriers allows for a decrease in the chance of passing along the mutant alleles.  This is 
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the founder effect; initial members of a community passing along a mutation to further 
generations by means of mating within a small, isolated population.  It is common for 
members of the observant Jewish community to have many children, and hence this 
also increases the likelihood that the founder mutation will be passed on to future 
generations.  Genetic drift refers to the actual frequency of the mutation in a 
population such as this small community, where the number of individuals who are 
carriers of this mutation will vary greatly from one generation to another.73   
Chase and others74 postulate that both the founder effect and genetic drift 
account for how the frequency of TSD became 100 times greater than that of the 
general population.  Founder members of the community had the mutant alleles for 
TSD, and their mating produced both homozygotes and heterozygotes for the disease.  
Interestingly, Chase claims that history may have been an unwitting accomplice to this 
increase in frequency: he believes that “…the parents of Tay-Sachs infants are in 
reality distant cousins whose ancestors have been separated by decades of 
unsystematic migration resulting from the many persecutions to which the Jewish 
people have unjustly fallen heir.”75  
Others claim that the high frequency of the mutant gene within this small 
population occurs because of a selective advantage for carriers of this trait.  
                                                 
73 Gelehrter, Collins, and Ginsburg, 47. 
74 See also GA Chase and VA McKusick, “Founder Effect in Tay-Sachs Disease,” 
American Journal of Human Genetics 24 (1972): 339-347. 
75 Chase, 108. 
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Myrianthopoulos and Melnick and others76 argue that heterozygotes for the mutation 
have an evolutionary advantage in a particular environment that non-carriers lack.  
Specifically, the authors argue that an increased resistance to tuberculosis is the 
benefit that carriers receive for their status.  As a result of this advantage, natural 
selection has selected “for” heterozygotes for TSD as those who are most fit to survive 
in that particular environment.  The authors utilize both scientific and historical 
evidence, where they elucidate the history of the Diaspora in order to account for this 
selective advantage.77,78 
While they are all associated with the same gene, a number of different 
mutations are responsible for the lack of effective Hex A; in effect, there are a variety 
of factors that lead to a similar outcome.  In the Ashkenazic Jewish population, three 
mutations account for 98% of all of the cases of TSD.79  Two of these are responsible 
for the disorder described above, which is also referred to as “infantile” TSD since 
infants are first affected with the disease.  The third mutation is responsible for an 
                                                 
76  See also Gloria M. Peterson et al, “The Tay-Sachs disease gene in North American 
Jewish Populations: Geographic Variations and Origin,” American Journal of Human 
Genetics 35 (1983): 1258-1269. 
77 Ntinos C. Myrianthopoulous and Michael Melnick, “Tay-Sachs Disease: A Genetic-
Historical View of Selective Advantage,” in Progress in Clinical and Biological 
Research, eds. George J. Brewer, Vincent P. Eijsvoogel, Robert Grover, Kurt 
Hirschhorn, Seymour S. Kety, Sidney Udenfriend, and Jonathan W. Uhr, vol. 18, Tay-
Sachs Disease: Screening and Prevention, ed. Michael M. Kaback (New York: Alan 
R. Liss, 1977), 95-106. 
78 Some dispute the claims of resistance to tuberculosis as the advantage, however.  
See Petersen et al., 1267. 
79 Gelehrter, Collins, and Ginsburg, 295. 
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adult-onset form of TSD, which is often simply referred to as GM2 gangliosidosis.80  
With adult-onset gangliosidosis (AOG), patients have the Hex A enzyme that is 
missing in the infantile form of TSD, but the Hex A they possess is defective.  Hence, 
the lipids gradually accumulate in the neurons over the course of the patient’s life and 
impair function much later than in the infantile form.  Often this disorder masks itself 
as clinical psychiatric disorders, as “…the clinical picture is diverse, with symptoms 
mimicking dementia, depression, mania, schizophrenia, paranoid, and anxiety 
states.”81   
What is interesting about this adult-onset form is that in all of the cases 
identified, the allele bearing the point mutation is found in the patient along with 
“…one of the two Ashkenazi infantile Tay-Sachs alleles.”82 Later studies that 
identified individuals not of Jewish origin with the adult-onset form of TSD also had 
some form of a mutation in the gene that codes for the enzyme.83 Hence, the adult-
onset alleles must work in combination with the others, and has led some study 
authors to conclude that “…the appearance of the adult disorder in Ashkenazi Jews is, 
                                                 
80 Barbara L. Triggs-Raine et al, “Screening for Carriers of Tay-Sachs Disease Among 
Ashkenazi Jews,” New England Journal of Medicine 323, no. 1 (July 5, 1990): 6. 
81 Diane Hamilton, “A Nursing Challenge: Adult-Onset Tay-Sachs Disease,” Archives 
of Psychiatric Nursing 5, no. 6 (December 1991): 383. 
82 Ruth Navon and Richard L. Proia, “The Mutations in Ashkenazi Jews with Adult 
GM2 Gangliosidosis, the Adult Form of Tay-Sachs Disease,” Science 243 (March 17, 
1989): 1473. 
83 Ruth Navon, Edwin H. Kolodny et al., “Ashkenazi-Jewish and Non-Jewish Adult 
GM2 Gangliosidosis Patients Share a Common Genetic Defect,” American Journal of 
Human Genetics 46 (1990): 817. 
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in large part, due to the high carrier frequency (1/30) of the infantile Tay-Sachs 
alleles.”84 
Screening Programs 
 Once scientists isolated the missing or defective Hex A as the cause of the 
various forms of Tay-Sachs disease85 physicians were able to offer screening for the 
disease to their patients.86  Two methods of testing are employed today.  
Serum testing is used for carrier screening in men and 
nonpregnant women.  Leukocyte HEX A testing must be used 
in pregnant women or in apparent serum-defined carriers who 
are taking oral contraceptives, are on unusual medications, or 
are suffering with a tissue destructive-disease [cancer, etc.] (as 
determined by a personalized questionnaire that is completed 
by each individual at the time of testing).87   
 
Leukocyte testing is more specific and hence is necessary for individuals who present 
with the aforementioned confounding factors.  Serum analysis is automated, while 
leukocyte testing must be done manually, making it more costly in terms of time and 
personnel.  Hence, leukocyte testing is performed only in the circumstances previously 
                                                 
84 Navon  and Proia, 1473. 
85 There is also a juvenile form of TSD that is characterized by a reduced amount of 
Hex A.  This form of the disease is not particularly prevalent in the observant Jewish 
community and accounts for fewer cases of the disease than the infantile form; hence 
it will not be discussed here. 
86 Carrier screening is almost exclusively limited to the infantile, or classic, form of 
TSD.   
87 Michael Kaback, Joyce Lim-Steele, Deepti Dabholkar, David Brown, Nancy Levy, 
and Karen Zeiger, “Tay-Sachs Disease – Carrier Screening, Prenatal Diagnosis, and 
the Molecular Era,” Journal of the American Medical Association 270, no. 19 
(November 17, 1993): 2307. 
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mentioned.  Screening is relatively inexpensive for patients ($20 - $75 according to 
1993 statistics)88, and hence financial hardship is rarely an impediment to testing.   
 As previously mentioned, prior to the 1970s, individuals learned of their carrier 
status through the birth of an affected child.  Once these screening procedures had 
been developed, however, researchers were able to institute large-scale screening 
programs.  This is important in order to accurately predict those who will be affected 
by TSD.  “Overall fewer than 20% of pregnancies at risk of important single gene 
disorders can be predicted on the basis of a positive family history….Hence selective 
testing of pregnancies on the basis of a positive family history, while of benefit to the 
families concerned, can never have a major impact on the birth frequency of these 
genetic conditions.”89  If the goal is to reduce the number of children born with this 
lethal condition, then mass screening must be implemented. 
The first such program occurred in the Baltimore/Washington D.C. area in 
1971, and with its success (defined in terms of the number of individuals screened and 
also by the number of Tay-Sachs affected children prevented from being born) came 
multiple copies of the program in other metropolitan areas.  The rationale for the 
screening programs included three major components.  First, the disease 
predominately affects individuals in a defined population.  This allows physicians and 
researchers to target the screening programs to those most at risk.  Second, there is a 
                                                 
88 Ibid. 
89 Darren Shickle and Ian Harvey, “’Inside-Out,’ Back-To-Front: A Model for Clinical 
Population Genetic Screening,” Journal of Medical Genetics 30 (1993): 580. 
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reliable, effective, and relatively inexpensive screening test available for the 
mutations.  Third, an alternative is available for those pregnant women whose fetus is 
found to be affected by TSD, namely, selective abortion.90  As long as these three 
factors are in place, genetic screening for TSD seems appropriate.  After all, “[a]t issue 
is not the saving of lives for the affected children, but the prevention of suffering for 
them and their families….This prevention of suffering must be considered, alongside 
the avoidance of uncertainty, as the cardinal benefit of Tay-Sachs screening.”91 
 While those three components may be necessary prior to the implementation of 
a screening program, the list is certainly not complete.  Other important elements are 
required in order for the program to be a success, and those elements are education 
and counseling.  Education is necessary in order to inform patients exactly what it is 
that they are being tested for and what the results of the test might show.  This is 
especially important when screening for a recessive trait, since the information gained 
from screening will have implications regarding future relationships.  Mating with 
another carrier brings with it the risk of affected offspring.  There is some evidence 
that misunderstandings prevail regarding carrier testing, such that some who have 
undergone genetic screening (and ostensibly were told that they were not carriers for 
                                                 
90 Peter Hechtman and Feige Kaplan, “Tay-Sachs Disease Screening and Diagnosis: 
Evolving Technologies,” DNA and Cell Biology 12, no. 8 (1993): 653. 
91 Madeline J. Goodman and Lenn E. Goodman, “The Overselling of Genetic 
Anxiety,” The Hastings Center Report (October 1992): 22. 
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gene X) were falsely reassured about their health.92  Screening for a particular genetic 
trait does NOT give information about one’s overall health; finding out that one is not 
a carrier for TSD does not imply that an individual is healthy or even is free from risk 
for other genetic diseases.93  In a related study, it was discovered that individuals tend 
to be overly optimistic regarding their risk of developing disease; “that is, they tend to 
think their own chances of experiencing health and safety problems are less than the 
chances of their peers.”94  
Misunderstandings work the other way, however, as well. In a volume edited 
by Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, a plethora of examples 
enumerate how judgments made under uncertain conditions vary greatly according to 
a wide variety of factors. The ways in which material is presented to an individual, the 
similarities and differences between the representative and the category, and the 
environment in which one is making the decision are all factors that influence an  
                                                 
92 T. Tymstra and B. Bielman, “The psychosocial impact of mass screening for 
cardiovascular risk factors,” Family Practice 4 (1987): 287-90. 
93 Since there may be additional genes associated with this disease that were not tested 
for – presumably because we are currently unaware of them or because tests have not 
yet been developed – this also does not guarantee that the individual is free from this 
genetic disease. I am grateful to Glenn Graber for pointing out this complication to 
me. 
94 Neil D. Weinstein, “Why It Won’t Happen to Me: Perceptions of Risk Factors and 
Susceptibility,” Health Psychology 3, no. 5 (1984): 432-3. 
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individual’s perception of risk, in addition to many, many other factors. 95 Proper  
education can help to alleviate these types of misunderstandings. 
 Because the information gathered from such testing may be psychologically 
burdensome, appropriate counseling measures must also be in place to ensure a quality 
program.  There is some evidence to suggest that health screening can actually damage 
one’s health in terms of psychological distress and subsequent behavior.96 Consider 
how much greater the distress must be to discover that one is carrying a child afflicted 
with TSD.  Even if selective abortion is an option for the couple (and it is not for 
everyone, a point to be discussed at length in the next chapter), the psychological 
strain of such a decision can be immense.  As Goodman and Goodman point out, once 
a couple discovers it has conceived an affected child, what the parents have to 
confront “…is not the choice between life and death for that fetus, but a choice 
between prenatal death and a lingering and painful death in early childhood after the 
rudiments of personality have begun to emerge.”97  When that knowledge is coupled 
with the fact that any future pregnancy the couple has is also at 25% risk for TSD, the 
need for counseling becomes apparent. 
                                                 
95 Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); see also Debra 
G. Froberg and Robert L. Kane, “Methodology for Measuring Health-State 
Preferences – I: Measurement Strategies,” Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 42, no. 4 
(1989): 345-354. 
96 Howard G. Stoate, “Can Health Screening Damage Your Health?” Journal of the 
Royal College of General Practitioners 39 (1989): 193. 
97 Goodman and Goodman, 21-22. 
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 For those who are not currently pregnant, information that one is a carrier for 
TSD can become burdensome as well.  This information may restrict one’s marriage 
and/or mating choice.  It may also put someone in the position of urging a significant 
other to undergo testing in an already tense situation.  Authors of one early study of a 
screening program noted that screening may have another unanticipated effect.98  
When interviewed prior to screening, only 2 out of 21 couples99 interviewed stated 
that they already had all of the children they wanted.  Yet after discovering their 
carrier status, only 2 out of the remaining 19 couples have attempted subsequent 
pregnancies.  Many possible explanations may be offered for this phenomenon,100 but 
the authors themselves are “disconcerted” by these results and acknowledge that 
“[p]erhaps the anxieties created by carrier screening are greater than we realize.”101  
Hence, the knowledge that one is a carrier is not psychologically neutral and thus 
requires the availability of counseling services.   
                                                 
98 J. Alexander Lowden and John Davidson, “Tay-Sachs Screening and Prevention: 
The Canadian Experience,” Progress in Clinical and Biological Research, eds. George 
J. Brewer, Vincent P. Eijsvoogel, Robert Grover, Kurt Hirschhorn, Seymour S. Kety, 
Sidney Udenfriend, and Jonathan W. Uhr, vol. 18, Tay-Sachs Disease: Screening and 
Prevention, ed. Michael M. Kaback (New York: Alan R. Liss, 1977). 
99 The twenty-one couples here refer to those that were identified as carriers from 10, 
567 individuals initially tested. (Lowden and Davidson, 43.) Hence, this is a 
retrospective analysis. 
100 The authors of this article, in fact, offered few explanations; they did not present 
the data regarding whether or not the non-carriers had initially stated that they wanted 
more children, nor did they present the data regarding how many more children the 
non-carriers did, in fact, have. However, my point in mentioning this study was to 
demonstrate that screening may have adverse affects on people’s subsequent behavior, 
and the point stands regardless of lack of the aforementioned data. 
101 Lowden and Davidson, 45. 
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 Misunderstandings can occur here as well. The heterozygous state of TSD 
apparently has no ill-affects on an individual’s health.  Yet there is some evidence that 
patients who discover that they are carriers for a particular trait suffer negative effects 
as a result of screening. One study demonstrated that individuals who discovered their 
carrier status through screening were more worried about their future health than the 
non-carrier and control groups.102  Perhaps this increased concern is justified, since 
this knowledge may have an impact on intimate choices that these patients will make. 
On the other hand, this worry may result because “…these carriers (erroneously) 
consider that their future health will be jeopardised by the presence of an abnormal 
gene.”103 Regardless, recognizing the psychological or social aspects of screening is 
imperative for a successful program. 
 The delivery of such information must be carefully orchestrated as well.  There 
is some indication that compliance with screening is much higher if an advocate takes 
an active role, specifically a physician.104 Perhaps this increased compliance reflects a 
certain level of confidence in the medical establishment, so that if one’s personal 
physician recommends screening, it takes on a different importance than if one simply 
reads about the program in the newspaper or is contacted by a social worker from a 
local organization.  Furthermore, it seems that the better that individuals understand 
the issues of heredity and genetics as they relate to their health and risk for TSD, the 
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more likely it is that the patients will comply with screening.  Hence, having an 
individual capable of delivering this sometimes complicated information to the patient 
is crucial for increasing the likelihood that she will be tested. 
This is not to suggest, of course, that physicians are the only individuals 
capable of delivering such information: genetic counselors do so on a regular basis.  
And in this particular case, one might make the argument that involving specific 
members of the community would greatly increase participation in screening.  Since 
this disease primarily affects Ashkenazic Jews, involving the Jewish community 
would seem to reaffirm the importance of screening for this population.  One study 
suggests that premarital counseling by rabbis is the ideal setting for discussing Tay-
Sachs screening, as that is a point in a couple’s relationship when knowledge of carrier 
status could indeed determine procreation plans.105 Furthermore, both parties are 
presumably of an age and/or maturity level when considering marriage to allow for 
greater understanding of the results of screening.  Screening programs that directly 
targeted a younger clientele – specifically high school students – have been criticized 
for a failure to recognize this problem of an inability to understand the test results and 
put their risk in perspective. Increasing the involvement and education of the 
community will help to ensure a successful program. 
                                                                                                                                            
104 Lowden and Davidson, 39-40. 
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It is also noteworthy that this screening program is taking place within the 
Jewish community, a community often marked by persecution and suspicion.  Too 
often in the history of the Jewish people had edicts been imposed from without for the 
“benefit” of the members of this group, and instances of medical “interventions” 
generated externally from the community are particularly sinister.  Nazi 
experimentations come to mind here, as do the overall attitudes of the Third Reich, 
where the goal of creating a genetically superior race required the elimination of the 
genetically “inferior.”106  These attempts singled out the Jews as a distinct group, and 
often it was their difference alone that “justified” the special treatment.  It makes 
sense, then, that this particular group of people would be suspicious of any attempt to 
classify them that is explicitly directed at their difference; and in the case of TSD, they 
are the targets of screening precisely because they are Ashkenazi Jews.   
In order for this screening program to be successful, then, the impetus had to 
come from within the community.  In order to do this, the program coordinators made 
contacts with the rabbinate in the particular communities, as well as enlisting the aid 
of lay volunteers from within the community.  Since “…the entire success of 
screening programs is predicated on, and directly proportionate to, the in-depth  
                                                 
106 See Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics (New York: Knopf, 1985), 74-75, 
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education of the medical profession, the rabbinate, and the lay community,”107 
ensuring that such education occurred with these various groups was essential.  From 
the very first pilot screening program in the Baltimore/Washington D.C. area, where 
1800 people were voluntarily tested, to the greater-than 700,000 people that have since 
been tested, involvement of the community was key for recruitment, education, and 
counseling services.  These features account for the judgment of many that the mass 
screening programs that occur(ed) within the Jewish community constitute a “model” 
screening program. 
This can be contrasted with a much less successful program that was instituted 
in the African-American community in America in the early 1970s.  Sickle-cell 
anemia, another recessive disease, affects predominantly those of African and 
European-Mediterranean descent.  Unlike the controversy surrounding the reason for 
the preponderance of carriers of TSD in the Jewish community, there is agreement as 
to the cause of the high frequency of the mutation here: having one copy of the sickle-
cell gene, or being a carrier for sickle-cell anemia, confers a specific advantage: 
resistance to malaria. Given the geographical history of carriers of this disease, one 
can easily see how being a heterozygote for this mutation would be an evolutionary 
advantage and hence selected “for.”  Of course, with advances in medical technology 
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for the prevention and treatment of malaria, it can be argued that this advantage is now 
evolutionarily and practically unnecessary.  But with the expensive nature of medical 
care and the lack of attention that much of the developing world receives in terms of 
health care, even in the 21st century such an evolutionary advantage may prove useful. 
Around the same time that Tay-Sachs screening programs were being 
instituted in the United States, the government began to take action against sickle-cell 
disease.  In 1972 the Legislature passed the Sickle-Cell Anemia Control Act which 
allocated funds to ensure the “’establishment and operation of voluntary sickle cell 
anemia screening and counseling programs’ and to ‘develop information and 
educational materials relating to sickle cell anemia and to disseminate such 
information and materials to persons providing health care and to the public 
generally.’”108  The problem came with the implementation of such programs.  States 
enacted their own sickle-cell screening programs, but without the community 
involvement, educational, or counseling services promised.  As one writer put it, 
“[t]his wasn’t something a community was doing to help itself; this was a 
congressional program to control a disease in an already burdened community.”109 
Two points are significant here regarding the comparison of the two screening 
programs.  One is the difference between sickle-cell anemia and TSD.  Possessing two 
copies of the Tay-Sachs mutation means certain death at a very young age for the 
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unfortunate bearer. The same cannot be said for sickle-cell anemia.  The mutation in 
this case causes red blood cells to be shaped like a sickle, which are then more likely 
to clog capillaries and cause oxygen deprivation to the affected area.  This effect 
happens sporadically in what are known as “sickle-cell crises,” which occur with little 
warning and in different degrees for different individuals.  Hence, the fate of one 
afflicted with sickle-cell anemia is by no means assured.  Individuals with the sickle-
cell trait can lead full, productive lives, unlike with TSD.  So the goal of the 
government is in some ways quite curious here: “controlling” a disease that is less 
virulent and less deadly than many other afflictions. 
This relates to the second significant point, which is that in the United States, 
sickle-cell anemia predominantly affects the black population.  Hence, “control” of a 
disease takes on a sinister connotation, as a group already discriminated against 
becomes the target of a governmental program.  It is worth remembering that the now 
notorious Tuskeegee syphilis study had only recently been stopped at the time of the 
start of these programs, so the African-American community had good reason to be 
suspicious of the American medical institution.110  Because of poor educational 
strategies, there was a widespread misunderstanding that being a carrier of sickle-cell 
anemia, known as having sickle-cell trait, was also detrimental to one’s health, which 
is not at all clear.  And as the psychological effects of screening are as important as the 
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physical effects (what we are to do with the knowledge that we have gained, what sort 
of burden we have by virtue of being carriers, etc.) a lack of available counseling 
services is problematic, to say the least.  Whereas Tay-Sachs screening involved the 
community, sickle-cell screening was imposed on the community.  Given the poor 
way in which this program was handled, it is not surprising that the public reacted so 
negatively.  It was not long before insurance companies began canceling policies or 
raising premiums for those who were sickle-cell carriers, and the U.S. Air Force 
excluded carriers from consideration as airlines fired or grounded carriers across the 
board.111 
Given all of this, it is understandable why some argue that concern over the 
degree to which particular groups are targeted for genetic screening is justifiable.  In 
“The Overselling of Genetic Anxiety,” Madeline Goodman and Lenn Goodman are 
critical of the educational interventions offered to the Jewish population, charging that 
even those messages that originate within the community have an element of 
manipulation or coercion.112  Some of the educational innovations in question played 
on the fears and anxieties of the population in order to “guilt them” into screening, 
emphasizing the genetic nature of the disease and that there is no hope for success in 
treatment; only prevention of this dreadful disease is possible by avoiding births of 
homozygotes.  Goodman and Goodman are also critical of the appeal to community 
members in the educational process.  While it is true that such intervention may be 
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more effective coming from those sources on whom individuals have relied, it is 
precisely this relationship that calls the ethics into question.  Who am I to disagree 
with screening if my rabbi thinks it’s a good idea?  Hence, the utilization of 
community resources themselves may be implicitly coercive.  Finally, Goodman and 
Goodman address the issue of stigmatization, where even though the scientific data 
attest to the fact that carriers of TSD are not in ill health and present little “danger” to 
others, the reputation that this is a “Jewish” disease or is limited to this often-derided 
community can serve as a psychological stigma.  This stigma can apply both within 
the community and outside: within the community in terms of finding marriage 
partners once carrier status is known, and from outside of the community lies the 
“…problem of apparent scientific confirmation to age-old prejudices about racial 
debility, clannishness, and the like.”113   
One subset of this community, however, has solved the problem of the internal 
stigma by initiating a screening program that keeps the identity of the carriers a 
secret.114  Rabbi Josef Eckstein began a Tay-Sachs screening program in his ultra-
Orthodox Jewish community in Williamsburg, New York.  The program is called Dor 
Yeshorim, from a phrase in the Talmud meaning “generation of the upright.”  Eckstein 
himself watched four of his eleven children die from Tay-Sachs disease, and both as a 
way to deal with his own grief as well as to prevent other parents from suffering a 
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similar fate, Eckstein rose to the challenge of prevention.  It is important not to 
underestimate the power of the stigma within this community.  Having a child with 
TSD would “taint a family like a curse” such that it would be almost impossible to 
find matches for siblings of TSD children.  It was so bad that “some families hid Tay-
Sachs kids in Catholic hospitals before they died so that none of the Jews would learn 
about it.”115  So Eckstein’s chief dilemma was “How do we prevent children with Tay-
Sachs without causing the stigma?”116  It took many years to develop, but the result of 
Eckstein’s efforts was that every senior in high school in Orthodox Jewish schools 
gets a blood test to screen for the Tay-Sachs mutation.  Each sample is identified by a 
six-digit number.   In this community, a matchmaker still arranges the marriages of 
eligible individuals, so when a match is proposed, the matchmaker submits the names 
to those who safeguard Eckstein’s databank.  If the proposed match is between two 
carriers, the matchmaker is told that the match is unacceptable.  To further preserve 
confidentiality, the matchmaker is likely to offer another reason why the match is  
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unacceptable.  Hence, the individuals will likely never know that they are carriers.117  
Dor Yeshorim now processes tests not just from New York high schoolers, but from 
people all over the world; they have offices in New York and Jerusalem, and work 
with laboratories and volunteers in England, Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, and all 
across the U.S. and Israel.  Over 50,000 people have been tested to date, and Eckstein 
has reduced the incidence of Tay-Sachs disease in his community to zero.118 
 It is clearly the availability of the matchmaking framework that permits the 
achievement of such a dramatic decline in the incidence of TSD.  Yet the world-wide 
mass screening programs that have occurred in other Jewish communities have also 
been successful in terms of a substantial decrease in incidence of the disease.  Recall 
that the frequency of the Tay-Sachs mutation in the Ashkenazi Jewish population is 
1/30, as compared to 1/300 in the general population.  Prior to 1970 (and hence prior 
to mass screening programs) approximately 60 new cases a year of TSD were 
diagnosed.  In the United States and Canada “[s]ince 1983, when only two new cases 
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were diagnosed, the annual number of newly diagnosed infants in the Jewish 
population has remained at around three to five cases per year.  This represents a 
greater than 90% reduction…” in the number of Tay-Sachs-affected babies born.119  
Since prenatal diagnosis has been available, statistics show that between 1969 and 
1992, prenatal detection prevented nearly 500 births of Tay-Sachs afflicted children. 
Organizers want to emphasize, however, that “the TSD carrier screening experience is 
mostly about the birth of nearly 2000 healthy infants”120 that might otherwise never 
have been born had their parents feared the birth of a(nother) Tay-Sachs afflicted 
infant. 
Ethical Issues 
 Typically, preventing the birth of Tay-Sachs affected babies means one of two 
things: preventing the carriers from mating in the first place, as is attempted by Dor 
Yeshorim’s program, or prenatal detection and subsequent abortion of affected 
fetuses.  Hence, the (im)permissibility of abortion is a crucial part of the debate 
surrounding Tay-Sachs disease.  Aside from religious prohibitions on abortion (which 
will be discussed in the next chapter), individual assessments regarding the 
permissibility of abortion of affected fetuses plays a large role in determining the 
morally right course of action.  If abortion is not an option for a woman, for personal 
or religious reasons, then one may question the wisdom of prenatal screening in the 
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first place.  This problem is not unique to screening for TSD, however.  When 
questioned about the “routine” triple screen that is performed on pregnant women for 
the purpose of detecting three particular genetic diseases (Down’s Syndrome, Open 
Neural Tube Defect, Trisomy 18), many obstetricians say that they require their 
patients to have the procedure performed even if the patients refuse to be informed of 
their results.  This is because the outcome of the screening changes the way that the 
physician in question cares for her patient, either during the course of the pregnancy or 
in terms of having the appropriate specialists at the delivery of the child.  The same 
argument does not apply here, as the outcome of the results of Tay-Sachs screening 
have few clinical implications for obstetricians.  There is currently no way to replace 
the deficient enzyme in these children or to compensate for the degenerative effects, 
so the knowledge of having a Tay-Sachs affected patient requires little intervention 
from obstetricians. 
 That is not to say, however, that such knowledge is useless.  As with many 
other conditions for which no cure exists, information that helps parents to plan for a 
special needs child is valuable.  There may be physical, financial, emotional, and 
psychological considerations that parents need to prepare for prior to the birth of such 
a child.   
 With TSD, however, such information often stands as more of a burden than a 
benefit.  With the knowledge that one’s child will have an inevitably fatal disease and 
with a lack of any means by which to prevent such an end, such information can be 
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psychologically and emotionally devastating for patients. Knowledge that the child for 
whom there were so many hopes and dreams would be permanently impaired not only 
affects the future of this family but also, in the words of Barbara Katz Rothman, 
“spoils the pregnancy.”  By informing the woman of the disaster waiting to befall her 
yet-unborn child, physicians have robbed her of an important part of the motherhood 
experience: enjoyment of the pregnancy itself.  For something for which there is no 
cure nor hope, then, Rothman argues that women (and, by analogy, couples) are better 
off not having this information so that at least this part of the parenting experience can 
be preserved.121 
 It must also be remembered that even if both members of a couple are carriers 
of TSD, there is only a ¼ chance that each pregnancy will result in a child who has 
TSD.  So while this number may be alarmingly high to some, for others the risk is low 
enough to allow them to feel comfortable “playing the odds” and concentrating on the 
75% likelihood that a resultant child will be free from this dreadful affliction.  It is 
noteworthy that in this particular community, having a family is religiously important 
in addition to being socially and traditionally valuable, and hence these obligations 
may override any personal feelings about the risk to individual couples. 
Alternative forms of reproduction are now available for those couples who 
discover that they are both Tay-Sachs carriers and do not want to risk the chance of 
conceiving a child with TSD.  The husband’s sperm can be replaced with the sperm of 
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a donor (screened for TSD and many other genetic diseases prior to acceptance) and 
inseminated into the woman.  That way, the resultant child will not be a victim of 
TSD, and yet will be biologically related to at least one of the parents raising her.  If 
biological parentage is crucial for both members of the couple, then in-vitro 
fertilization (IVF) may be a better option.  This technology allows technicians to 
combine the eggs and sperm in a petri dish in a laboratory.  Once the fertilized egg has 
divided several times, the zygote is then implanted in the woman.  Before 
implantation, it is possible to test the embryos for TSD and subsequently only implant 
those embryos that are not homozygous for the disease. There is usually a greater 
likelihood of multiple pregnancies with this technique, as multiple embryos are often 
implanted at once in order to increase the chances that at least one of them will 
properly implant in the uterus and develop.  But many view this as a reasonable risk in 
exchange for the huge psychological burden that is lifted from those who felt they 
were doomed to have a very sick child. 
It is important to note, however, that while the new reproductive technologies 
do offer hope for many individuals, this hope does not come without its price.  IVF is 
particularly expensive and usually not covered by medical insurance, running at 
approximately $10,000-$15,000 per attempt.  This alone puts this technology out of 
the reach of many who might otherwise utilize this service.  So what may be an option 
for some is made impossible by financial considerations for others. 
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This psychological burden would also hold true for those who discovered they 
would fall victim to the fate of adult-onset TSD, with its accompanying mental and 
physical degeneration.  In this respect, many of the ethical issues are similar to those 
faced by victims of Huntington’s Disease (HD), also a genetic disorder which does not 
affect its victims until later in life.  Many who have HD lead productive and 
meaningful lives until the onset of the disease’s effects.  There is now a genetic test to 
detect HD, but interestingly, many who are at risk (as determined largely by family 
history) have opted not to be tested on account of the psychological burden that may 
result from doing so.  True, it might work the other way as well: individuals who 
presumed they were at risk may learn from genetic screening that they are not in fact 
carriers of the trait.122  Yet the certainty of knowing that one will develop a disease for 
which there is no treatment or cure may be devastating enough to significantly 
outweigh any benefit received were the data to come back with the opposite findings.  
What is important for the decision-making process is the likelihood of each outcome 
and the individual’s assessment of its value or disvalue.123  One can make the same 
case for adult-onset TSD: finding out that you are going to develop an irreversible and 
degenerative disorder may outweigh any considerations to the contrary.  The benefit of 
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123 For a more detailed discussion of decision analysis in relation to medical decisions 
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testing lies in either prevention or preparation.  Preventing carriers of HD from 
reproducing (where offspring have a ½ chance of having HD) or from doing so in the 
conventional way is one goal of testing. Another important goal is simply gaining 
information from the test so that individuals, for example, do not postpone important 
projects in their lives. 
Furthermore, there is some question as to the wisdom in pursuing measures 
whose purpose is to completely eradicate a genetic trait from the population.  With the 
example of sickle-cell disease, where there is a clear advantage to being a 
heterozygote, and where the majority of the population affected by this trait may still 
benefit from it, preventing the continuation of this trait has a disadvantageous effect as 
well.  So if the government’s plan to “control” sickle-cell anemia had worked ideally, 
the trait – and its accompanying advantage – would have disappeared completely from 
the population.  While the heterozygotic advantage is not quite as clear in the case of 
TSD, it is still significant that some advantage may be conferred on carriers such that 
eradication of the trait is not desirable. It is still a fact that even as quickly as the 
human genome project is progressing, there are still many things that are left to be 
discovered.  Eradicating one trait, such as a mutation responsible for TSD, by germ-
line gene therapy, for instance, may in turn have some disastrous effect on some other 
part of an individual’s physiology.  We do not currently have the scientific knowledge 
to assure us that this would not happen.  Until our technical knowledge progresses to 
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the point where we more fully understand the risks involved to both physical and 
emotional health, we ought to be cautious in our adoption of various interventions.   
Part of that caution should be suggested from history.  One author wonders 
“…why, after the ‘eugenic’ programs of the Nazi state, post-war Jewish communities 
would be interested in even considering participation in a program which would 
identify what some would have called a ‘race-based’ genetic ‘defect’ present among 
Eastern European Jews.”124  While Edelson here makes a similar point to that of 
Goodman and Goodman discussed earlier, his mention of eugenics is worth pointing 
out.  While some make a distinction between “positive” eugenics as the project of 
increasing the number of favorable genes and “negative” eugenics as the attempt to 
decrease the number of harmful genes125, others conflate the two programs and 
condemn all such attempts as unethical.  While it is not clear that charges that with 
screening procedures we are attempting to “play God” or “interfere with nature” hold 
for this community, it is worthwhile to take a few steps back to analyze proposed 
policies and procedures prior to implementation to ensure that they are more beneficial 
than harmful for all those in question. 
Part of doing just that involves the development of a cost/benefit analysis of 
screening.  Factored into such an analysis must be the financial burden of instituting 
                                                 
124 Paul J. Edelson, “The Tay-Sachs Disease Screening Program in the U.S. as a 
Model for the Control of Genetic Disease: An Historical Overview,” Health Matrix 7, 
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mass screening programs as compared to the cost of caring for Tay-Sachs affected 
children that would otherwise have been born.  Previous analyses have indicated that 
the cost of caring for children with TSD far outweighs the financial considerations 
imposed by mass screening programs.126  The problem with these analyses is that the 
authors fail to consider professional salaries and volunteer efforts in their figures.127  
While these services were donated at the time of initial screening, it is unreasonable to 
assume that they (or others) would continue to do so in perpetuity.  Furthermore, many 
critics point out that the particular community in question is unique in its education 
level and its fortune, so that many individuals (mostly women) had the luxury of being 
able to volunteer their time.  When viewing the TSD screening program as a “model,” 
one must be aware that this is not a feature easily exportable to other communities.  
Hence, when assessing the financial considerations of a screening program, volunteer 
efforts and professional salaries must be included. 
More alarming than this omission, however, is Kaback et al.’s failure to 
include the costs for counseling and/or psychological facilities in their analysis.128  As 
previously discussed, such services are essential to a screening program and must be 
                                                                                                                                            
125 Daniel J. Kevles, “Out of Eugenics: The Historical Politics of the Human 
Genome,” in The Code of Codes, eds. Daniel J. Kevles and LeRoy Hood (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), 9-10. 
126 Michael Ruse, “Genetics and the Quality of Life,” Social Indicators Research 7 
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included.  As these services in particular typically carry with them high fees, their 
omission in a cost/benefit analysis is suspect to say the least. 
That is not to say, however, that Kaback et al. are completely misguided in 
their investigations.  In fact, they are likely correct that it is economically more sound 
to engage in screening programs than to pay for the care of babies with TSD.  My 
point is only that one needs to be cautious when evaluating such economic analyses. 
Another potential cost of screening relates to insurance.  While the federal 
government has instituted certain regulations to prevent insurance companies from 
discriminating against those with disabilities of various kinds, it is not at all clear how 
far such regulation extends.  If the sickle-cell screening program is any indication for 
how the public reacts to discovering carriers – by denying employment in certain 
fields and canceling insurance plans – then this must also be factored in as another 
cost of screening. (This point will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.) 
Hence, while engineers of the TSD screening programs were pioneers in 
detecting genetic disease of a particular community, the programs were not 
unproblematic.  Careful consideration must be given to the ethical dimensions of the 
program so that mistakes are not repeated. 
Breast Cancer 
 There are many forms of breast cancer, just as there are multiple forms of 
TSD.  However, all of the forms of TSD are associated with the same gene, albeit with 
mutation in different regions of that gene; the result is that a necessary enzyme is 
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either not produced, is produced in a diminished form, or is defective.  The same is not 
true of breast cancer.  The majority of cases of breast cancer are associated with 
sporadic mutations, rather than due to a mutation or series of mutations being passed 
down through families.  In fact, only 5%-10% of breast cancers are “considered due to 
an inherited predisposition.”129  Of that 5%-10%, “[g]ermline130 mutations in the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes are thought to account for most of familial breast-ovarian 
and breast cancer.”131   
 So why the fuss over the genes associated with breast cancer?  According to 
some estimates, “[t]he lifetime risk of breast cancer may approach 80%-90% in 
women who have germline mutations of either…BRCA1 or BRCA2.”132  Hence, for 
those unfortunate women who have this genetic predisposition, their chances of 
getting breast cancer are high indeed.  To make matters worse, the frequency in 
mutations of these two genes in the Ashkenazi Jewish population – the same 
population with a high frequency of mutations responsible for TSD – is also high here: 
around 2%-2.5%.  There are over 100 different BRCA1 mutations that have been 
identified, but three specific mutations have are the most prevalent in the Ashkenazi 
                                                 
129  Ephrat Levy-Lahad et al, “Founder BRCA1 and BRCA2 Mutations in Ashkenazi 
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community community, with mutations in BRCA1 accounting for 45% of familial 
breast cancer and 90% of familial breast-ovarian cancer.133  “[T]he risk of breast 
cancer among carriers of one of the three mutations is 33 percent by the age of 50 and 
56 percent by the age of 70.”134  Thus, the “breast cancer genes,” as they are called, 
are of specific concern to this community. 
 Scientists account for the prevalence of the mutations in this community again 
according to the founder effect: a small group of “founder” individuals in the 
community passed down the mutations through marriages and reproduction within this 
tight-knit community to future generations.  Specifically, some trace this founder 
population back to the “Jewish Pale of Settlement” in the western part of Lithuania 
and Poland.135 This founder population is combined with three additional elements 
that contribute to the founder effect: (1) drastic changes in population over the history 
of the Diaspora, (2) a complex and rapidly changing demographic history, and (3) a 
commitment to marriage within the group.136 
 Interestingly, the most common mutation in the breast cancer gene, 185delAG, 
is also prevalent among Iraqi Jews.  What is interesting about this is that Iraqi Jews are 
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not of Ashkenazi descent, but are rather Sephardic in origin.  Since the “Iraqi Jewish 
community is thought to be the oldest Jewish community living outside Israel (since 
the Babylon exile in 586 B.C.)” some have suggested that “the presence of an 
Ashkenazi mutation among Iraqi Jews indicates that the age of the mutation is > 2,500 
years.”137 The supposition is that since the Babylonian Jewish community was the 
“main cultural Jewish center until the 11th century,” close contact with other Jewish 
communities transferred the mutation from individuals of Ashkenazi descent to 
members of the Babylonian community, or vice versa.138 Thus, the founder effect is 
still a reasonable explanation for these empirical findings.     
 What is particularly interesting about this prevalence data is what it really 
means for individuals in this community.  The breast cancer mutations are importantly 
different from the mutations that cause TSD.  Mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2 
confer on its bearers a susceptibility to developing breast cancer.  There is no way to 
determine whether or not individuals will in fact develop breast cancer.  And given the 
importance of environmental factors and gene-gene interactions (both of which will be 
discussed later), the predictive value of having the mutation is even more uncertain.  
The knowledge that one has mutations in one of the genes associated with breast 
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cancer offers probabilistic information at best: it is likely that one will develop breast 
cancer, but not certain.   
 Similarly, as only 5%-10% of breast cancers are considered to be on account of 
inherited predispositions, knowledge that one does not have mutations in the breast 
cancer genes does not guarantee freedom from developing breast cancer.  In fact, since 
one in nine (perhaps one in eight, according to some estimates) women can expect to 
develop breast cancer over the course of their lifetimes, vigilance in screening for 
signs of this disease is recommended, genetics notwithstanding.  
Screening 
 Given this information, then, there is reason to be cautious when 
recommending genetic screening for such a predisposition.  There are three categories 
of concern with regard to BRCA1 and BRCA2: scientific questions, economic and 
efficiency questions, and general ethical questions. 
1.  Science 
 Scientifically, the genetic contribution to breast cancer is complex.  As over 
100 mutations have been identified in BRCA1 alone, screening for all of these 
mutations would be unreasonable given current technology.  But given that three 
prominent mutations are responsible for the majority of cases of familial breast cancer 
in Ashkenazi Jews, and that “[u]p to 40% of all Ashkenazi Jewish breast cancer 
patients aged < 50 years could…be carriers of either of the…mutations,” broad 
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screening seems justified.139  However, it isn’t that simple.  It is not enough to 
determine that someone has a particular genetic mutation, as not all mutations become 
expressed as disease in the same way or with the same frequency.  Some of the 
mutations responsible for breast cancer, like 185delAT, frequently get expressed as 
breast cancer; that is, having this in one’s genome often results in the phenotypic 
expression of breast cancer.  Yet, through mechanisms that are not yet fully clear, 
other mutations, like 6174delT, get expressed as breast cancer much more infrequently 
than other mutations.  In fact, 6174delT gets expressed as breast cancer approximately 
only 25%-30% as often as does 185delAG.  This phenomenon, referred to as 
penetrance, is an important factor when considering large-scale screening programs.  
Since the mutation 6174delT is only expressed as disease 25%-30% as often as 
185delAG,140 possessing this trait presents less of a risk to carriers than a trait of 
higher penetrance.   
Furthermore, the likelihood that a woman’s cancer has a genetic component 
depends on an additional element: the patient’s age.  In general, “1.7% of all breast 
cancer cases diagnosed below age 70 years are due to BRCA1,” but the percentage 
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rises to 5.3% for those diagnosed below age 40 and 7.5% below age 30.141  The 
numbers climb when applied to specific mutations: the 185delAG mutation in BRCA1 
accounts for “16% of breast cancer and 39% of ovarian cancer diagnosed before age 
50 in Ashkenazi Jewish women.”142  In fact, “[o]ne in five Jewish women with breast 
cancer at <40 years of age has been found to carry a germ-line 185delAG 
mutation.”143 Hence, while it does seem clear that women who are carriers of the 
185delAG mutation are more likely to develop breast cancer than those who carry the 
other mutations, the actual risk of an individual depends on the patient’s age. 
Furthermore, at least one study demonstrated that presymptomatic testing for 
individuals without a strong family history for breast or ovarian cancer had poor 
predictive value.144  This is illustrative of an important point in genetics: few diseases 
or conditions are actually the result of a single gene or mutation acting alone in an 
individual’s body.  Much more common are what are known as multifactorial traits, 
where a combination of genes and environmental factors are responsible for the 
resultant condition.  The mechanisms of such interactions are complex and the vast 
majority have yet to be fully understood.  Hence, it is not clear that testing for one 
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mutation alone would give sufficient information to patients or clinicians to implement 
a care plan.   
Finally, it is important to remember that with many conditions that have a 
genetic component, understanding the ways in which the genome interacts with the 
environment in which it is located is essential to predicting the expression of the 
condition for the particular individual in question.  Sometimes the environmental 
interaction is readily apparent, but often it is not.  Hence, any prediction of the 
likelihood of developing a disease like breast cancer must be done with caution, as 
environmental factors may confound any such prediction – in either direction. 
2.  Economics & Efficiency 
 This relates closely to the issues of economics and efficiency.  It is both 
extremely costly to screen for the hundreds of mutations and inefficient: in a specific 
population where the prevalence of three particular mutations has become apparent, it 
is cheaper and more efficient to screen for those.  But given the data about the 
decreased penetrance of the BRCA2 mutation, as well as the fact that 185delAG is 
much more prevalent than 6174delT, perhaps screening can be limited yet further.  
Hence, it may be more cost effective to only screen for the 185delAG mutation in this 
ethnic population.  The problem with this, of course, is that the full mechanistic 
explanation behind this difference in expression is yet to be offered, as was indicated 
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in the previous section.  And if it turns out that one mutation is influenced by another, 
then limiting screening in this way is too restrictive and will be detrimental to overall 
benefit.  There is some indication that the third mutation, 5382insC, may confer a 
higher lifetime risk than the other mutations, but this must be investigated further.145  
Hence it is not at all clear that limiting the screening to one, or a few, particular 
mutation(s) is the best way to go, either: screening that doesn’t take into account other 
facets of an individual’s history may lead to test results that are inconclusive at best 
and misleading at worst.  And if this leads individuals to pursue further testing or even 
to engage in litigation on account of misleading test results, then limiting the screening 
in this way may not be the most cost effective.  The most efficient strategy would be 
to restrict screening to high risk women only, defined as those with a strong family 
history and/or early onset breast cancer themselves.  But again, this methodology 
would be less than ideal, since many who have the mutations would be missed by this 
scheme. 
 Ideally, of course, as the science of genetics progresses, scientists will gain a 
greater understanding of the mechanisms involved with various diseases, including the 
effects that various environments have on genetic expression.  Screening for the 
various traits will then become more specific and results of such tests will be better 
predictors for an individual’s actual risk of disease.   
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 The problem with this, however, is that often a large expenditure of money is 
required to engage in such research, which initially appears economically unjustified.  
After all, while these mutations are prevalent within the Ashkenazi Jewish community, 
that community itself is still a minority within the population.  Spending large sums of 
money to improve a test for such a small segment of the population, while 
praiseworthy in itself, may not be economically efficient when compared with other 
research needs of the population. 
 What is interesting about this predicament is that in order to fully assess the 
predictive value of a screening test for 185delAG in Ashkenazim, for example, testing 
must be done on other groups, as well as increasing research on the Ashkenazim 
specifically.  While this will benefit a minority group, it may also benefit the other 
large groups that are being tested in order to gain more information.  It is also worth 
noting that the kind of research I am suggesting here is “basic biological research” and 
hence of value more generally, both to medicine and biology more generally.146 
 Another economic consideration is relevant to a positive finding of one of the 
breast cancer mutations in an individual.  Just as with carrier status for both sickle-cell 
anemia and TSD, genetic discrimination is an unfortunate reality.  The federal 
regulations offer some protection for individuals, but gaps remain. Regarding 
discrimination in health insurance, federal legislation has passed that offer some 
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safeguards for individuals.  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) of 1996: 
· Prohibits excluding an individual from group coverage because of past 
or present medical problems, including genetic information. 
· Prohibits charging a higher premium to an individual than to others in 
the group. 
· Limits exclusions in group health plans for preexisting conditions to 12 
months, and prohibits such exclusions if the individual has been 
previously covered for that condition for 12 months or more. 
· States explicitly that genetic information in the absence of a current 
diagnosis of illness shall not be considered a preexisting condition. 
 
HIPAA does not: 
· Prohibit an insurer from denying coverage based upon genetic 
information to individuals seeking health insurance in the individual 
market. 
· Prohibit the use of genetic information as a basis for charging more for 
health insurance. 
· Limit the collection of genetic information by insurers and prohibit 
insurers from requiring an individual to take a genetic test. 
· Limit the disclosure of genetic information by insurers.147 
 
Hence, the fear of information of this type “getting into the wrong hands” is palpable 
for many people, and may prevent them from seeking genetic testing.  Most states 
have issued legislation confirming their support of this federal regulation, and thirty-
seven states (including Tennessee) have issued their own legislation regarding 
insurance discrimination.  Yet the fear regarding the possibility of losing one’s health 
insurance or being faced with unaffordable premiums on account of information 
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gained in a genetic test remains.  In one study, “[of] the participants who declined 
testing, 80% cited concern about losing or obtaining health insurance as the reason for 
their decision…and 50% ranked this reason as the most important factor in their 
decision.”148  The National Human Genome Research Institute argues that it is not 
sufficient to limit the definition of “predictive genetic information” to “information 
derived from a genetic test, as many states have done.  Failing to protect information 
about family medical history would allow insurers in the individual market to use 
predictive genetic information, such as cause of death and/or a history of disease in 
parents or siblings, to deny coverage or charge exorbitant premiums.”149   
Similar arguments can be made regarding discrimination in employment based 
on results of genetic screening.  In fact, the concerns may take on greater importance 
since no federal regulation has passed on this issue.150 Fewer than half the states have 
enacted their own legislation on this matter,151 so patients may be right to be worried 
about this possible consequence.  Since results regarding a predisposition towards 
cancer are inconclusive at best, some may fear that the harms that are an outcome of 
testing may outweigh any incentives for testing.  Losing one’s insurance coverage 
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(because of an inability to pay increased premiums, for example) or being denied 
employment may be significant enough harms to outweigh any desire to learn of one’s 
likelihood of developing breast cancer.  After all, there are few therapeutic options 
available to carriers, aside from the increased vigilance that may be recommended for 
all women.  Hence, economic considerations alone may encourage some women to 
forgo screening for breast cancer mutations. 
3.  Ethics 
 More importantly, however, are the ethical considerations related to screening 
for breast cancer.  The primary benefit of screening for any of the breast cancer 
mutations is in the information gained.  Specifically, an Ashkenazi Jewish woman 
who discovers that she carries the 185delAG mutation has learned that she has a much 
higher risk of developing breast cancer than if she did not have that mutation.  The 
value of such information must be weighed according to a relative scale: what harms 
are generated by such knowledge as compared to the benefits.  Many view knowledge 
about one’s health and risk of disease as valuable in and of itself.  To those for whom 
this is true, screening for mutations in BRCA1 or BRCA2 may indeed be beneficial.  
Others, however, measure the benefits of a screening test by the predictive power of 
the information gained.  For individuals like that, the value of breast cancer screening 
is unclear.  The results from a screening test are importantly inconclusive no matter 
                                                                                                                                            
151 “Employment Discrimination.” National Human Genome Research Institute.  
March 2000.  Issue Update.  September 26, 2000. 
<http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/Policy_and_public_affairs/Legislation/99upemp.htm>. 
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what the outcome: a positive result indicates that an individual has an “increased” (the 
amount of the increase depends on a number of other factors, as previously 
mentioned) risk of developing breast cancer, and a negative result simply indicates 
that an individual will not develop breast cancer on account of one of the mutations 
screened for which the individual was screened.  This by no means indicates that the 
individual is free from the risk of developing cancer, as only 5%-10% of the cases of 
breast cancer are due to one of the mutations in these genes.  In fact, receiving a 
negative screening result may result in more harm than good: women may misinterpret 
the results of the test and assume that since they “don’t have the gene” for breast 
cancer then they are not at risk.  This in turn may lead to a decreased vigilance on their 
part, so that they grow lax with self or clinical breast exams and/or mammography. 
Individuals who discover that they do not have one of the identified breast cancer 
mutations simply share the same risk as the rest of the population: about one in nine 
women will develop breast cancer.  Clearly this decreased attention to the warning 
signs of a problem may have a negative impact on the health of the women receiving 
negative test results and hence must be considered when offering screening. 
  Receiving information from screening that indicates that a woman is carrying 
one of the mutations for which she was screened, may lead to negative psychological 
effects.  Of course a woman who discovers that there is an 80% probability that she 
will develop breast cancer over the course of her lifetime has reason to be dismayed.  
But some women may be so devastated by the information as to allow it to impair 
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other aspects of their life.  This may be coupled with the fact that it is unclear what 
therapeutic options are available as prophylaxis for these women.  There is some 
indication that double radical mastectomy decreases the risk of those women who 
undergo such disfiguring surgery,152 but it is by no means certain that this will prevent 
an individual from developing breast cancer.  So for those for whom these negative 
effects would outweigh the benefit of the information, screening for these mutations 
may not be a recommended course of action.  There are some studies about women’s 
attitudes towards breast cancer screening, and more must be attempted before we will 
know the best approach to take in counseling these women.153 
 Another interesting point is related to the fact that the disorder in question is 
genetic in nature.  Since the screening process detects mutations in the germline, that 
is, mutations that appear in every cell in the body, any mutations that are detected in 
me have the possibility of being passed down to my offspring.  Similarly, mutations 
that are in me may have resulted from mutations in my parents, and hence may be 
detectable in them or in my siblings.  So any information that I receive about the 
presence or absence of mutations may have implications for my family members.  As 
                                                 
152 L.C. Hartmann, D. J. Schaid, J. E. Woods, T. P. Crotty, J. L. Myers, P. G. Arnold, 
P. M. Petty, T. A.  Sellers, J. L. Johnson, S. K. McDonnell, M. H. Frost, and R. B. 
Jenkins, “Efficacy of bilateral prophylactic mastectomy in women with a family 
history of breast cancer” New England Journal of Medicine 340, no. 2 (January 14, 
1999): 77-84. 
153 See Richards et al; Sharon J. Durfy et al, “Attitudes and Interest in Genetic Testing 
for Breast and Ovarian Cancer Susceptibility in Diverse Groups of Women in Western 
Washington,” Cancer Epidemiology, Biomarkers and Prevention 8, no. 4, part 2 
(April 1999): 369-375. 
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Barbara Katz Rothman points out sardonically, as a result of inheritance, “a three-
year-old girl can have a diagnosis of breast cancer before she even has breasts.”154 
Certainly it would not be recommended to share such information with a child who is 
far from being able to understand or deal with this knowledge, and, strictly speaking, 
this is false, since all that we would know at that point would be her genetic 
predisposition, not whether or not she would actually develop the disease.  Regardless, 
this does paint a powerful image about the importance of (not) sharing information.  
Just because I have made the decision to engage in screening so that I know if I am at 
increased risk for breast cancer does not mean that my sister has a similar desire to 
know this information.  Hence, the fact that the knowledge gained from screening has 
implication for other family members must be considered in the testing process. 
 There is yet a more fundamental concern with screening for mutations in the 
breast cancer genes.  Breast cancer was once a very private diagnosis, one that was 
shared only with family members and intimate friends, and one that often spelled a 
death sentence for the unfortunate bearer.  That is not the case any longer.  For a 
number of reasons, breast cancer has moved from the very private sphere into that of 
the very public.  This might be on account of public figures sharing with the rest of the 
world the battles of themselves and/or their family (notably Happy Rockefeller, Betty 
Ford, Ann Jillian, and Rosie O’Donnell).  Alternatively, it may be the result of 
scientific and statistical research that demonstrated the large number of women who 
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can expect to develop breast cancer over the course of their lifetime.  It is largely on 
account of this that the medical establishment began the very public campaign to 
ensure that women were vigilant regarding the signs and symptoms of breast cancer, 
because survival rates with breast cancer are dramatically higher when the cancer is 
detected at early stages and then treated rather than at later stages.  As a result, the 
public has been bombarded by the statistics of breast cancer risk and implored to 
engage in whatever preventative measures are appropriate for an individual of that age 
and situation.  Women are scared. 
 What is interesting about this campaign is the emphasis the medical 
establishment places on this particular condition.  Not only is breast cancer not the 
leading cause of death among women (heart disease is), but it is also not the leading 
cause of cancer deaths (lung cancer is).155  Furthermore, skin cancer is even more 
common than breast cancer.156  One wonders, then, why breast cancer in particular has 
gained so much attention.  Certainly lung cancer and skin cancer may be more readily 
preventable (don’t smoke; stay out of the sun), and there are some proven ways to 
combat heart disease (eat a low fat diet, get regular exercise, etc.).  Yet it is breast 
cancer about which women are to be especially vigilant. Why? 
                                                 
155 See “Women and Cardiovascular Disease,” Biostatistical Fact Sheet – Populations, 
American Heart Association.  May 16, 2000 
<http://americanheart.org/statistics/biostats/biowo.htm>; “Facts About Lung Cancer,” 
American Lung Association. May 16, 2000 
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 Some might argue that the “early detection, early cure” mantra with which 21st 
century individuals are so familiar speaks to the real reason behind the public 
campaign: women who are careful about watching for the early signs of breast cancer 
are more likely to seek treatment regularly and hence the cancer may be caught in the 
early stages.  After all, survival rates are higher when the cancer is caught early, 
before it has spread to other organs.  The problem is that it is not clear that breast 
cancer is unique in this way: one can say the same thing for skin cancer, certainly, and 
watching for evidence of heart disease (regular cholesterol checks, or stress tests, for 
example) may accomplish the same goal.  There is little data on the benefit of 
intervention in early stage lung cancer simply because it is rarely caught in the early 
stages; once an individual is showing symptoms, the cancer may already be too far 
progressed.  Regardless, the point remains that early detection of lots of disorders may 
indeed lead to increased survival rates. 
 It is significant that the cancer in question affects breasts, often a defining 
characteristic of women.   The traditional focus on women’s physique reflects an 
attitude in society of shallowness and subjugation, where what is important about a 
person can be viewed at a glance and she can then be grouped accordingly.  I contend 
that this perspective is operant in the attempt to so forcefully encourage women to be 
aware of their breasts and problems with them.  In some way, a diagnosis of breast 
                                                                                                                                            
156 “Colon and Rectum Cancer,” Cancer Resource Center, American Cancer Society. 
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cancer is “worse” than that of the more genderless lung cancer or heart disease, and 
hence is to be avoided at all costs. 
 My present concern regarding genetic screening, then, is that such procedures 
may play into the masculine-centered emphasis on a woman’s different-ness rather 
than on health concerns that are more prevalent and more preventable. I am not 
arguing that women should relax all vigilance regarding the signs of breast cancer; on 
the contrary, I would like to see them step up their vigilance regarding these other 
disorders.  My concern is that if we focus our attention (energy, money, research) on a 
program that can at best tell us if there is an increased probability of developing 
something that there is very little we can do to prevent, then we may miss many 
opportunities to take a proactive role in the prevention of other disorders.  Genetic 
screening is not at fault here, but may be one element contributing to a larger problem. 
Colorectal Cancer 
 Colorectal cancer (CRC) is another disorder for which genetic testing may be 
useful in some instances.  Approximately 25% of colon cancers are thought to be 
inherited, as suggested by the fact that they occur in younger individuals and/or that 
there is a personal or family history of cancer.157 Furthermore, “[a]bout 3% of 
colorectal cancers are accounted for by two well-defined, highly penetrant, dominant 
                                                 
157 Jonathan P. Terdiman, Peggy G. Conrad and Marvin H. Sleisenger, “Genetic 
Testing in Hereditary Colorectal Cancer: Indications and Procedures,” The American 
Journal of Gastroenterology 94, no. 9 (1999): 2344. 
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hereditary syndromes for which genetic testing is now available.”158 These two 
syndromes are familial adenomatous polyposis (FAP) and hereditary nonpolyposis 
colorectal cancer (HNPCC).  As with Tay-Sachs disease and breast cancer 
susceptibility, there is a specific mutation that is particularly dominant in the 
Ashkenazi Jewish community.  One variant of APC, the gene responsible for FAP, 
was “first identified as a founder mutation in ~6% of the Ashkenazi Jewish 
population.”159 Hence, genetic testing for the APC mutation is of particular interest 
here. Since it is the gene responsible for FAP that is of interest to the community, the 
following discussion will be limited to FAP and will not address HNPCC. 
 FAP is an autosomal dominant disorder, which means that one defective copy 
of the APC gene is enough to cause the individual to be affected by the disease.  FAP 
is characterized by “the presence of hundreds to thousands of colonic polyps occurring 
in the second or third decade of life.  In most cases, one or more polyps will progress 
to CRC.”160 A particular allele, or form, of the APC gene, I1307K, has been identified 
in Ashkenazi Jews with CRC.  One study indicated that carriers of this mutation have 
a “twofold increased risk of CRC” and that this allele is responsible for a “significant 
percentage of family CRC in Ashkenazi Jews.”161 Since “the lifetime incidence of 
                                                 
158 Ibid. 
159 Diane L. Maresco et al, “The APC I1307K Allele and BRCA-Associated Ovarian 
Cancer Risk,” American Journal of Human Genetics 64 (1999): 1228. 
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CRC in the general Ashkenazi population has been estimated to be 9-15%,…the 
lifetime risk for CRC in patients with I1307K is likely to be in the range of 18-30%.  
Moreover, our data suggest that 28% of familial CRC in Ashkenazim is associated 
with the I1307K mutation.”162 Other studies have not been able to confirm these 
findings,163 but have instead confirmed a “modestly elevated risk for developing 
cancer” for those who carry the I1307K allele.164 Nevertheless, the authors of one 
review article contend that “even a small increase in CRC risk conferred by a gene that 
is common in a particular population will have important implications for that 
population.”165 
 There is some indication that the I1307K allele, while predisposing certain 
individuals to colorectal cancer, may also confer a susceptibility to breast or ovarian 
cancer.166  We previously mentioned the various degrees of penetrance associated with 
the breast cancer mutations, and suggested that, while the mechanisms of such varied 
expression are largely unknown, one possibility is that an interaction with other genes 
may account for the high penetrance of some mutations rather than others.  The 
I1307K allele may be just such a gene which, when combined with one of the BRCA1 
or BRCA2 mutations, modifies the penetrance of the mutation. The result, then, is that 
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individuals with both of these mutations may have an increased likelihood of 
expressing this disease than they would if they simply had one of these mutations. 
“Thus, even though APC I1307K alone does not appear to confer a substantial risk of 
ovarian cancer in the Ashkenazi Jewish population generally…, it remains possible 
that ovarian cancer risk may be increased in carriers of both APC I1307K and a BRCA 
mutation.”167,168 This, then, provides another indication for genetic screening for this 
mutation. 
Ethical Issues 
There are both similarities and differences in the ethical issues that surround 
breast and colon cancer.  One difference is that colon cancer is not as prevalent as 
breast cancer in the population, and as many men are at risk as women. One similarity 
may be regarding an aspect of screening for the two diseases.  Just as mammograms 
are not recommended for women as routine heath care until the age of 50 or so, 
colonoscopies (for those who have no reason to expect a particular susceptibility to the 
disease) typically are not considered until that age as well. 
 Another similarity to breast cancer is the fact that a particular genetic mutation  
                                                                                                                                            
166 …or not. See Luba Petrukhin et al, “The I1307K APC Mutation Does Not 
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“…is a significant modifier of BRCA penetrance for breast, but not ovarian, cancer.” 
(Maresco et al, 1229-30.) However, the point still remains that testing for the APC 
I1307K allele may reveal information about the patient’s risk for other diseases. 
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seems to confer an increased likelihood of developing colon cancer on its unfortunate 
bearers. This mutation is unlike the Tay-Sachs mutation that means certain lethality 
for individuals who carry two copies of the gene. But it is also unlike the breast cancer 
mutations in the chances it confers of developing the disease. The numbers are 
nowhere near as high as the 80-90% prevalence rate of disease development as it is 
with carriers of one of the BRCA mutations, and this difference in prevalence is 
significant for decision-making (a point to be discussed in greater detail in chapters 
three and four). 
 One important empirical difference we see with colon cancer is that the rate of 
genetic screening is quite low, even among those who have reason to think that they 
are at high risk.169  In light of some of the issues discussed relating to breast cancer 
screening that also seem to apply to colon cancer, this is curious.  That is, if the same 
kinds of presuppositions hold here, screening rates ought to be much higher.  Recall 
that we said that many people state that simply having the knowledge about their 
actual risk is valuable to them.  For some this is reflective of an increased ability to 
make plans in their lives based on this information. These plans could consist of things 
that had been put off until the individual was more certain about his or her likelihood 
of developing the disease. Some suggest that “[d]ispelling the uncertainty of cancer 
risk may reduce anxiety, improve coping, aide [sic] in planning for the future, and 
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improve compliance with medical recommendations.”170 Alternatively, perhaps the 
possibility of developing cancer was so psychologically and emotionally distressing 
that until one received good news (that he or she was free from the mutation) or more 
definitive bad news (that one had the mutation), plans could not be made.  If these 
things are true, then screening rates ought to be higher. 
 Another possible reason for a lack of enthusiasm about genetic screening 
represents another difference between breast cancer and colon cancer.  The “early 
detection, early cure” mantra of breast cancer indicates the benefit of clinical 
screening: the earlier the cancer is caught, the more effective intervention can be 
offered.  Identifying individuals who are carriers of the mutations for breast cancer 
provides an opportunity to monitor those who are most likely to develop the disease, 
and hence therapeutic intervention can be most effective. 
 It is not clear that similar measures can be taken for colon cancer. A major 
difference lies in the invasiveness of clinical examination.  Individuals who are at 
increased risk for breast cancer can be more vigilant about watching for the signs of 
breast cancer by performing monthly self-breast exams in addition to annual clinical 
exams.  The same cannot be said for colon cancer, where the most effective 
monitoring procedures are clinically intensive. Some “options for cancer surveillance 
and prevention for FAP…in known or suspected gene mutation carriers” include: 
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· Annual flexible sigmoidoscopy beginning by age 10-12.  
· Annual colonoscopy, beginning at age 20, when attenuated FAP 
suspected.  
· Prophylactic colectomy in teen years or when polyps are 
detected at endoscopy.  
· Endoscopic surveillance every 4-6 mo after ileorectal 
anastomosis and annually after ileoanal anastomosis. 
· Upper endoscopy, including duodenoscopy, every 6 mo to 3 yr 
starting by age 20.171 
  
Hence, while a negative result from genetic screening might levy the important 
consequence of reducing the frequency with which individuals need to be so screened 
(from every year to every two years, for example), a positive result confers no such 
benefit.   
 Of course, genetic information about one member of a family has implications 
for other members here as well.  One clear benefit of a positive genetic screening 
would be to inform families of the risk children face of developing colon cancer long 
before any routine screening would be instituted. Hence, it is in this way that the 
benefits of screening most resemble that of breast cancer: where information from test 
results will prompt individuals to be more vigilant about the signs of disease 
development.  This has a downside as well, however. Individuals who receive negative 
test results may experience some psychological feelings of guilt or shame from 
knowing that other members of their family may not be as fortunate as he or she is.172 
This must also be weighed as a factor when considering screening. 
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 The dangers of receiving negative test results from genetic screening for colon 
cancer may be even worse than they are for breast cancer in some ways. We 
previously mentioned that individuals who find that they are not BRCA mutation 
carriers may misinterpret that information and assume that they are then free from risk 
of developing the disease. A possible consequence from this is a reduction in the 
vigilance by individuals in either self or clinical breast exams or in mammography.  
The situation could be even worse for the case of colon cancer, where the only way to 
detect masses is through an invasive procedure; one can imagine that for individuals 
who learn they are not carriers of the mutation becoming lax in making or attending 
appointments for the abovementioned clinical procedures would be almost welcome.   
 An interesting side note relates to the frequency with which people usually get 
routine screening for colon cancer. With breast cancer becoming popularized in the 
media and with the baby boomer population aging, clinical screening for breast 
cancer, including mammography, has become increasingly popular. Most women see 
their health care providers for an annual exam, even if this initially is to enable them to 
obtain birth control or pregnancy counseling.  The same cannot be said for clinical 
colon cancer screening. Fewer individuals go for colonoscopies than go for 
mammograms.  This may be partly on account of the invasive nature of clinical 
screening for colon cancer than mammography; colonoscopies, sigmoidoscopies, etc. 
are uncomfortable and disruptive.  And given that the most reliable method of 
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detecting early colorectal cancer is through a colonoscopy, comparisons can be made 
to the use of mammography for breast cancer.   
This reduced use of screening in comparison to breast cancer may also be 
because of the differing degrees of public attention associated with the two diseases.  
Breast cancer used to be a very private diagnosis, one that women rarely discussed, 
until some very public figures brought the disease to the limelight.173  Colon cancer 
has yet to achieve such notoriety, and short of a physician’s recommendation to 
engage in regular screening procedures, few voluntarily choose such a path.  In 
contrast, the genetic screening for this disease is much less invasive, requiring a blood 
sample from participants. Hence, it is possible that increased genetic screening might 
lead to the identification of more cases of colon cancer.  At the very least, it will 
identify individuals who are at increased risk.  So indeed genetic screening for this 
disease may provide benefits for those who otherwise would not engage in a screening 
process. 
 Part of the difficulty with such procedures, though, are the risks of genetic 
discrimination that may plague individuals who opt for screening.  Given that 
prophylaxis for this disease is questionable and often radical (coloectomy, for 
example), one must weigh the costs of screening with the benefits.  A conversation 
with a health care provider may reveal information that indicates that yearly 
colonoscopies, preferable in many ways, would be a better option for someone who is 
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concerned about his or her colon cancer risk.  Assuming that such yearly preventative 
measures are included under one’s health insurance plan (not a neutral assumption, to 
be sure), then it seems as though the clinical exam may be more beneficial than the 
genetic screening which runs the risk of increasing premiums, canceling policies, or 
influencing employment decisions.   
These tests are also rather expensive to perform, and many individuals may be 
hesitant to claim such procedures against their insurance for the reasons mentioned 
previously. This is further complicated by the issue of reimbursement for those who 
would be willing to submit a claim; most insurance plans cover colonoscopies only 
when they are indicated by an abnormal finding in a previous – and less expensive – 
test: the fecal occult blood test or a sigmoidoscopy.  Medicare typically reimburses 
physicians anywhere from $125 to $200 for a sigmoidoscopy and from $400 to $600 
for a colonoscopy; the average price charged to private patients for a colonoscopy is 
$700, while a sigmoidoscopy is only $200.174  Hence, the cost of the tests may be an 
impediment to having the screening done.175 
Conclusion 
 What we see from the examples of “genetic” disease listed in this chapter is 
that for each disorder, there are unique features that are important to consider when 
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making medical decisions. Some of the issues surrounding these disorders may be 
shared with other diseases.  For example, the decision whether or not to abort a fetus 
that a family has discovered has Tay-Sachs disease may involve much of the same 
thought process as a family who is considering abortion for any reason: what abortion 
means to the family personally and religiously, how this act will compare with 
alternative acts (such as raising the child), when a life becomes a “person,” etc.  But I 
contend that with the age of genetic medicine and genetic information, new issues 
emerge that raise important problems for ethical decision-making.  Knowing that the 
information received from a genetic test for one of the breast cancer mutations has 
implications for my siblings and my children will, and should, affect my decision to 
engage in such a procedure.  Understanding that by submitting a claim for 
reimbursement for a genetic test for colon cancer, I might be endangering my family’s, 
and my own, ability to find affordable health insurance should factor into my decision 
as well. These are just a few samples of the unique features of the genetic age of 
medicine that make these issues so compelling. 
As a community that typically seeks religious guidance for ethical questions, 
the observant Jewish community will look to its leadership and tradition for assistance 
in making these difficult decisions.  The traditional approach to answering such 
questions has been to apply certain rules or principles to the case or problem at hand in 
order to aid in decision-making. What I contend is that such an application of rules or 
principles, which necessarily requires some analysis and “simplifying” of the case in 
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order to pick the appropriate (set of) principle(s), will miss an important part of the 
decision-making process.  In a tradition that focuses on the family as the central unit, 
the nurturing, caring, and sustaining roles of the family must be considered as equally 
important to the application of the traditional principles and rules. Hence, augmenting 
the traditional perspective with an ethic of care will lead to a more complete ethical 
framework. 
In the next chapter I will discuss the traditional Jewish bioethical approach to 
medical decision-making, focusing primarily on the issues that relate to the three 
examples mentioned in this chapter.  I will also point out where it apparently fails to 
adequately capture all of the important moral components of the problem. In chapter 
four, then, I will give the argument for why augmenting the perspective with an ethic 
of care is actually not a new aspect of this system, but is in fact part of the process that 
the rabbis have used all along.  A recognition of this will lead to a more satisfying 
guide to moral decision-making in a medical context. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
TRADITIONAL JEWISH BIOETHICS 
 
 With those three cases in mind, we are now in a position to turn to the question 
of traditional Jewish medical ethics. As mentioned in chapter one, Jewish scholars 
were dealing with questions of medical ethics long before it evolved into its own 
discipline.  Obviously, then, many of the issues predate the development of genetic 
screening, testing, and intervention. Even before we knew there were such things as 
genes that were at least partially responsible for a variety of disease states, however, 
physicians and scientists did recognize the “heritability” of certain disorders: that 
some families were prone to particular ailments and others were not. This may have 
served as the basis for some of the ancient guidelines regarding the permissibility of 
treatment and risk-taking in these and similar situations.176 
 Early on in the discussion of Jewish medical ethics proper, though, scholars 
began dealing with the issue of Tay-Sachs Disease (TSD).  Since this ailment was so 
common in the Ashkenazi Jewish population as compared to the population overall, 
this was a natural place to focus attention for the Jewish sources: on a disease that 
primarily affects Jews.  Contemporary Jewish ethicists spent a fair amount of time 
early on discussing TSD and the possible options, so there is a good deal of literature 
on the subject. 
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 The tests for BRCA1 and BRCA2 are still relatively new in comparison with 
the test for TSD, as is genetic screening for colorectal cancer. Hence, while there is 
some literature on this issue from a Jewish perspective, much work is yet to be done. 
My task in this chapter is to review the Jewish bioethics literature of these ethical 
discussions. What will emerge is an exemplification of the process mentioned in the 
first chapter: particular principles will be isolated from each of the cases, and then the 
authority figures will use these principles to guide the patient to action. The primary 
principles, I argue, in cases of TSD are the sanctity of human life, the duty to preserve 
life and health, the obligation to procreate, and the principle of mental anguish. Issues 
related to abortion will also be relevant. For the genes associated with breast cancer, 
three main principles are important: the sanctity of human life, the notion that the body 
belongs to God, and, once again, the principle of mental anguish. In the section on 
colorectal cancer, I will discuss Jewish attitudes towards risk-taking. 
 In each of the cases (TSD, breast cancer, and colon cancer) I will further 
suggest why the analysis offered or suggested by traditional Jewish medical ethics is 
inadequate, and make some suggestions as to what is lacking. The inadequacy arises 
from a failure to fully take the context into account for each of the cases discussed, 
and this leaves an important part of moral decision-making out of the process. 
Incorporating an ethic of care into the traditional schema will help to alleviate this 
problem.  In chapter four, I will further argue that this addition is really not new at all, 
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but instead is already a part of how the rabbis counsel individuals in their decision-
making, and focusing on this aspect of the process will lead to a richer moral theory. 
Tay-Sachs Disease 
 
 Both because of the early date at which the causal mechanism was discovered 
for TSD and because of the effect it has on this particular community, Jewish scholars 
have been thinking and writing about the issues involved for over thirty years.  In this 
abundance of literature, one is able to discern the crucial issues for discussion from the 
perspective of a traditional Jewish bioethic. The first issue concerns the permissibility 
of genetic testing for TSD, or, for that matter, for other similar genetic problems.  
There are three time periods in an observant couple’s life when this testing could 
occur: prior to marriage, after marriage but prior to conception, and after marriage and 
conception but prior to the birth of the child. These are the morally significant stages 
from the traditional Jewish perspective, as each stage carries with it different 
obligations and permissions, as will be described below.177  A second issue becomes 
relevant after the discussion of the third time period, and that is the permissibility of 
abortion in Judaism.  Each of these issues will be discussed in turn. 
                                                 
177 It is certainly possible, of course, that a couple might seek testing post-conception 
but prior to marriage. It is not clear to me that such a time period has different moral 
significance attached to it, apart from issues about premarital sex. There might be 
issues about the pregnancy that stem from this particular relationship of the couple, 
but these are not issues that arise from genetic medicine (or from medicine at all, for 
that matter). A discussion of how this complexity factors into this schema would be 
interesting but tangential to the line of argument presented here. The issues that related 
to this group, then, will be captured in the discussion of post-conception (post-
marriage) testing, and will relate to the discussion of abortion. 
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Genetic Testing Prior to Marriage 
 The first time period at which a couple may be concerned with their risk for 
TSD is prior to marriage. Since there is a ban on premarital sex in Judaism, and since 
the disease in its most common form only affects children, couples who are 
considering marriage may be concerned about TSD for the first time. As we saw in 
chapter two, one particularly noteworthy example of a group that engages in genetic 
testing at this stage is the Orthodox group Dor Y’shorim.  The founder of the group, 
Rabbi Eckstein, believed that this was the best opportunity to make a difference in the 
alarmingly high affliction rate within the Jewish community. As a result of his efforts, 
the rate of TSD within this community has dropped radically. 
 To understand why Rabbi Eckstein and others argue that prior to marriage is 
the most appropriate time to screen for TSD, one must understand the significance of 
marriage in the Jewish tradition.  Marriage is commanded to all Jewish individuals, 
independent of procreation.178 Yet it is within the context of procreation that the 
importance of marriage relates to issues of genetic screening. With a recessive trait 
such as TSD, where two copies of the mutant gene are necessary for the expression of 
the disease, it is only the coming together of the two sets of genes that is significant 
with respect to the risk of a child acquiring the disease. Hence, if it is the case that 
procreation is important in this culture, then there is added concern for genetic testing. 
                                                 
178 For an extended discussion of marriage independent of procreation, see chapter 2 
of David M. Feldman, Birth Control in Jewish Law (New York: New York University 
Press, 1968). 
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 In fact, procreation is of primary importance in this culture.  David Feldman 
argues that, contrary to common opinion, the primacy of procreation does not derive 
from the fact that “Be Fruitful and Multiply” is often listed as the first in a long list of 
mitzvoth, or good deeds. Rather, “[t]he first-rank importance of the duty of 
procreation is set forth by the Talmud itself: ‘He who does not engage in procreation is 
as if he committed murder; alternatively, ‘is as if he diminished the Divine Image.’”179   
Feldman further divides the mitzvah into three distinct parts: one biblical and 
two rabbinic. All of the “parts” of the deed attempt to ascertain what is required for the 
fulfillment of the “be fruitful and multiply” commandment.  The biblical interpretation 
refers to Genesis 1:27, “male and female he created them,” to argue that the 
commandment has been satisfied when a couple has produced both a son and a 
daughter, thereby replacing themselves.180 The rabbinic interpretations are derived 
from two additional concepts: la-shevet (habitation) and la-erev (evening).  The 
mitzvah known as la-shevet refers to a passage in Isaiah where the author speaks of 
the world being created for the purpose of habitation.  The mitzvah known as la-erev 
speaks of the commandment to engage in intercourse both in the morning and in the 
evening, since the participants can never be sure as to when conception will occur.  
From these two additional interpretations, scholars conclude that simply having one 
son and one daughter is insufficient to fulfill the commandment.  After all, the son or 
daughter might be infertile, which would result in the decrease of population, 
                                                 
179 Ibid., 47. 
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something that is at odds with “habitation” of the world. Furthermore, as Feldman 
points out, it is easy to add social and practical reasons to bolster the rationale of the 
law. Given infant mortality and morbidity rates, it is relatively easy to see why having 
two children may not be sufficient. Finally, in a culture that has been systematically 
persecuted throughout its history, it is understandable why there would be an 
injunction on couples to have more than the minimally required two children, to 
replace those who can no longer engage in procreation themselves. Hence, what seems 
clear is that Jewish couples are required to have a minimum of two children, but are 
strongly encouraged to have more.181 
 Given the importance of having children, then, it makes sense why Eckstein 
and others view prior to marriage as the best time to evaluate one’s Tay-Sachs 
probabilities. If it is discovered prior to marriage that both individuals are carriers of 
the mutant gene, the marriage and hence potentially affected children can be avoided. 
This is the most straightforward way of ensuring that TSD rates decrease in that 
population.  
Remember what is at issue here: whether or not genetic screening for TSD – or 
for any other disease, for that matter – is permissible under Jewish law. The 
permissibility of screening during this particular time period – prior to marriage – will 
depend upon the permissibility of genetic screening in general. That is, if genetic 
                                                                                                                                            
180 Ibid., 48. 
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screening is prohibited in this community, then the time period during which it would 
be done would be irrelevant.  It is to this issue that we now turn. 
The permissibility of genetic screening derives from the overall perspective 
towards medicine in Judaism.  First among important principles is the mandate to heal 
in Judaism. This mandate derives from a number of different sources.  Exodus 21:19 
speaks of healing another in case of an injury resulting from a confrontation.  The 
wording used in this passage is a bit vague; when translated literally, the word “heal” 
is repeated: “…and heal he shall heal.”182  The rabbis of the Talmud interpret “this 
duplicate mention of healing as intended to teach us that authorization was granted by 
God to the physician to heal.”183 This is important, of course, to counter the 
supposition by some that any intervention in disease or illness, often viewed as 
Divinely caused, would somehow be either usurping the power of God, admitting to a 
lack of faith in His power, or to presume to understand God’s will.  Immanuel 
Jakobovits refers to this as the “…inner conflict between the essentially divine (and 
therefore providential) character of disease and the human efforts, through medical 
treatment, to mitigate or, if possible, to frustrate its effect.”184   
                                                                                                                                            
181 Of course, a couple’s chance of fulfilling the requirement in the minimal number of 
attempts is only 50% anyway. I am grateful to Jonathan Kaplan for reminding me of 
this. 
182 Rosner (1991), 7. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Immanuel Jakobovits (1975), 2. 
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Jakobovits chronicles three approaches to this problem.185  One approach is 
represented by an ancient sect of Judaism known as the Karaites, who did fear some or 
all of the concerns about usurping God’s power and hence relied solely on faith and 
prayer to sustain them in times of illness or disease. “The second approach was simply 
to ask whether there was any less moral justification for curing illness, especially 
where it was caused by human negligence [as in the aforementioned passage], than for 
the application of water to the thirsty throat or of the plough to the virgin soil.”186  As 
there is a duty to do provide water to the thirsty person, this implies the duty to 
perform the former action as well. This approach is suggested by Rabbi Abraham Ibn 
Ezra, a famous biblical commentator, who argued that while some human intervention 
was justified, the passage in question limited that context to those of injuries inflicted 
by another in, e.g., a fight. Internal injuries (probably what we typically consider to be 
illness and disease) are left to God alone to heal.187  
The third, and more widely accepted approach, was to acknowledge the 
“concept of disease as a divine visitation” while still affirming the justification of 
human intervention through a “divine sanction” to engage in healing.188 Part of this 
sanction derives from the notion that as humans, we are both subject to the laws of the 
Divine and are partners with Him in the process of creation and sustenance.189  “The 
                                                 
185 Ibid., 2-3. 
186 Ibid., 2. 
187 Feldman (1986), 17; Rosner (1991), 8. 
188 Immanuel Jakobovits (1975), 3. 
189 Feldman (1986), 16. 
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elaborate skill and ministrations of health-care people, and the sophisticated means 
and medicaments made use of, are ultimately an expression of God’s inexorable 
blueprint.  God afflicts and man, in fulfillment of a divine imperative, heals.”190  This 
is the view that ultimately prevailed, as Rosner states: “there is nearly universal 
acceptance that the sanctioning to the physician to heal is all-inclusive, encompassing 
all internal and external physical and mental illnesses. In fact, a commentary on the 
Talmud…specifically states that it is permitted to heal not only man-induced wounds 
but even heavenly-induced sicknesses and afflictions, i.e., all illnesses.”191 
The second biblical passage that is cited in regard to the mandate to heal is 
Leviticus 19:16, which commands that “thou shalt not stand idly by the blood of thy 
neighbor.”  According to Fred Rosner, “[t]he passage refers to the duties of human 
beings to their fellowmen and the moral principles which the sages expounded and 
applied to every phase of civil and criminal law.”192 What is interesting for our 
purposes here is to see how this biblical passage has been interpreted by both ancient 
and contemporary scholars to justify the mandate to heal. Rosner gives us a nice 
summary of the procedure. He refers to the writings of Maimonides, the great 
medieval rabbi and physician, to demonstrate this procedure. Rosner first cites the 
passage Maimonides uses in his code of law, and then interpolates from there.  
Maimonides…states: 
 
                                                 
190 Ibid., 18. 
191 Rosner (1991), 8 
192 Ibid., 9. 
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Whoever is able to save another and does not save him 
transgresses the commandment neither shalt thou stand 
idly by the blood of thy neighbor. Similarly, if one sees 
another drowning in the sea, or being attacked by 
bandits, or being attacked by a wild animal and is able to 
rescue him…and does not rescue him…he transgresses 
the injunction neither shalt thou stand idly by the blood 
of thy neighbor. 
 
Such a case of drowning in the sea is considered as loss of one’s body, 
and therefore, if one is obligated to save a whole body, one must 
certainly cure disease, which usually afflicts only one part of the 
body.193 
 
Rosner here extrapolates the justification for a principle from a more specific set of 
instances. 
 Another passage that is cited as important for the permissibility of offering 
medical care is Deuteronomy 22:2, which includes the phrase, “And thou shalt return 
it to him,” referring to lost property.  Scholars have used this passage to argue for the 
requirement to aid others in life-threatening situations on the basis that in such 
instances that which one would be returning to another was his health or his body.194   
 Fred Rosner sums up the duty to heal from within the Jewish tradition in the 
following paragraph: 
If one asks why God granted physicians license and even mandate to 
heal the sick, one can offer the following explanation. A cardinal 
principle of Judaism is that life is of infinite value.  The preservation of 
human life takes precedence over all commandments in the Bible 
except three: idolatry, murder, and incest.  Life’s value is absolute and 
supreme.  Thus an old man or woman, a mentally retarded person, a 
                                                 
193 Ibid. 
194 Fred Rosner and J. David Bleich, Jewish Bioethics (New York: Hebrew Publishing 
Company, 1979), 23; Rosner (1991), 9. 
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defective newborn, a dying cancer patient, and the like, all have the 
same right to life as you or I.  In order to preserve a human life, the 
Sabbath and even the Day of Atonement may be desecrated, and all 
other rules and laws save the aforementioned three are suspended for 
the overriding consideration of saving a human life.  He who saves one 
life is as if he saved a whole world.  Even a few moments of life are 
worthwhile.  Judaism is a “right-to-life” religion. This obligation to 
save lives is an individual as well as a communal obligation.  Certainly 
a physician, who has knowledge and expertise far beyond that of a 
layperson, is obligated to use his medical skills to heal the sick and 
thereby prolong and preserve life.195 
 
 Given these biblical passages and the rabbis’ interpretations of them, we now 
have the foundation for understanding that genetic screening is in fact permissible in 
some cases. This permission derives from two different sources: either genetic 
screening is a means to save someone’s life, or screening is a means to engage in 
healing.  Since both saving someone’s life and engaging in healing are not simply 
permitted by required in Jewish law, using genetic screening to achieve these goals 
would be laudable.  However, genetic screening does not always serve these purposes. 
Under what circumstances would genetic screening fall into these categories, and 
hence be permitted? 
Genetic screening as a means to save someone’s life seems to be a 
straightforward application of the aforementioned principles. This will be discussed 
further in the next section.  The perspective of genetic screening as a means of healing, 
however, is a bit more complicated. To see how this concept is applied, one must 
understand “healing” in a broad sense. The reason that this is so is because in popular 
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use, at least, the word “healing” typically corresponds to an end that is achieved; 
someone who is “healed” no longer has the ailment that was previously plaguing her. 
Genetic screening may not always lead to these same kinds of consequences, and yet 
the information may be beneficial for the patients.  An example of this is genetic 
screening for TSD.  Recall that there is no cure for Tay-Sachs Disease; as was 
discussed in the last chapter; the only hope for disease eradication is the prevention of 
the birth of affected children (either by preventing carriers from mating or through the 
abortion of affected fetuses).  The eradication of disease is a project sanctioned by the 
observant Jewish community; this can be inferred from the focus on the duty to heal. 
We have looked at the passages that sanction human intervention into the disease 
process, even with the understanding that part of the cause of such a process may be 
divine.  Relieving the individual patient of her ailment will require some knowledge of 
illness and the disease process, especially that which will be most effective in “curing” 
the individual of her sickness.  Focusing on the individual and curing her ailments 
carries with it a correlative obligation to eradicate the disease that is afflicting her.  
This is because the duty to heal is the overriding consideration and is not restricted to 
individual instances of disease, but rather sanctions research into illness on the whole.  
The eradication of disease, then, is permitted, and in fact required, by the 
aforementioned biblical references.  Since, at least at this point in medicine, the only 
way to eradicate Tay-Sachs disease from this community is to prevent its occurrence, 
Jewish law prima facie sanctions efforts in this vein. Since genetic screening for 
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carriers of the disease is one such effort, genetic screening may be permissible on the 
grounds that it is a way to heal individuals of their suffering. 
 As to the question of the time period most appropriate for screening, genetic 
testing shortly prior to marriage is one of the least disputed intervals among Jewish 
scholars. Testing individuals much earlier than that, for example, early in high school, 
is inadvisable for two reasons. First, as was discussed in the previous chapter, it takes 
two copies of the mutated gene to produce the disease. Carriers of (one copy of) TSD 
suffer no health complications. Hence, until the individual is contemplating marriage 
and its correlative obligation to procreate, such knowledge is not useful. A second 
reason not to screen individuals earlier is on account of the psychological effects such 
information may have on the teens. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein remarks that “…most 
young people are quite sensitive to nervous tension or psychological stress and, 
therefore, young men… or women… not yet contemplating marriage should not be 
screened for Tay-Sachs disease.”196 What Rabbi Feinstein seems to be referring to 
here is the process of maturation. Teenagers may be particularly “sensitive to nervous 
tension or psychological stress” because of both the pressures on them at that point in 
their lives (what to do with their lives, whether or not to pursue a college degree and if 
so, where, etc.), and because of the way that their emotions and psyches are 
developing at that point.  We often hear about the influence of peer pressure at that 
age, and for a good reason: often our friends are what console us during these difficult 
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periods. Hence, to add an additional burden, the knowledge that one is a carrier for a 
deadly disease, is both unnecessary and cruel.  Hence, waiting until the individual is 
contemplating marriage, when the information gained from screening may have an 
impact, is preferable.197 
Genetic Screening During Marriage But Prior to Conception 
 Of course, the aforementioned reasons for why it is inadvisable to screen for 
TSD early in one’s life do not speak to the possibility of screening for TSD later in 
one’s life.  It is to that question that we turn in this section. The next logical step 
would be to screen for TSD after one has married but prior to the conception of any 
children. If screening is considered at this stage, the rabbis typically have had a further 
inquiry: for what purpose is screening being performed? Certainly, the eradication of 
disease through the prevention of the birth of Tay-Sachs afflicted children is still the 
broader goal, but the more specific intentions of the couples are important.   
 One reason why married couples may engage in testing prior to conceiving a 
child is simply to have information: to know if they are among those who risk a 1 in 4 
chance of having a child afflicted with TSD.  Many individuals find this knowledge 
helpful, whether the results are positive or negative. Certainly negative results may 
                                                 
197 In communities where the marriages are not arranged, but dating is permitted, then 
we might alter our recommendation to disclosure at an earlier point. I am still 
concerned about adding unnecessary burdens too early for them to be understood or 
even useful, but I recognize the danger in waiting too long, when emotional ties have 
already been formed and hence greater harm occurs because of the lateness of 
awareness. As with many such decisions, the right approach is a balancing act between 
the costs and the benefits. 
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alleviate the anxiety level of couples who are concerned about their risk for having 
affected children. But some even argue that the knowledge that one is at risk for 
transmitting the disease it also helpful; couples become more aware of the possible 
outcomes of having a child.  Even if no other action is taken, many people find some 
relief in knowing the odds. 
 A second reason why married couples might engage in genetic screening for 
TSD prior to conception is to avoid the problem completely: if they find out that they 
are both carriers of the mutant gene, then they will refrain from having children.  It is 
in this case where a couple’s motive first takes on increased importance from the 
perspective of  Jewish law.  Remember that procreation is particularly important for 
this group of people: “He who does not engage in procreation is as if he engaged in 
murder.”  While having children is not the only reason for engaging in marriage, it is 
one of the most important obligations of a married couple. Hence, engaging in genetic 
screening for the purpose of not having children if the results come back positive is 
expressly prohibited by this group. Rosner cites J. David Bleich on this issue, who 
argues that: 
The obligation with regard to procreation is not suspended simply 
because of the statistical probability that some children of the union 
may be deformed or abnormal.  While the couple may quite properly be 
counseled with regard to the risks of having a Tay-Sachs child, it 
should be stressed that failure to bear natural children is not a 
halakhically [Jewish legal] viable alternative.198 
 
Hence, screening for the possibility of not bearing children is prohibited. 
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 Advances in medical technology, however, have made possible a middle 
ground between these two positions.  Rather than engage in genetic screening simply 
for the purpose of information without the ability to alter one’s conduct in light of that 
information, or rather than engage in screening for the purpose of making a drastic 
decision regarding one’s progeny, another alternative is available. A couple may 
engage in screening to discover their carrier status, and then if the results come back 
positive, engage in conception that differs from the natural method: they could have 
children by means of assisted reproduction. Since it is having two copies of the 
affected gene that results in a child with TSD, assisted reproductive methods would 
have to ensure that this did not occur. One way of doing this is through artificial 
insemination by a donor (AID), where a woman would be inseminated with sperm that 
came from someone other than her husband who does not carry the gene. This would 
eliminate the risk for TSD because then only the woman would carry the mutated 
gene, and hence the child would be free from the disease (but may herself be a 
carrier).  Another possibility involves in-vitro fertilization (IVF) where the woman’s 
egg and the man’s sperm are combined in a petri dish and then transferred to the 
woman’s uterus once it has divided a number of times. Multiple embryos are routinely 
implanted in this procedure to increase the likelihood that one of them would “take” 
and implant itself in the uterine wall.  What makes this technique particularly 
attractive for couples facing the risk of TSD is that such a procedure allows lab 
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technicians to implant only those embryos that were free from TSD.199 Hence, assisted 
reproduction in this way also allows for some assurances regarding the alleviation of 
disease. 
 Before discussing whether or not either of these procedures would comprise 
viable options for the observant Jewish couple in lieu of conceiving naturally, we must 
determine whether or not such procedures are permitted at all. After all, if these 
technologies are prohibited generally, then even the best of intentions – prevention and 
hence eradication of TSD – may not be enough to justify their use. On the other hand, 
we have previously discussed instances where actions that were normally prohibited 
were “trumped” by other considerations and hence permitted in the service of some 
higher goal. That could happen here as well. Regardless, it is important to understand 
the perspectives on the technologies before evaluating them further. 
 Regarding AID, there are two conflicting schools of thought.200 One school 
cites a number of Talmudic passages where an individual’s parentage appears to have 
resulted from a means other than sexual intercourse between his parents: through 
impregnation via water in which a woman had bathed, or “linen on which a man other 
than her husband had lain” resulting in someone’s impregnation.  There are two 
primary concerns here: the status of the resulting child and whether or not the woman 
has violated a religious rule (against adultery, against incest, against premarital sex).  
                                                 
199 As Mary Ann Handel pointed out to me, this technology is very specialized and not 
widespread. However, the possibility does exist for the expansion of such technology, 
especially if there is a demand for the procedure by a portion of the population. 
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In each of these cases, the rabbis found judgment in favor of the woman in question, 
so that the religious rules that may have been violated had sexual intercourse taken 
place were not violated in this instance.  In all of these cases, the rabbinic rulings 
supports the principle that “…the relationship between father and child is not 
necessarily dependant on physical intercourse between the parents, and that, on the 
other hand, the legal consequences of incest render a child illegitimate only if the 
forbidden union between the parents was natural.”201 
 There is wide disagreement with these rulings, however, and contemporary 
rabbis almost universally condemn the practice of AID. This is primarily on account 
of three concerns: the prohibition against incest, the prohibition against adultery, and 
questions about genealogy that may lead to issues with inheritance.202 The scholars 
fear that if a woman conceives a child through an anonymous sperm donation, then the 
resultant child, not knowing her parentage, may marry her brother. In such a case, the 
child will have committed incest, one of the three cardinal transgressions of Judaism. 
(Recall that any religious law may be circumvented to save a life except for the 
prohibitions against idolatry, murder and incest; these are the three “worst” crimes 
under Jewish law, and all are punishable by extreme measures.)  A concern about 
adultery also arises because the sperm is not that of the husband’s, and as a result the 
child may be considered a bastard, which has important legal consequences. Questions 
                                                                                                                                            
200 Immanuel Jakobovits (1975), 246-248. 
201 Ibid., 247. 
202 Rosner and Bleich, 108-116. 
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about inheritance also wrinkle the picture, as the rabbis are uncertain to the claims of 
the child to the money and other assets of what today we would call the “social” 
father.   
 Immanuel Jakobovits also opposes AID, on more fundamental grounds than 
the above-mentioned, which are easily argued in either direction. Jakobovits opposes 
AID for “moral reasons”: he is concerned about the possible precedent that allowing 
AID would set. He speaks of “…reducing human generation to stud-farming 
methods,” and argues that this procedure  
…severs the link between procreation of children and marriage, 
indispensable to the maintenance of the family as the most basic and 
sacred unit of human society…Altogether, the generation of children 
would become arbitrary and mechanical, robbed of those mystic and 
intimately human qualities which make man a partner with God in the 
creative propagation of the race.203 
 
Because of this severing of the family ties, some scholars worry that AID will lead to 
promiscuity and hence should be prohibited on these grounds.204  
 There is no clear conclusion from these varied sources as to the permissibility 
of AID. It is considered “by most rabbinic opinion to be an abomination and strictly 
prohibited,”205 but given the divided opinions, Rosner suggests caution in the 
application of the general principles: “[s]ince many important legal and moral 
considerations which cannot be enunciated in the presentation of general principles 
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204 Ibid., Rosner and Bleich, 111. 
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may weigh heavily upon the verdict in any given situation, it seems advisable to 
submit each individual case to rabbinic judgment, which, in turn, will be based upon 
expert medical advice and other prevailing circumstances.”206 Perhaps most important 
for our purposes is David Feldman’s brief mention that “[n]one of the medically 
resourceful alternatives would be chosen, or permitted to be chosen, when conception 
and birth in the normal way are possible.”207 A question that must be addressed, then, 
is whether or not an exception would or could be made in the case of a couple facing 
the possibility of TSD.  Since conception and birth are not the problem, but rather the 
constitution of the resulting child, it is doubtful that this procedure, contentious in and 
of itself, would be a viable option for these couples. 
Homologous in-vitro fertilization208 – IVF using the wife’s ova and the 
husband’s sperm -- does not carry with it the same problems that AID does: the sperm 
in question comes from the husband, so there are no problems regarding adultery for 
the women or questions of genealogy on the part of the child. Hence, the prohibitions 
against incest and the legal ramifications of illegitimacy do not arise in the case of 
IVF. However, IVF remains morally problematic for this group for three reasons: (1) 
as this procedure is conducted outside of the intimacy of the family bond, this 
similarly “severs the link between procreation and marriage” of which Immanuel 
                                                 
206 Ibid., 97. 
207 Feldman (1986), 75. 
208 From here on out, I will simply refer to homologous IVF as IVF. 
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Jakobovits speaks, so if AID is to be prohibited on those grounds, IVF will fare no 
better.  
(2) The second major problem is the way in which the sperm is collected from 
the husband, as alluded to in chapter one.209 This issue would also be raised in 
situations of artificial insemination with the husband’s sperm – AIH. However, since 
the goal in cases of TSD is to prevent the birth of a Tay-Sachs afflicted child by 
making sure that both partners are not carriers of the mutation, AIH is not an option. If 
the husband is a carrier of the Tay-Sachs mutation, artificial insemination will not 
help.  
Looking at the rulings regarding AIH, however, does assist us in the 
understanding the stakes involved in the procurement of semen.  There is great 
concern in Jewish law to avoid the “improper emission of generative seed.” While 
there is no clear biblical passage to which this prohibition refers, many relate this to 
the practice of “onanism,” which was named for the main character in a Biblical story. 
In Genesis 38:7-10, we learn of Onan, whose brother had died and left his wife 
childless. According to the rules of levirate marriage, Onan was required to marry 
Tamar, his sister-in-law, for the purpose of having children and continuing his 
brother’s line. He did marry her, but he apparently practiced coitus interruptus so that 
                                                 
209 See page 15. 
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Tamar never conceived. For this offense, God punished Onan with death, ostensibly 
because he “wasted” seed.210 
Since semen procured for the purpose of inseminating his wife is not “wasted” 
in the same way, the rabbis cautiously permit the practice of AIH. What is at issue is 
how the semen can best be procured.  Masturbation, the most common way to obtain 
semen today, is to be avoided at all costs.  Instead, methods that more closely 
resemble the “natural” act of intercourse are preferred. For instance, the most desirable 
method of semen procurement is to retrieve the sample from the woman’s vagina 
following sexual intercourse. Since this is logistically challenging in many cases, some 
authority figures sanction the use of a condom to procure the semen.  Others, however, 
actually prefer coitus interruptus.211  Regardless of the method, two important points 
are to be noted: “wasting” seed is to be avoided at all costs and is punishable by death, 
and that the procurement of semen in order to assist reproduction must be 
accomplished by the method that most closely resembles the “natural” act of sexual 
intercourse that is possible in the particular situation.212 
(3) The third problem is the possible destruction of extra embryos is a problem  
                                                 
210 This is somewhat of an oversimplification of the story and its surrounding 
implications, but it is sufficient for our purposes.  For a lengthy discussion of this 
incident, see Feldman (1968), 144-165. 
211 Rosner (1991), 95-97. 
212 Jonathan Kaplan suggested to me that it would be useful to be reminded here of the 
distinction between those who follow the traditions most closely and those who do 
not; alternative methods of semen procurement may be less of an anathema to couples 
that do not follow such orthodox traditions. 
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for some scholars in the Jewish tradition. In fact, this issue has the community divided.  
For our purposes, the terms “extra embryos” refer to embryos that were not implanted 
either because (1) they were simply extras or (2) because, after screening, it was 
determined that they carried two copies of the Tay-Sachs mutation and hence were 
deemed unsuitable for implantation.  One source comments that “…untransplanted 
embryos have no standing and may be discarded.”213  The Talmud speaks of an 
embryo being “’mere water’ within the first forty days of conception”214 and hence 
can be destroyed. As another rabbi comments, “[t]o the extent there is an absolute 
[permission] to abort215 a pre-40 days embryo, there would certainly be a dispensation 
to destroy or discard a preembryo (regardless of how many days had passed from 
fertilization) since its development has certainly not progressed to the 40-day 
point.”216 However, where the agreement seems to be is in the fact that an embryo 
conceived in vitro will not develop into a human being unless it is transplanted into the 
woman’s uterus. For example, Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu argues that: “’Fertilized ova 
that have been designated for transfer to a woman’s uterus should not be destroyed, 
since a live fetus will develop from them, but fertilized ova that have not been 
                                                 
213 Richard V. Grazi and Joel B. Wolowelsky, “Preimplantation Sex Selection and 
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designated for transfer may be discarded.’”217  Hence, the untransplanted embryo is 
not human, and “if there is no human fetal life outside the uterus, a superfluous 
fertilized ovum could be disposed of by any means, such as flushing down the drain. 
An alternative course of action would be to refrain from supplying nutrients to the 
ovum, thereby allowing it to perish.”218  What Rosner is identifying here is a 
distinction between a fertilized egg in a woman’s uterus and a fertilized egg in a 
laboratory.219 The crucial distinction is the potential for development. If science 
progresses to the point of the creation of an artificial womb, this distinction might be 
revisited.   
This is, of course, different from those sources that argue that life begins at the 
moment of conception, when the sperm fertilizes the egg. Some argue on these 
grounds that the protection that is offered to the fetus extends back before the 40-day 
point.  In IVF, technicians combine the sperm and egg in the petri dish; hence, despite 
the fact that the fertilized egg is not in a medium in which it can develop into a human 
being, conception has taken place.  Hence, those who argue that life must be protected 
would not sanction the destruction of such an entity.  Mackler cites J. David Bleich as 
opposing the destruction of viable embryos on the grounds that the distinction Rosner 
cites breaks down. “’[T]here are no obvious grounds for assuming that nascent human 
                                                 
217 Mordechai Eliyahu in Aaron L Mackler, “An Expanded Partnership with God? In 
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life may be destroyed simply because it is not sheltered in its natural habitat, i.e., its 
development takes place outside the mothers womb.’ He suggests that in vitro 
embryos that are viable should not be destroyed.”220 
Mackler suggests an alternative to these two views whereby unused embryos 
are permanently stored with the possibility of future transfer into a woman for 
gestation. He argues that this will respect all of the obligations regarding the status of 
embryos and the protection that some feel that they deserve. As recent events221 
demonstrate, however, this solution is less than ideal, as storage facilities are 
beginning to run out of room to hold all of the unused embryos. Mackler’s suggestion 
seems simply to prolong the problem rather than to solve it.  
Hence, the (im)permissibility of IVF seems to rest on the (im)permissibility of 
abortion, which is the topic of the next section. 
Genetic Testing after Conception 
 It is possible that couples that are already pregnant would engage in genetic 
testing for the sole purpose of information gathering; that is, parents may want to 
know if the child they are expecting will be afflicted with TSD so that they can be 
                                                                                                                                            
219 See also Moshe D. Tendler, “Rabbinic Comment: In Vitro Fertilization and 
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physically and psychologically prepared. As previously discussed, there would be 
little objection to testing if this were in fact the motivation. 
 However, many authorities would be concerned that results from such a test 
that indicated that the expectant mother was carrying a child with TSD would be used 
to justify abortion. To understand the implications of this, we must understand the 
views regarding the (im)permissibility of abortion in Jewish law. 
 Judaism has always permitted abortion in one particular circumstance: when 
the continuation of the pregnancy endangered the life of the mother. The defense of 
this practice can be traced to two principles: (1) that the fetus is not a “person” in the 
full sense until after birth, and (2) the fetus in such a case is viewed as a “pursuer” that 
is threatening the mother, who is then permitted to defend herself. I will briefly 
explain each idea below. 
  The fetus becomes a person, according to Jewish law, after it has been born. 
Until that point, it is considered to be a part of the mother and has no legal status of its 
own.222 It is important to remember, however, that having no legal status does not 
automatically mean that the fetus has no moral status, either. Even if that moral status 
is less than that of the mother, certain moral considerations may be due to the fetus.  
Yet the fact that it is not a person with full moral status grants certain actions 
permissible that would otherwise be prohibited. One major scriptural basis grounding 
the different status between a fetus and a person is Exodus 21:22, where, as a result of 
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some sort of assault, a pregnant woman miscarries. The punishment levied on the 
offenders in this case is that they must pay some fine, as opposed to the penalty that 
would be appropriate for homicide, a capital crime.  Hence, a fetus must be 
importantly different in status from persons in general. 
 This is not to say, however, that the fetus has no moral standing in Jewish law. 
On the contrary, Judaism is a life-affirming religion, with a principle respecting the 
sanctity of human life (which will be discussed in the next section).  The “wanton 
destruction” of the embryo is never permitted, as the embryo is still potential life and 
has some significance.223  
 So what is the precise dividing line between “wanton destruction” and 
sanctioned disposal? One instance where abortion is clearly permitted is in the case of 
a threat to the mother’s life.  The passage from the Mishna most frequently cited is: “if 
a woman has [life-threatening] difficulty in childbirth, one dismembers the embryo 
within her, limb by limb, because her life takes precedence over its life. Once its head 
(or its “greater part”) has emerged, it may not be touched, for we do not set aside one 
                                                                                                                                            
222 Rosner (1991), 136; Feldman (1968), 254.  The status of the child changes once it 
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223 J. David Bleich, “Abortion in Halahkic Literature” in Rosner and Bleich, 135. This 
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40 days has passed. Or it could be that “wanton destruction” implies a complete lack 
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life for another”.224  Some sources liken this to a case of self-defense, where we are 
permitted to kill someone who is mortally threatening us without the waiting for due 
process. Of course, an implication of this is that if the mother’s life is threatened while 
pregnant – during labor, for example – from a cause other than the fetus, then abortion 
is not justified as a solution.225  Only when the fetus is the cause of the mortal distress 
is abortion permitted.  There is universal acceptance of abortion in this case; in fact, 
many sources argue that abortion is not merely permitted in such circumstances, but in 
fact is required to save the woman’s life.226  
 From that point, however, the water becomes murkier. In traditional secular 
bioethics, therapeutic abortion has not been limited to cases of threats to the mother’s 
life, but also included threats to her health.  Authorities in Jewish bioethics differ on 
the permissibility of abortion in such circumstances. Given the difference in moral 
status between the fetus and the woman, however, most authorities claim that abortion 
is sometimes, even often, permitted when the woman’s health is threatened.  
To categorize the different approaches that sources have used to discuss this 
issue, David Feldman identifies one approach that “moves up” from certain principles 
and another that “moves down.” That is, one approach begins with the assumption that 
abortion is “’akin to homicide,’ and therefore permissible only in cases of 
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corresponding gravity, such as saving the life of the mother.”227  This approach then 
works down from this strict perspective to one that acknowledges the legitimacy of 
abortion for other reasons, such as a threat to the woman’s health and not just her life. 
The other approach “assumes no real prohibition against abortion at any time, except 
perhaps during the most advanced stage of pregnancy, and builds up from this lenient 
position to safeguard against indiscriminate abortion.”228 The first viewpoint, 
represented by Rabbi Unterman, looks to the danger involved to the woman were her 
pregnancy to continue. He includes in this assessment of danger challenges to mental 
health as well. Any form of instability that carries with it suicidal tendencies does 
constitute a life-or-death situation, and hence the principle should be extended this far. 
This is most commonly related to the principle of “mental anguish,” where a person’s 
psychological state is so severely affected by one of the proposed choices as to justify 
the selection of the alternative. Someone who is in such distress at the prospect of an 
upcoming child, for example, might do harm to herself or others, and hence would 
qualify as a life-or-death situation. These sources argue, then, that the notion that 
abortion is “akin to homicide,” should be relaxed in these cases. 
 As for the other perspective, which does not recognize the strict legal 
interpretations of the first view, it still carries with it a recognition of the sanctity and 
value of human life, and an understanding of the fetus as a potential form of actual 
life. Hence, indiscriminate abortion is prohibited. After all, the fetus does retain some 
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moral status, and it is simply the consideration of the overriding status of the mother 
that outweighs the other’s claim to life.  However, given the absence of strict 
regulation as to the permissibility of abortion, when such an action is considered 
“…for a reason, even if it is a slim reason…then we have precedent and authority to 
permit it.”229 
 There are a few specific concerns with which the sources have dealt that will 
be helpful for us to consider as they relate to issues involved with TSD.  As to the 
woman who was distressed at the likelihood that her child may be deformed, because, 
for example, the mother had German measles or took Thalidomide during pregnancy, 
the rabbis traditionally have not permitted abortion in this instance. This is because of 
the uncertainty of the outcome; there is no guarantee that the child will be 
deformed.230 This would require some sort of divine foreknowledge that humans lack. 
Hence, abortion is not permitted in these circumstances.231 
 With the advent of modern technology, of course, the issues change 
dramatically. Through mechanisms like ultrasound and amniocentesis parents are now 
much more sure of whether or not their children will be born with some abnormality. 
Hence, the argument that rests on the certainty of the outcome is diminished. That is, 
previously it was argued that women were prohibited from having an abortion because 
                                                                                                                                            
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid., 291. 
230 Ibid., 292. 
231 In instances where the mother would be so distraught at such a prospect as to pose 
a threat to herself or others, however, abortion would be permitted. 
  
  
133
of a suspected abnormality with the fetus. Now that technology has allowed us to be 
more certain of the outcome, the argument about uncertainty no long holds. If abortion 
is still prohibited in this case, it must be because it is wrong to abort deformed fetuses, 
not because we are unsure that a deformed fetus will result.  That is, in fact, the case 
here. If a woman was to have an amniocentesis performed for the purposes of aborting 
the fetus if an anomaly was detected, and such an abortion were prohibited, then the 
amniocentesis should be likewise prohibited. Engaging in such a procedure offers little 
in the way of solution and much in the way of heartache for these couples.  It is on this 
basis that some rabbis argue against engaging in these procedures.  So it is the case 
that the use of modern technology must be subjected to the principles and precedents 
in the same manner as other medical procedures. 
 As far as earlier intervention is concerned, there is some support for the notion 
that the fetus prior to 40 days is considered “mere water” and can be discarded or 
affected in ways not permitted of older fetuses.232  Some consider the destruction of 
such an embryo not the taking of a life but rather the “destruction of seed,” which 
carries with it different importance.233 Even in the more strict interpretations, an early 
abortion is much less objectionable than a later one. This is understandable given the 
difference in moral status granted solely on the basis of development: the child that is 
born is closer to being a full person than is an early collection of undifferentiated cells. 
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Some sources234 do not grant full personhood to the child until she has reached the age 
of 30 days, given the high rate of infant mortality in the historical texts. A child that 
survives 30 days out of the womb is considered likely to develop and grow and hence 
is given full moral status. 
 With this as background, we can now turn to the question of the permissibility 
of abortion in cases of children with TSD.  Assuming no other complicating factors, it 
is not the case that the woman’s physical health is in jeopardy by carrying a TSD baby 
to term. Typically, there are no physical problems with the pregnancy, so the 
permissibility of abortion on the grounds of the threat to the mother’s life do not apply 
here. 
 The question then revolves around the danger to the mother’s health. For those 
sources that follow the strictest interpretation of law and precedent such that a danger 
to the mother’s health is not a mitigating factor, abortion would not be permitted.  
 Many sources, however, do make an exception for women carrying a baby 
they know (through genetic testing) will have TSD. This is commonly accomplished 
through an appeal to the principle of mental anguish.  According to this principle, an 
abortion is permitted if it can be demonstrated that the mother’s mental health is in 
great jeopardy if she were to continue the pregnancy.  The protection of the woman’s  
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mental state235 is affirmed because of the connection between mental health and 
physical health; one who is in a “state of hysteria” might very well “do physical harm 
to self or others.”236 Hence, certain cases of abortion have been justified according to 
this criterion: the mental anguish a mother may experience at the prospect of giving 
birth to a child who will degenerate before her eyes for a matter of 3-5 years may very 
well be a threat to her (or another’s) physical health, and hence should be avoided.   
 It is solely with these considerations that a woman may abort a fetus with TSD. 
Either carrying such a child to term will produce such mental anguish in the mother 
that it would be destructive to her or to others, or else the fetus is viewed as a 
“pursuer” from whom the woman is justified in defending herself. So an abortion is 
possible for some women who discover that they are carrying a TSD-affected fetus, 
depending on the authority consulted and on the severity of the consequences that will 
result if she were to carry the child to term. Given the great variety in source 
interpretations, however, as well as the contingency of any claim of mitigation on the 
part of the woman, it is understandable why most rabbis recommend that testing for 
TSD be performed long before a woman is pregnant. However, for those that would 
permit a woman to have an abortion if the results came out positive for TSD, then 
genetic testing for this disease at this stage would be advised. For those who oppose 
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abortion on these or other grounds, genetic testing at this stage would not be advised, 
since there is a good chance that distress would result from gaining information about 
which we could take no action. It is the case, as previously discussed, that genetic 
testing in order to be prepared for one’s circumstances is, strictly speaking, allowed. 
Yet whether or not such action is advisable depends upon the amount of distress that 
might be experienced as a result of the information gained.  While it is difficult to 
determine exactly how we will react to upsetting news, some indicators are better 
predictors than others about what to expect from others and from ourselves. These 
expectations must be taken into consideration when ascertaining the advisability of 
genetic testing. 
Breast Cancer 
An observant Jewish woman who is contemplating genetic testing for breast 
cancer would typically seek out her rabbi (or empower her husband to do so on her 
behalf) to determine whether or not such testing is acceptable according to Jewish law.  
Pronouncing an action acceptable under Jewish law does not require that it be carried 
out, but it does grant permission for its consideration, which otherwise would be 
lacking. This becomes especially important in a medical context, where the decision in 
question will likely affect the body of the individual. According to Jewish law, a 
person does not maintain complete sovereignty over her body; rather, her body 
belongs to God, and is simply on loan for the duration of her lifetime. Because of this 
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special relationship, every person is required to “take reasonable care of our bodies” 
and correspondingly to avoid any unnecessary harm.237 Ascertaining exactly what it 
means to take “reasonable” care and avoid “unnecessary” harm is the task of the 
contemporary authorities. 
 So how would religious authorities determine the acceptability of breast cancer 
screening, given that there are obviously no specific guides on the subject in the 
ancient texts?   The first step in assessing the acceptability of genetic testing for the 
mutations associated with breast cancer is to identify the rules and principles that 
would be relevant to this case.  There are three fundamental principles that seem 
appropriate to apply to this case: (1) the sanctity of human life; (2) the principle of 
mental anguish; and (3) the idea of the body as belonging to God.  I will discuss each 
of these in turn.   
 The principle of the sanctity of human life carries with it an obligation on the 
part of health care providers to heal whenever possible. Except for three cardinal 
transgressions (the prohibition against murder, idolatry and incest), it is permitted to 
override any religious obligation, including observance of the Sabbath, if it will save 
the life of oneself or another. This is because “…the overriding consideration in 
suspending religious laws is the intrinsic value of life, which transcends the moral 
worth of religious observance.”238 Hence, this principle takes prima facie precedence 
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over all the others; if a course of action can save a life, then that is the action that must 
be performed.239 
 Given this focus on the value of the life of the individual (which, of course, has 
certain implications for end-of-life treatment decisions), one thing that must be 
ascertained is whether or not testing for the mutations associated with breast cancer 
falls under the scope of this principle. Certainly the regular breast cancer screening 
procedures (self breast exams, yearly clinical exams, mammography) coincide with 
the goal of saving life, as the purpose of those procedures is to detect cancer early so 
that effective treatment may be offered and hence will help to prolong the life of the 
individual.  Genetic testing for breast cancer mutations may accomplish a similar goal.  
A woman who has tested positive for one or more of the mutations will be aware of 
the need to exercise increased vigilance for signs and symptoms of the disease. It is 
also possible that she will engage in a clinical trial of a prophylactic medication, or 
even go to the extent of having a prophylactic mastectomy and/or oopherectomy on 
account of the information she receives from a genetic test. All of these measures 
seem to correspond to an emphasis on the intrinsic value of life. 
 However, one must remember that the opposite is also possible. I mean two 
things by this. First, it is possible that the test results will come back negative, and that 
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such a finding may dangerously encourage women to become lax in their self or 
clinical breast exams. This would run counter to the goal of the value of life. While 
this is certainly possible, it is with the second meaning that I am more concerned.  It is 
possible that the psychological burden of a positive test result might be so severe as to 
impair an individual’s experience with living. Knowing that one has a significantly 
increased likelihood of developing cancer – perhaps even the same cancer that killed 
her mother and sister – is a harm that must be considered when deciding on the 
advisability of testing. An interesting thing to note about the principle of the sanctity 
of life is that nowhere does it speak to the quality of the life that is preserved – a bone 
of contention with some euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide advocates.  
Regardless, even if these negative results develop as a result of finding out that one is 
at increased risk for developing breast cancer, insofar as this information is likely to 
lead to saving the life of this woman, there is nothing in the sanctity of life principle 
alone that speaks against having the test performed. 
 This quality assessment is apparently addressed, however, with the principle of 
mental anguish, which was discussed in the last section.  Recall that according to this 
principle (in the previously-mentioned context), an abortion is permitted if it can be 
demonstrated that the mother’s mental health is in great jeopardy if she were to 
continue the pregnancy.  The protection of the woman’s mental state is affirmed 
because of the connection between mental health and physical health; one who is in a 
  
  
140
“state of hysteria” might very well “do physical harm to self or others.”240 Given this 
context for evaluating the importance of maintaining mental health when 
contemplating a medical decision, it is necessary to ask whether or not the fears 
previously mentioned regarding genetic testing for mutations associated with breast 
cancer would qualify under this principle.  Certainly it is possible that the information 
gained from genetic testing would negatively affect someone’s mental health. The 
question then becomes one of breadth: how broadly can the principle of mental 
anguish be applied before it becomes meaningless?  This is a problem, of course, 
because any difficult decision carries with it some degree of mental anguish, some 
measure of being unsettled by the choice that has to be made. At what point does the 
distress become sufficiently severe to warrant an overriding status?  Fred Rosner notes 
that “[p]sychiatric indication for abortion must be certified by competent medical 
opinion or by previous experiences of mental illness in the mother, such as a 
postpartum nervous breakdown.”241 From this, it seems as though the circumstances 
must be grave indeed to warrant the inclusion of this principle into the decision 
process. If that is the case, however, then the applicability of the rule is severely 
limited.  Without clear evidence that the woman will have some serious breakdown as 
a result of the information she may receive from genetic testing, then there is no 
reason to override the principle of the sanctity of human life.242  And yet mental 
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distress manifests itself in various forms, and is often quite harmful to many 
individuals on multiple levels.  We have no indication, however, that Jewish law 
allows for this sort of consideration in the decision-making process. 
 The final principle that is of concern when discussing the permissibility of 
breast cancer testing is that the body belongs ultimately to God.  The rules that cover 
the ways in which we care for our bodies follow from this overarching principle. 
There are rules that require Jews to take “reasonable care” of their bodies, to avoid 
“unnecessary risk,” and to take positive steps to “maintain good health” whenever 
possible.243 Fred Rosner interprets this to mean that a person “…is entrusted with her 
body and may use but not abuse it.  She is commanded to care for her body and soul 
and do all that is necessary to protect and preserve both.”244   
The idea that the body is on loan to an individual, then, seems to sanction 
genetic testing for the purposes of information gathering insofar as the information is 
useful and important in saving the life or protecting the health of the individual. While 
this course of action also coincides with the principle of the sanctity of human life, it is 
brought into specific relief here.  So, for example, a woman who discovers that she is 
at an increased risk of developing breast cancer may become more vigilant about the 
warning signs and hence her cancer may be detected earlier, thus saving her life. If 
Jews are commanded to do what they can to care for and preserve the body that is 
simply on loan to them, learning susceptibility information aids in that service.   In 
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fact, one might make the argument that if sufficient treatment options are available for 
a particular affliction, engaging in testing for that disease is not merely permissible, 
but is mandatory. This follows directly from the notion that we are commanded to do 
whatever we can to preserve these bodies that are on loan to us. Certainly this seems to 
be the attitude society has taken in regards to the condition phenylketonuria (PKU).  
Infant testing is mandated by law in most states because the condition is largely 
manageable with a particular diet plan started almost immediately upon the child’s 
birth.  This is an example of an affliction where the therapy offered is sufficiently 
effective and accessible, and the test itself has a sufficiently low degree of risk 
involved, such that testing is required.  Certainly the benefit-to-burden ratio needs to 
be assessed in each case, but the model is clear.  The requirement to take “reasonable 
care” of our bodies in Jewish law clearly sanctions following health regimens to the 
extent we are able -- we ought to eat nutritionally-advantageous foods and get regular 
exercise – so that our body is being preserved as well as we are able.  Seeking medical 
attention when it is necessary is also important, both for acute and chronic conditions.  
With the advent of genetic medicine, the injunction to seek medical care takes on a 
new twist.  If a genetic test were developed that enabled us to know that we were at 
significant risk for heart disease, for example, which we know can be combated by 
eating sensibly and engaging in a regular exercise program, then taking “reasonable 
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care” of our bodies might include both having the test done and, subsequently, 
following the recommended course of action.   
The situation is a bit less clear with genetic testing for the genes associated 
with breast cancer, since there is little therapy currently available for those who 
discover that they are at particular risk for developing the disease.  However, learning 
which diseases pose special threats to individuals may not only increase their vigilance 
regarding signs and symptoms of the disease, but may also cause them to take 
proactive measures, such as engaging in prophylactic treatment interventions or not 
having children to avoid passing the gene to future generations. 
 One example of such engagement is the woman who chooses to take a more 
proactive role in relation to her risk for developing breast cancer and opts for a 
prophylactic mastectomy and/or oophorectomy.  This act may indeed save the 
woman’s life…or it may not. A prophylactic mastectomy does reduce the woman’s 
risk of getting breast cancer, but not all the way to zero; there is still a chance that she 
will develop the disease in remaining tissues.  Furthermore, recall that there is no 
guarantee that a woman who tests positive for one of the mutations will in fact develop 
breast cancer.  So if the woman never develops the disease, it is possible that this 
disfiguring surgery was, in some sense wasted. (Of course, it is also possible that she 
did not develop breast cancer because she had the surgery!) Regardless, this speaks to 
an important issue: how much evidence is “enough” to justify an action? The rules in 
Jewish law regarding the treatment of the body are specific; both temporary measures 
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like the use of cosmetics and the more permanent measure of cosmetic surgery are 
permitted on the grounds that we are beautifying ourselves and hence further 
dignifying the bodies that God has loaned to us.245  The proposed body alteration in 
this case, of course, does not involve beautification, but rather the opposite: intentional 
deformity. And yet the removal of a cancerous breast from an affected individual is 
clearly sanctioned.  This action is justified in Jewish law by the positive obligation to 
preserve life and health, and insofar as the removal of the tissue coincides with this 
goal, then the action is permitted. Intentional deformity, then, would be permitted in 
the case of actual breast cancer, but it is unclear to me if it would be likewise 
permitted in the case of the susceptibility to breast cancer. 
 Rabbi Dorff utilizes the previously mentioned principles to argue for an 
obligation for a woman at risk for the mutations to be tested. He offers two grounds 
for this obligation: the duty to preserve life and health, which requires increased 
vigilance on the part of the woman if she tests positively for the mutations and, 
secondly, because such a test “opens up the possibility … of a radical mastectomy in 
an effort to prevent breast cancer.”246 However, he offers no further defense of the 
mastectomy, and hence it is still unclear to me that such an action would be permitted, 
much less required. 
 A final issue that must be considered in relation to the woman’s decision to 
undergo a prophylactic mastectomy relates to the issue of probabilities.  As previously 
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discussed, it is not certain that the woman will not develop breast cancer if she has the 
surgery, nor is it certain that she will develop the cancer if she refuses this course of 
treatment. Hence, the degree of uncertainty to which each alternative is tied will be 
important in the woman’s decision process. For example, while it is the case that she 
might still develop breast cancer even if she has the mastectomy, the probability of her 
doing so is drastically reduced. Depending upon how the surgery would affect her 
psychologically, this course of action may carry with it the greatest benefit. On the 
other hand, if she were so psychologically burdened by the surgery that knowing that 
she still would retain some chance of developing the disease would be even more of a 
harm, then the probability of her developing breast cancer takes on a greater 
importance. What this underscores is the need to evaluate each individual’s situation 
separately, with an understanding of the probabilities as well as how this will be 
influenced by her concerns and predilections. 
Colorectal Cancer 
 There are many similarities between the issues involved in colorectal cancer 
and those that are involved with the other diseases mentioned.  The applicability of the 
notion that the body belongs to God and is on loan to humans, for us to care for during 
our lifetime, is one notable similarity between breast cancer and colon cancer.  The 
principle of mental anguish, discussed in relation to both TSD and breast cancer, will 
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apply here as well. Hence, much of that which was previously used to justify decisions 
in Jewish law will apply in this context as well. 
 However, there are unique features of colorectal cancer that make it an 
interesting subject for discussion.  One main difference between colorectal cancer and 
breast cancer, for example, is the rate of prevalence of the diseases, as discussed in 
chapter two.  Not only is colorectal cancer less common than breast cancer, but the 
implication of the genetic test is importantly different: individuals who have the 
genetic mutation associated with colorectal cancer have an increased likelihood of 
developing the disease, but how likely that development is is unclear. While a positive 
result of mutation testing for BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutations indicated a strong 
likelihood that the individual would develop breast cancer, and even more so for the 
Ashkenazi Jewish population where carriers of one of the mutations are at three times 
the risk for developing breast cancer as is the general population.247  The situation is 
more vague with colorectal cancer. This is important because with the difference in 
probability of developing the disease comes a different set of considerations in 
assessing the risk of participation in genetic testing. 
It is also significant that the clinical screening examinations for signs and 
symptoms of colorectal cancer are much more invasive and uncomfortable than those 
for breast cancer.  This is important because, in some senses, it raises the stakes for 
genetic testing: if it were the case that a negative result from genetic testing would 
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mean that individuals could participate in fewer invasive examinations, and that the 
testing does not carry with it any additional burdens, then this is a compelling reason 
to engage in testing. Since roughly 15% of the cases of colorectal cancer diagnosed 
annually have a hereditary component, this information could indeed be significant.248  
In fact, though, there are additional burdens with this, as with all, genetic testing: the 
risk to an individual’s insurance coverage, and the risk that that the patient will find 
out information about her family members that the family members may not want to 
know.  Furthermore, there are dangers associated with testing that are similar to those 
discussed in relation to breast cancer: individuals who find that they do not have the 
mutation associated with colorectal cancer may become lax in getting recommended 
clinical exams.  This is especially dangerous for those at risk for colorectal cancer 
since the only way to detect the disease is through the invasive exams.  All of this 
must be weighed in a cost/benefit analysis of genetic testing for colorectal cancer.  
Since the recommended course of action for a negative test result – that annual 
colonoscopies that are recommended for those with a family history of early-onset 
colorectal cancer can be reduced to a colonoscopy every two years – is, in some ways, 
only a slight benefit, many would argue that the burdens incurred by genetic testing 
outweigh the benefits. In this section, I will focus on individuals who share these 
concerns and, as a result, desire not to engage in genetic testing, despite the 
recommendations of their health care providers. 
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 There are three principles in Jewish law that explicitly relate to genetic testing 
for colorectal cancer, but because of these varied consequences, I contend that the 
closest analogy to this issue in Jewish law is the concept of risk. The other two 
principles, the principle of mental anguish and that of the individual as a caretaker of 
her body, will be discussed in relation to the issue of risk.  Assessing how much risk 
an individual is permitted to – or even should – take will be appropriate for the patient 
who is considering not engaging in genetic screening because of some or all of the 
abovementioned factors.  It is important to note here that while risk is involved both in 
engaging in screening and in refraining from screening, more risk to an individual’s 
health is at stake when an individual refrains from engaging in genetic testing. This is 
because the additional information that would be available to the individual as a result 
of the test would be absent. Hence, unless otherwise noted, the risk discussed in this 
chapter refers to that which the individual incurs by refraining from engaging in 
genetic testing for the mutations associated with colorectal cancer. 
According to Jewish bioethicist Benjamin Freedman, the general attitude 
towards risk is that “…risks must be counterbalanced by proportional gains, so that 
even the greatest risks are allowable under extreme conditions.”249  To begin with, 
Freedman emphasizes the role of the individual as the caretaker of his or her body. As 
discussed in the section on breast cancer, an individual’s body belongs to God and is 
on loan for the duration of his or her lifetime.  Any acceptable risk to this body, says 
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Freedman, must coincide with the goal of the individual acting as a reasonable 
caretaker of this body.  Some risk may be allowable – for example, occasionally 
ordering pizza with extra cheese – but such a risk is relatively minor.  In an attempt to 
ascertain how much risk is allowable in a medical context, Freedman discusses three 
principles that define and classify “allowable risk.” According to the first principle, an 
individual may risk life in order to lengthen life.250  For example, if there is one last 
treatment for a dying man that has a chance at saving his life, but also has a chance of 
killing him if it does not work, the Jew is permitted, but not required, to participate in 
the treatment and hence assume the risk.  Presumably this is on account of one of the 
principles previously mentioned, that of the sanctity of life.  Since life is sacred in 
Judaism and we are commanded to do whatever we can to save a life, then the benefit 
of taking on a risky procedure that has some chance of saving someone’s life overrides 
the possibility that it might cause death.  The attempt to save a life is what is crucial 
here.   
Given this focus on the sanctity of life, it does not appear as though taking on 
the risk by not engaging in genetic testing would be sanctioned according to this 
principle.  Knowledge that one has a genetic mutation that puts her at increased risk 
for developing colorectal cancer could assist her in saving her life by stimulating her 
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to engage in more frequent clinical exams,251 to become more vigilant about the 
warning signs, etc. Hence, if there is a way to sanction refraining from engaging in 
genetic testing for colorectal cancer, it must be justified according to another principle. 
The second principle Freedman mentions is “risking pain and life for quality of 
life.”252  An understanding of this principle includes knowledge of Jewish attitudes 
towards pain and suffering. While a detailed discussion of this is beyond the scope of 
this work, suffice it to say that, unlike some in other religious traditions, pain and 
suffering are not to be sought or endured for some means of salvation or soul-building. 
Rather, pain is to be alleviated wherever possible, even when such alleviation carries 
with it some level of risk.  
Quality of life assessments, however, are not exclusively concerned with pain 
and suffering.  In his discussion of cosmetic surgery, Freedman investigates whether 
or not an individual is permitted to undergo some “self-wounding” in order to produce 
a better appearance. He argues that this is justified in Jewish law because “…a person 
is permitted to undergo a degree of self-wounding and pain on behalf of that which he 
or she judges to be a greater good.”253 Of course, the interpretation comes with 
figuring out exactly what constitutes the “greater good.” If one holds that the burdens 
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of screening for mutations associated with colorectal cancer outweigh the benefits, 
then it seems like the greater good to be served here might indicate that an individual 
should not be tested.  The principle of mental anguish seems relevant here as well: the 
severity of the mental distress caused by the possible consequences of finding out the 
testing information is important to consider. If, psychologically, the burdens 
significantly outweigh the benefits, then this is another justification for refraining from 
testing.  Suppose that the individual does engage in testing and finds out that he or she 
carries one of these mutations.  Despite the regulations previously discussed, it is 
possible that employers or insurance companies may learn of this data, and that would 
in turn affect not just the individual, but her family as well. That is, there is a threat 
that if he or she learns that he or she carries the mutation, so will the insurance 
company.  The insurers may then exclude coverage of colorectal cancer treatment not 
only for herself, but also for her children, etc. This is a burden that must be considered 
when contemplating testing. 
Freedman discusses risk in relation to occupational hazards, and argues that an 
individual may take increasing risk as her economic situation becomes more 
desperate.254 For an individual who is concerned about losing insurance coverage as a 
result of a positive result from genetic testing, it is possible to argue that her economic 
constraints are sufficiently severe to justify taking such risk. Considering that any 
information gained from a genetic test also gives information about my family 
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members, the concern about insurance coverage for everyone becomes even weightier. 
Hence, it may be possible to justify refraining from screening on economic grounds.  
Freedman specifically argues, though, that this principle cannot be restricted to 
occupational considerations, since “[p]ersons are more than just economic units.  
Rather, it [the principle] must be understood as encompassing both occupations and 
any other important social role (e.g. marriage, filial duty) that person occupies or plans 
to occupy.”255  If this is the case, however, then it seems as though the principle leads 
to contradictory rulings. Considerations of my social role, for example, as a parent, 
seem to argue for the injunction to be tested.  This is because testing is a course of 
action that may result in saving or prolonging my life, and my obligations to my 
children seem to require that this action be undertaken.  My children depend on me to 
be here to care for them.  
On the other hand, a genetic test reveals information about my children just as 
it does about me. Perhaps we could argue that my obligations as a parent require that I 
not engage in testing because doing so might result in a series of bad consequences: 
the cancellation of my insurance policy, making my children uninsurable when they 
apply for coverage, or raising of the premiums to a point where I would be unable to 
pay, which would be detrimental to the health care of my children; gaining 
information about my family members regardless of whether or not they want to know 
the information, etc.  There is a minimal ranking of principles in Judaism; first and 
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foremost, we are commanded to do what we can in order to save a life. The problem is 
that even this principle is not absolute; previously in this section we looked at actions 
that could be undertaken which had some chance of risking life in favor of some other 
goal (ending pain and suffering, for example). So there is no clear way to adjudicate 
between these conflicting principles, or between conflicting actions that seem to be 
justified by a particular principle.  This is one of the key problems with using Jewish 
bioethics as a moral guide, and it will be discussed in more detail later. 
The third and final principle Freedman discusses in relation to risk is in regard 
to the threshold of risk and the notion that “God protects fools.”256 While there are 
many interpretations of this principle and the scope is quite large, Freedman focuses 
on one in particular.  “This view understands the principle as granting the reasonable 
caretaker permission to engage in activities that the general population have come to 
accept despite the (relatively improbable) risks they might entail.”257  In order for the 
risky behavior to be sanctioned, says Freedman, two conditions must hold: (1) the risk 
must be improbable; and (2) “it must be an activity widely (although not necessarily 
universally) engaged in, without its participants particularly noticing the minor risks to 
which they are exposed.”258 There is risk involved in not engaging in genetic testing: 
an individual may have a particular mutation whose discovery could lead to extra 
vigilance for the symptoms of cancer, or she might be able to engage in some sort of 
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prophylactic therapy.  A negative result from genetic testing might alleviate the 
psychological worry of individuals, and hence not having the test done would enable 
the individual to continue to fear that he “has the gene.”  However, there is also risk 
involved in engaging in genetic testing for colorectal cancer.  A positive test result 
may result in insurance and/or economic problems for the individual and his/her 
family.  Test results will give information about other family members who may not 
share the desire to know of their risk.  Negative test results may cause an individual to 
become lax in getting clinical exams, which could have a detrimental effect on her 
health. 
It is difficult to determine how “improbable” these risks are, and hence 
whether or not this action would be permissible for Jewish law. It seems to me that the 
probability of the various outcomes will vary by each situation and hence must be 
addressed accordingly. More interesting, I think, is the idea of the risky activity being 
one that people generally engage in without a recognition of the kinds of risk they are 
engendering by their action.  Since mutations run in families, those individuals often 
are aware of their risk: they have a father, or a sister, or a grandparent, who developed 
the disease. But is the general public aware of their risk of getting colon cancer? It is 
unclear.  Certainly one interpretation of the fact that fewer people engage in routine 
colonoscopies suggests that the general population is not aware of its risk.  The 
interesting thing is that the “risky” activity referred to here is living, and omitting 
genetic testing does not change that.  So the question for our purposes becomes: Is the 
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risk of developing colorectal cancer too great to justify living without the knowledge 
of whether or not one carries a genetic mutation associated with that disease? It is 
unclear that these principles give us any guidance in relation to this problem.  The 
genetic test itself has a low level of risk (it has the same risk as any simple blood test, 
or even less than that if a cheek swab is sufficient for analysis). The risk involved is in 
obtaining the results from the test.  Giving the current state of public misunderstanding 
about genetics and the results of genetic testing, some would argue that given the 
uncertain nature of the information gained from the test for mutations associated with 
colon cancer, the risk is actually greater from having the test done than from simply 
continuing to visit one’s doctor to get regular clinical evaluations.   
Regardless, from the principles mentioned associated with risk, and given the 
varying probabilities associated with the information gained from this genetic test, it is 
unclear whether or not Jewish law would sanction genetic testing for colorectal cancer.  
My sense is that it would be permitted but not required, and I contend that this is not 
enough. In a sense, we’re back to square one: trying to decide whether or not to 
engage in testing. Nothing that has been said here gives us a sufficient action guide to 
help us make the decision of what to do in this situation. What it does, as I will specify 
in the next section, is to function as side constraints on action that narrows the range of 
choices, but gives no positive guidance to help the individual make a decision.  In 
order to prove useful to actors, an ethical theory must help us to narrow the choices of 
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action in which we can engage, and it is not clear to me that Jewish bioethics alone 
accomplishes this.   
Problems with Jewish Bioethics 
 The principles and rules that have been discussed in this chapter are intended 
to serve as action guides for the observant Jewish community. The individual Jew who 
is facing a treatment decision approaches his or her rabbi to discover both which 
principles are appropriate for his/her situation, as well as how to apply those rules to 
arrive at a decision. So it is the assessment of the relevant principles and rules that are 
intended to assist the individual in making a treatment decision that is sanctioned by 
Jewish law.  
 Some might object that it is unfair to collapse rules and principles into one 
entity, as I have done throughout this work.  Jean Grimshaw, for example, argues that 
rules and principles are importantly different. According to her interpretation, the 
guides that I have described in Jewish law would be rules, not principles.  “A rule 
specifies or forbids a certain sort of action, and to follow a rule is to accept a guideline 
for one’s conduct whose purpose is to eliminate the need for reflection, except in 
marginal or problematic cases.”259  A principle, on the other hand, invites reflection, 
and can best be expressed in the form “Consider….”.260   
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It is not clear to me, however, that such a distinction is tenable when we look 
at the model of Jewish law.  The proper domain of rules that Grimshaw specifies, that 
of serving as guides for decision-making, only makes sense in terms of specific cases, 
and the application of those ideas will require reflection.  Traditionally, that has been 
the role that the authority figures have assumed, presumably because they were better 
equipped in some way to specify the range of acceptable action.  The rules in question 
must be general in order to be widely applicable.  Yet it is this breadth of application 
that is the limitation of these rules.   
Perhaps an example will help to clarify this point.  Grimshaw uses as an 
example the shared belief by both of her parents that it is wrong for a man and a 
woman “to live (i.e. sleep) together if they are not married.”261  This shared belief 
resulted in different actions in relation to Grimshaw’s sister, who apparently was 
doing this very thing.  Her father refused to visit his daughter’s house for fear that 
such a visit might be construed as “condoning” the practice, while her mother did visit 
her child and grandchildren despite maintaining the belief that her daughter’s practice 
was wrong.  Grimshaw argues that what is exemplified in this case is that her mother 
and father share a rule (“’Don’t sleep with someone to whom you are not married,’”) 
but did not share principles. Grimshaw argues that her father’s principle was: 
“’Consider whether your behaviour will condone that which you think to be morally 
wrong.’ My mother also had this principle, but she had another one too: ‘Consider 
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whether your behaviour will stand in the way of maintaining care and relationships.’ 
This principle overrode the other…”262 
This case is not as clear-cut as it seems. Suppose that we grant Grimshaw the 
fact that her parents shared the rule in question: Don’t sleep with someone to whom 
you are not married. Her parents followed this rule, as much as we can tell: they 
weren’t sleeping with anyone but each other. The problem was with what the daughter 
was doing, and there is no indication that she shared this rule of her parents – in fact, it 
is relatively clear that she explicitly rejected this rule.  If the sole function of a rule is 
to specify or forbid a sort of action to “eliminate the need for reflection,” then this did 
its job…for those who accepted it.  Grimshaw’s parents were not having extramarital 
sex.   
The problem, of course, is that the case in question required her parents to 
consider their actions towards someone who violated this rule of theirs, without 
specifying why anyone should accept this rule in the first place.  To be more precise, 
the rule that specified or forbade action in this case would have to go something like 
this: Don’t sleep with someone to whom you are not married, and don’t perform any 
action that might be interpreted as approval of such behavior.  This rule is better 
because it applies to situations like Grimshaw’s sister’s, where a choice in action had 
to be made. 
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What is evident, of course, is that the rule/principle distinction has collapsed. 
What Grimshaw called the “principle” that her parents shared I have turned into a rule.  
I contend that something like this happens whenever we look at an actual case, and 
this is important: rules and principles are supposed to aid our decision-making process, 
and our decisions only matter when they are about real cases. Reflection is a necessary 
part of the moral life, and it is unlikely that a distinction between the overtly reflective 
and non-reflective portions of a decision will do any work for us when we have to 
make a decision. Hence, I will continue to use the terms “principle” and “rule” 
interchangeably. 
It is not clear to me, however, that these rules and principles do serve as 
appropriate action guides for the individual patient.  Knowing that we are required to 
do whatever is necessary to save life and preserve health gives us a good starting point 
to initiate the discussion. But in light of the various options open to the patient, this 
principle is rarely sufficient to serve as an action guide alone. Many different courses 
of action might coincide with the goal of saving life or preserving health, especially if 
the latter is understood to include mental health in its definition.  Instead, this principle 
seems to serve as either a side constraint on any proposed action, or, alternatively, the 
principle gives us a general orientation according to which we should approach 
particular problems. 
If that is the case, then perhaps the other rules and principles that are specified 
by the authorities for particular cases do help to shape an individual’s decision.  That 
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argument seems plausible when we look to some of the ethical issues involved in 
TSD.  A couple that is concerned about their risk of having a child affected by TSD 
might initially consider not having children as a response to this concern. That is, there 
is a range of possible action open to the couple concerned about its risk for having a 
child with TSD that includes not having children in the first place.  The principle that 
specifies the duty to procreate, however, rules out this option.  That is, this principle in 
Jewish bioethics removes this action from the range of those possible for the couple 
because if they are committed to following the demands of the tradition, they must 
procreate.  Once again, this is a limiting agent for the decision-maker; in effect, this 
principle serves as a boundary within which a decision must be made. The boundary is 
specified by the applicable rules or principles – actions on one side (outside?) of the 
boundary are impermissible, and actions on the other side (inside?) are permissible. 
This is useful, of course: a moral theory ought to limit our range of choices. 
My argument is that Jewish bioethics does not limit them enough.  I am not 
advocating that a moral theory ought to only prescribe one or two right actions, and 
leave no room for whim or choice on the part of the individual.  What I am saying is 
that a moral theory ought to do more than simply serve as rough guidelines; it should 
give us some mechanism by which we can wade through the possible actions so that 
we can decide on the right action for us. 
We could make the same argument for both breast and colorectal cancers. 
Suppose a woman is trying to decide whether or not to engage in genetic testing for 
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either of these diseases.  The principle that the body belongs to God serves as a 
limiting agent, that is, as a constraint on action: she is prohibited from engaging in 
action that intentionally destroys the body, and is permitted to engage in measures of 
beautification. Furthermore she is aware of the value of life and that she is to do what 
is necessary to take “reasonable care” of the body while it is in her possession.  How 
this translates into the decision about whether or not to engage in testing, though, is 
unclear.  Getting information that may be useful to save her life is desirable under 
Jewish law. But if such knowledge causes some or all of the harms previously 
mentioned, then such suffering is to be avoided. Once again, the general rules and 
principles serve as side constraints, but do not further assist the woman in making a 
decision. 
There is an image in my mind that corresponds to the methodology employed 
by Jewish bioethics.  Starting with the range of possible action for an individual, I 
envision a series of concentric circles whose boundaries represent the principles in 
Jewish bioethics. The outermost circle’s perimeter represents the principle of the 
sanctity of life. The inside of the circle represents the range of action in which the 
decision-maker is still permitted to engage. With each decision handed down by the 
rabbis, the relevant rules and principles make the circle’s boundary, and hence the 
range of permissible action, a bit smaller. The requirement to have children, for 
example, further limits the choices for the couple concerned about the risk of having 
offspring with TSD.  These are, then, rules of exclusion of sorts: by informing 
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believers of which practices are not permitted under Jewish law, the authorities are 
limiting the range of actions. 
Part of what I have in mind here is suggested by Robert Nozick in his 
discussion of “moral constraints.”263 Nozick discusses a way to incorporate important 
moral considerations in some way other than making them part of the overall goal of 
the moral theory. Nozick is specifically responding to critics of utilitarianism who are 
concerned about possible rights violations, and who thus argue that utilitarianism is 
defeated on these grounds. Instead, Nozick suggests that the utilitarian can incorporate 
the protection of rights of the individual as “…side constraints to safeguard the 
inviolability of others.”264 One can still seek to maximize the good as a goal of a moral 
theory, and yet be protected against the unwanted consequences of rights violations by 
adhering to the side constraints.  Specifically, Nozick argues that “[t]he side-constraint 
view forbids you to violate these moral constraints in the pursuit of your goals….”265  
Insofar as the side constraints do not suggest a positive direction for action – 
note, for example, this view says nothing about any obligation to maximize an 
individual’s rights – this corresponds to my suggestions about traditional Jewish 
bioethics.  I propose to call these negative action guides, since no positive action is 
required from such constraints but instead our action is restricted. In Nozick’s schema, 
then, utilitarianism itself serves as the positive action guide that actually gives 
                                                 
263 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1974), 
28-33. I am grateful to Glenn Graber for reminding me of this distinction. 
264 Ibid., 33. 
  
  
163
direction for what action should be chosen.  My ethical basis for a positive action 
guide, as I will argue in the next chapter, is an ethic of care. 
Before getting to that discussion, however, I want to be clear about the 
difficulties with Jewish bioethics as a representation of rules of exclusion, and of the 
general principled approach.  There are at least two problems with this approach. The 
first problem is with the principles themselves, and the second is with their 
application.  One problem with the rules is, frankly, that they do not limit the range of 
action enough.  The rules and principles are general enough to ensure that they apply 
to many different situations, and yet are too general to serve as real action guides. 
According to my analogy, what happens is that the center of the circle gets somewhat 
smaller, but not so small that a reasonable range of choices is apparent for the 
decision-maker.  Instead, there are many choices still available to the individual, and it 
is unclear which option is the best for her situation.  The duty to heal, for example, is 
important and justifies a range of action, but that range is alarmingly wide.  Such a 
duty would be consistent with a variety of actions, some of which may in fact be 
contradictory.  For example, the duty to heal is consistent with engaging in genetic 
screening for disease risk information, not engaging in genetic screening on account of 
the negative consequences that will be contradictory to the goal of healing if they 
result, engaging in means of assisted reproduction as a form of “healing” the 
childlessness of couples, not engaging in means of assisted reproduction if couples are 
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capable of conceiving naturally, etc.  So this rule must be specified either with other 
rules or else with more detail on how best it applies to the case at hand.  Regardless, it 
involves a good deal of interpretation for it to be useful to a patient making a decision. 
This relates to the second problem with this method, which is the process of 
application itself. Often this is where the rabbi figures most prominently, as it is his 
responsibility to interpret the texts and precedent in order to apply it to the case at 
hand. However, there are many courses of action that coincide with the precedents, 
and hence the rabbi must make a recommendation based on what he feels is most 
appropriate for the individual patient. How this decision is accomplished is unclear, 
and there is some indication that such a procedure is necessarily idiosyncratic.  As was 
demonstrated in the discussion on abortion, for example, the interpretations of the 
ancient texts differ according to the authority figure reading them.  Consulting two 
different rabbis, then, could result in two different sets of recommendations through 
which the patient would need to sort. There is no obvious way to adjudicate between 
these conflicting interpretations, and no way to choose among the different “circles” of 
action that would correspond to each one. 
There is little in the method described that would sufficiently aid the individual 
in making her decision, then. She would receive some information about proscribed 
action, and learn of the constraints upon her decision-making, but would be given little 
positive direction in terms of making her choice.  I contend that an ethic of care would 
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serve to better assist the individual in such circumstances, and in the next chapter I 
demonstrate how this will be an improvement on this methodology.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
ETHIC OF CARE 
 Some of the problems I have identified in chapter three are not exclusive to 
Jewish bioethics. One problem often cited with appeals to principles in general is that 
the approach may fail to adequately consider context.266  For example, in a Kantian 
framework, our obligation never to lie may lead to the consequence that the Nazis 
learn of our hidden Jewish compatriots, an action that strikes many of us as simply 
wrong.  This principle does not require that we actually inform the Nazis of the 
occupants of the attic, of course, but our silence in response to questioning may speak 
volumes. A carefully orchestrated lie, on the other hand, might set the villains on an 
alternate course that would result in a more favorable consequence.  A more complete 
assessment of the context would help to alleviate this shortcoming; it is significant that 
the result of my honesty will be that innocent people will die, and any moral decision 
must somehow take this into account.267  
 A common reply to this objection to traditional moral theory is that such an 
analysis does not do justice to the theories mentioned.268  Just as understanding that 
                                                 
266 For those that do, like act utilitarianism, they do so specifically in service to a 
principle – in this case, the principle of utility. 
267 Of course, a Kantian is not concerned with consequences, but rather with intent or 
motive. However, it is this focus on intent and disregard for consequences that strike 
many people as inadequate. An analysis of the context will include a discussion of 
these important consequences, while a strictly deontological approach will ignore 
them.  
268 This reply has been personally suggested to me by Glenn Graber, Robert Arnold, 
and Baruch Brody, just to name a few. 
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the obligation not to lie is not the same thing as requiring full disclosure of the truth, 
so too can a rich conception of the theory in question be seen as incorporating context. 
In the context of Nazi Germany, for example, “spilling your guts” and telling the 
Gestapo the location of the hidden Jews would be exactly the wrong action for a 
Kantian, as such an action would not be universalizable – it leads to an inconsistency.  
That is, if full disclosure of the truth was universalized, then there would be no such 
thing as hiding, since hiding is necessarily connected to nondisclosure.  Hence, taking 
account of the context is essential for knowing what it is that the principle in question 
specifies. 
 The same defense can also be said for utilitarianism, or for most forms of 
consequentialism, for that matter. Ascertaining which action promotes the greatest 
benefit for the greatest number of people while minimizing the negative effects for the 
greatest number of people requires us to look at the context in which the action is 
occurring. Only by understanding who is involved in the problem, what each person or 
group stands to gain or lose by the proposed action, and the various ways in which 
each participant might be affected can the consequences of an action truly be assessed 
and an action then chosen. 
 I will grant these points to the arguers, and yet still a problem remains. The 
context is important in each case – that is true. But the reason that the context plays a 
role is simply in the specification of the applicable rule or principle.  This makes sense 
because that is the goal of these theories: to perform only that action that is 
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universalizable, or to choose that action that has the best consequences overall. Hence, 
context is relevant only insofar as it is necessary to accomplish these goals.  If there is 
an element, or a series of elements, in the context that do not contribute to these goals, 
they will not be included in the assessment of the moral worth of an action.   
Yet often it is these very features that gave rise to the dilemma in the first 
place, or that make the right choice so very difficult to see.  Suppose that Helga is the 
woman hiding Jews in her attic when the Nazis come calling. What was not mentioned 
previously, but is, I contend, morally significant, is that the Nazi at the door is also her 
childhood sweetheart, Franz, whom she had planned to marry before the war began. 
Her feelings for him are divided on account of the kind of man she thought him to be 
compared to the evidence of the kind of man he is, via joining the Nazis.  She wants to 
trust that he would do the right thing and not harm the Jews if she tells him of their 
location, as she wants desperately to believe that she had not been so wrong about his 
character. And yet the stakes are awfully high.  
The morally right action in this situation likely does not change; she ought to 
put aside her desire to trust Franz and to test their love because the consequences, both 
for herself and others, are too great. The utilitarian calculus still clearly weighs on the 
side of nondisclosure.  For the deontologist, it is not clear that such considerations are 
relevant at all, given the fact that we are prohibited from lying, regardless of the 
reason.  And yet this relationship causes Helga moral distress. Of course there would 
still be a dilemma without this complication – the dilemma with which this chapter 
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began, in fact. But it seems like it is a different dilemma now, or at least one that is 
more complicated.  Aspects of the context that are significant get ignored or 
marginalized with these traditional approaches. 
A famous example of where the right act would be different because of such 
complications can be found in Plato’s Euthyphro.269  In this dialogue, Socrates meets 
Euthyphro who is bringing charges against a murderer.  In this case, the murderer also 
happens to be Euthyphro’s father.  Socrates asks Euthyphro whether his father killed a 
relative or a stranger because Socrates assumed that he would not prosecute his father 
for the murder of a stranger.270 One of the things that this case exemplifies is the 
importance of context to a situation; the mere fact that Euthyphro’s father killed 
someone seemed to be an insufficient reason to bring his father to trial, Socrates 
assumed. It is significant that the murderer was his father, and this relationship 
changed the morality of the action of bringing suit. 
I contend that the same holds true for Jewish bioethics, especially in the arena 
of genetic medicine. It is significant that a prophylactic radical mastectomy is major, 
disfiguring surgery with only some indication of benefit. It is significant that genetic 
testing for breast cancer predominantly affects women, who often have a different 
relationship with medicine than do men. Furthermore, the relationships in which the 
woman is engaged are significant. It is important to be clear here: the process that I am 
                                                 
269 Plato, Euthyphro, trans. Lane Cooper, in Plato: The Complete Dialogues, eds. 
Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).  
All references will denote original line numbers of the text. 
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concerned with is that of determining the morally permissible actions of a situation.  
Once that is accomplished, there will be further decisions made about which of the 
options is “best” for the person, and often these further decisions are made on non-
moral grounds. What I am arguing here is that the sorts of considerations on which I 
have been focusing are not simply important to the later decisions, but in fact matter to 
the moral permissibility of action.  Even the most careful weighing of the principles 
and obligations involved does not take into account the richness of context for which I 
have been arguing. Finally, solving moral problems in this way assumes that medical 
decision-making is exclusively rational: the rabbis say that action A is permitted and 
action B prohibited, hence I will perform action A.  As was discussed in the previous 
chapter, it is mistaken to assume that the principles always give a determinate answer, 
and hence it is the rabbis who must step in and specify the appropriate action.  Without 
a detailed analysis of how this specification works, it may appear that such decisions 
are devoid of emotions and simply emerge from the principles themselves.  It is not 
clear to me that decision-making271 happens in this way, and an ethic that serves as an 
action guide must include a more realistic assessment of the process. 
 I contend that an ethic of care and responsibility, as initially described by Carol 
Gilligan, will fill in the gaps suggested at the end of the previous chapter, and give a 
better focus to the decision-making process. Specifically, what I argue is that the 
                                                                                                                                            
270 Plato Euthyphro 4A-B. 
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rabbis are actually using the ethic of care when they apply the principles and 
precedents to cases that are presented to them, and so an understanding of this 
perspective is crucial.  In this chapter, then, I will first explain what the care ethic is 
and how it differs from traditional ethics of justice. I will then explore how we might 
apply such a perspective to the specific decisions in genetic medicine that serve as the 
exemplars in this work. This is the kind of process in which the rabbis are already 
engaged.  I will address the specific ways in which I think that the principles of Jewish 
bioethics and the orientation of caring work together in the final section. 
The Ethic of Care 
 Originally suggested by Carol Gilligan in response to studies on moral 
decision-making published by the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, an ethic of care 
encompasses aspects of moral decision-making additional to the traditional 
approaches. Traditionally, moral theorists have advocated procedures according to 
which individuals ought to make decisions based on rules or principles that are more 
general than the specific case at hand and that could, and should, be applied to all 
cases across the board. For instance, Kantian theorists argue that all moral action must 
be universalizable and must respect individuals as rational agents with ends and goals 
of their own. When making a moral decision, we should perform an action that 
respects an individual’s intrinsic worth and which could be performed by any agent in 
                                                                                                                                            
271 When I refer to decision-making in this way, I am referring to the process by which 
we determine what the morally right course of action is, not necessarily whether or not 
we do the morally correct thing. 
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similar circumstances. So when making a decision about breast cancer screening, then, 
a Kantian would ask us to consider what action best preserves the woman’s (and those 
individuals with whom she interacts, we can presume) status as an end-in-herself, and 
hence to consider what action could be universalizable. These general principles are 
applied to the specific case to determine morally justifiable action.  The task is then to 
identify particular features of the proposed action that would fall under the 
“jurisdiction” of the principles, hold them up to the test, and then proceed from this 
analysis. If the proposed action fails to abide by one of these principles, an alternative 
action should be performed. 
 It is a fact, though, that much of our moral life depends on experience. It is in 
real situations that moral questions emerge, and we depend on experience to tell us 
when a proposed action requires separate justification. Since so much of our moral life 
depends on subjective experience, care ethicists claim that conditions are rarely 
“sufficiently similar” to justify universal principles.272  Furthermore, because the 
application of general principles requires a certain amount of abstraction – eliciting 
only the parts of the proposed action that fall under the guise of the general principles 
– there will be much that is in the context of the moral problem that will not be 
addressed by such an approach. It is this failure to appreciate the richness of detail in a 
moral problem that leads to one major criticism of this approach by care ethicists. As 
Nel Noddings argues: “In doing this [abstracting from context], we often lose the very 
                                                 
272 Noddings (1984), 5. 
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qualities or factors that gave rise to the moral question in the situation.  That condition 
which makes the situation different and thereby induces general moral puzzlement 
cannot be satisfied by the application of principles developed in situations of 
sameness.”273  
An ethic of care has as its focus the goal of preserving and maintaining 
relationships, as it recognizes that our moral lives consist in interactions with other 
people.  We are all interrelated in important ways, and the recognition of this is an 
essential part of the moral life. Hence, care ethicists suggest that in order to make a 
morally sound decision, our thought process must include the others with whom we 
are in contact, and must explicitly address how our actions will affect them. 
 Of course, an objector will maintain, Kantian ethics and, for example, 
utilitarianism, also include this connection between people as a part of the decision-
making process.  Our actions must be universalizable according to Kant, so that it 
must be possible for everyone to act just as we have. The universalizability of the 
Kantian maxims depend upon the rules being able to be held simultaneously, or at 
least depends on the rules not contradicting each other.  The very nature of this 
principle of non-contradiction presumes an interaction with others who may face 
similar conflicts. In fact, Kant’s requirement that we treat individuals as ends in 
themselves who set their own goals and values demands that we respect the dignity of 
others.  The utilitarian will address this issue even more specifically; a utilitarian must 
                                                 
273 Ibid., 85. 
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include the effect that an action will have on all who might be affected by it when 
considering whether or not a proposed course is morally justified.  What is different, 
however, is the focus. A utilitarian must consider how her action affects others as well 
as herself, but she is still the primary agent, that is, the one who must act. So if it is the 
case that a proposed course of action leads to the best consequences for the greatest 
number of people but a few have to suffer greatly, then this course may be justified 
according to utilitarianism.  
It is not clear that we could make the same judgments from within care ethics. 
A proposed course of action that makes even a few people with whom I am in a 
relationship worse off is a primary concern for me in my deliberations, and may on 
balance prove to be the wrong decision.  This at least partly arises because of the 
primary focus on connection of individuals, rather than on the separation of one moral 
agent from another as seems to be the focus of ethics of justice.  Those operating with 
the latter perspective “…assume separation” from others and only later begin “…to 
explore parameters of connection,” while those who operate from within an ethic of 
care first “…assume connection” and only later begin “…to explore parameters of 
separation.”274  This is important because the very orientations lead us to different 
actions largely because they produce “…different images of self and of 
relationships.”275  According to Gilligan, the central insight in the ethic of care is that 
                                                 
274  Gilligan (1982), 38. 
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the self and other are interdependent276, and it is this realization that leads to moral 
action. So, unlike the traditional ethics of justice, an ethic of care makes no sharp 
distinctions between self and other.  “My day-to-day interactions with other persons 
create a web of reciprocal caring,”277 and it is the recognition of this web that binds us 
to each other, that constrains and determines our moral action. 
This distinction, between the demarcation of self and other that is characteristic 
of ethics of justice and that of the interconnectedness of individuals that is the focus of 
the ethic of care, is an important difference between the two approaches to morality 
because this distinction shapes the priorities of the ethics. That is, this distinction gives 
rise to different foci which are dependent on the different understandings of the 
relationship between individuals.  Joan Tronto argues that we must begin from the 
assumption that humans are interdependent, and when we do so “…the terms for our 
moral discussion must shift.  Rather than assuming that any and every threat to 
autonomy is beyond discussion, the interpersonal point of view raises questions about 
how to resolve these problems.  Shifting the assumptions we make about people 
changes the terms of what issues our moral theories must resolve.”278  For example, 
instead of our moral theory attempting to resolve the problem with rights violations for 
                                                 
276 Ibid., 74. 
277 Rita Manning, “Just Caring,” in Explorations in Feminist Ethics: Theory and 
Practice, eds. Eve Browning Cole and Susan Coultrap-McQuinn (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press: 1992), 46. 
278 Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care 
(New York: Routledge, 1993), 163-164. 
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which some authors criticize utilitarianism, now our moral theory must attempt to 
resolve the problem with individuals acting in disregard of their interdependence.   
In fact, Tronto argues that it doesn’t make much sense to think of individuals 
as separate, autonomous beings. We all are, at some point in our lives, in a position to 
need care from others. This is to be in a vulnerable place, and this alone “belies the 
myth that we are always autonomous.”279 Care theorists share with justice theorists a 
concern about the possibilities of abuse that may arise with such vulnerability, but 
they deal with this issue in very different ways.  According to Gilligan: 
The morality of rights is predicated on equality and centered on the 
understanding of fairness, while the ethic of responsibility relies on the 
concept of equity, the recognition of differences in need.  While the 
ethic of rights is a manifestation of equal respect, balancing the claims 
of other and self, the ethic of responsibility rests on an understanding 
that gives rise to compassion and care.280 
 
 This focus on relationships and the ties we have with others originates from the 
notion that we are all bound up in a web of caring, where my interests and objectives 
are inextricably linked to yours, and where ethical action arises from an 
acknowledgment of this interconnectedness.  Part of this recognition involves 
understanding the embeddedness of the self.  Who I am cannot be sharply distanced 
from others, as it is my interactions with others that has and continues to shape me into 
the person I am now.  The fundamental fact of connection is integral to my self-
concept, and continued interaction sustains my identity. 
                                                 
279 Ibid., 134-135. 
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 Because of this focus on the network of carers of whom I am but one part, the 
traditional concept of autonomy will not apply. This is an important difference 
between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice, and hence it is worthwhile to 
investigate how this distinction plays out.  To replace the notion of an atomistic 
decision-maker, who may consider others in her decision process but ultimately is 
only responsible for herself, Sarah Hoagland proposes the concept of “autokoenony,” 
from the Greek words for “self” and “community.”281 This concept of an individual is 
“not essentially defined in terms of another” but instead is “both separate and 
connected.” That is: 
What I mean by “autokoenony” is the “self in community.”  The self in 
community involves each of us making choices; it involves each of us 
having a self-conscious sense of ourselves as moral agents in a 
community of other self-conscious moral agents….Thus, being 
autokoenonous does not involve isolation, nor does it mean not being 
influenced by or not depending on others….An autokoenonous being is 
one who is aware of her self as one among others within a community 
that forms her ground of be-ing, one who makes her decisions in 
consideration of her limitations as well as in consideration of the 
agendas and perceptions of others.  She does not merge with others, nor 
does she estrange herself; she interacts with others in situations.282 
 
This definition works nicely with the conceptions Noddings proposes, where an 
individual undergoes motivational displacement towards the other but does not 
completely lose herself in the needs or goals of the other. This is important if one is to 
be able to care for another: the individual must be competent to meet the needs of the 
                                                 
281 Sarah Lucia Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics (Palo Alto: Institute of Lesbian Studies, 
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other individual.  Hence, the moral work of weaving an identity is part of the process 
of caring: knowing the limitations placed on me by the responsibility I have to care for 
others and yet knowing what my needs and goals are shape how I view my moral 
agency. 
So what does it mean to care? Caring involves many things, such that it is 
impossible, and undesirable, to make lists of criteria or categories of caring.283  At the 
very least, caring requires some action by the one caring on behalf of the one who is 
cared-for.284  This points to an important realization: “…caring is not simply a cerebral 
concern, or a character trait, but the concern of living, active humans engaged in the 
processes of everyday living.  Care is both a practice and a disposition.”285 The 
disposition evolves from what Noddings calls a “relation of natural caring” that is not 
simply a matter of projecting myself onto the object of care, but rather involves an 
engrossment with the other.286 Noddings compares this relationship to the one of 
mother and child, where the mother shares the infant’s feelings, as is exemplified by 
the impulse to comfort the child even before she ascertains what is causing his 
distress.  When this happens, when the individual becomes truly receptive to the other, 
Noddings argues that there is a fundamental motivational shift; my motivational 
energy is now shared with the other.287 Once this shift has taken place, “[t]he one-
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285 Tronto, 104. 
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caring assumes a dual perspective and can see things from both her own pole and that 
of the cared-for.”288 
 To be more precise, Joan Tronto and Berenice Fisher have developed four 
“analytically separate, but interconnected” phases of caring, which speak to both the 
disposition and the actions necessary to maintain an ethic of care. The four phases 
are289:  
(1) Caring about: It is in this phase where moral agents first recognize that care 
is necessary. “It involves noting the existence of a need and making an 
assessment that this need should be met.” 
(2) Taking care of: This phase involves the agent “…assuming some 
responsibility for the identified need and determining how to respond to it.” 
Inasmuch as this phase involves the recognition that someone can act to 
address these unmet needs, both agency and responsibility are involved in 
this phase.  It is in this phase that Tronto and Fisher’s definition of caring 
becomes important.  Caring is not simply a “cerebral concern” but instead 
“implicitly suggests that it will lead to some type of action…to care implies 
more than simply a passing interest or fancy buy instead the acceptance of 
some form of burden.”290  Determining whether or not I am the person to 
meet those needs is the function of the next phase. 
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(3) Care giving: In this phase is located the direct meeting of the needs for 
care, which almost always requires that care-givers come into direct 
contact with those who are in need of caring.291  Tronto argues that 
responsibility rests on a number of factors – if an action or omission of 
ours resulted in the need for care, then we must give the care.292 Or maybe 
we have a responsibility to care simply because we recognize the need.293  
The appropriate objects of our caring will depend on “political motivations, 
cultural practices, and individual psychology” in addition to “perceived 
gender roles…class, family status” and race.294  Tronto argues that we are 
better served by a flexible notion of responsibility than by continuing to 
use the concept of obligation.295   
(4) Care receiving:  In this phase it is recognized that “…the object of care will 
respond to the care it receives.” This is an important part of caring because 
it provides the only way that we know that caring needs have actually been 
                                                 
291 Tronto notes here that providing money is usually more a form of “taking care” 
than of “care giving.” In fact, she argues that the illusion that giving money is a rich 
form of caring, converting care to dollars and cents, directly points to the undervaluing 
of care giving in our society.  
292 Tronto, 132. 
293 It must be noted, of course, that this is not a complete theory as I have presented it; 
a person can recognize all sorts of needs that are beyond her capacity and/or obligation 
for which she ought to take responsibility.  I am grateful to Betsy Postow for 
suggesting this to me. 
294 Tronto, 132-133. 
295 Ibid., 133. 
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met, and this is crucial for maintaining the ability to assess how adequately 
care has been provided. 
Corresponding to these phases are four “ethical elements of care” that arise 
from the action that is taken in each of these phases. Corresponding to the first phase 
is the element of attentiveness, where we suspend our own needs to be attentive to the 
needs of others. According to this, then, ignorance is a form of “moral evil.”296  
Knowing what the other needs, however, is not an easy task. Lawrence Blum 
comments: 
Understanding the needs, interests, and welfare of another person, and 
understanding the relationship between oneself and that other, requires 
a stance toward that person informed by care, love, empathy, 
compassion, and emotional sensitivity.  It involves, for example, the 
ability to see the other as different in her own right, rather than viewing 
her through a simple projection of what one would feel if one were in 
her situation.297 
 
To really care for others, then, involves more than just putting myself into another’s 
shoes. To care for others includes listening to what the other needs, and recognizing 
that this may very well be something different from what I would assess that she 
needed based on my interpretation of the situation. Caring may require that I act very 
differently from what I would want in a situation, or from what I think the one cared-
for should want.  Ideally, if the motivational shift takes place, then my desire to meet 
the needs of the cared-for will arise naturally. 
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Corresponding to the second phase is the element of responsibility, where we 
assume the role of the one who can give the care.298  This is where the motivational 
shift becomes apparent, as it is on account of this that we take responsibility for 
meeting the needs of the cared-for.  
The third element, then, is competence, as one must be competent to give the 
kind of care necessary, or else the action is not really caring.299  If all I do to meet the 
needs of the other is to offer the care that I would need in that situation because I do 
not have the ability or skills to offer what the cared-for really requires, then I am not 
caring; instead, I am doing something like “transferring.”  Furthermore, if all I do is 
offer money so that someone else can provide the goods or services, then I am also not 
truly caring. What I am doing is enabling someone else to care, and this is a 
commendable action in the instances when I am incompetent to give care myself. I 
should not, however, assume that this provision means that I am caring, because that is 
simply not the case. 
The final element is responsiveness of the care-receiver to the one who is 
giving care.300  It is this element that demonstrates the success of the caring, and it is 
this element that alerts us to a potential problem in caring if, for example, I have 
simply transferred my values and needs onto the person of the cared-for rather than 
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cared for her as is appropriate for her in this case. So this element alerts us to 
insufficient or inadequate care as well. 
By acknowledging these elements and completing the four phases of caring, 
Tronto and Fisher propose that we have completed an act of caring. Often this process 
is more difficult than it appears, and conflicts in caring do arise.  For example, 
sometimes what the cared-for needs is in direct opposition to what someone else may 
need, and hence there is a moral dilemma.  But when conflicts in caring arise, the 
approach to solving them is quite different from the procedures in traditional ethics of 
justice. In cases of a conflict, the agent “…does not decide by formula, nor by a 
process of strict ‘rational decision-making.’ [Instead] she turns away from the abstract 
and back to the person for whom she cares. [A decision] is right or wrong according to 
how faithfully it was rooted in caring – that is, in a genuine response to the perceived 
needs of others.”301 So to evaluate whether or not a decision that I reached was the 
right one, I look less to the actual outcome of the decision and more to the process. As 
Noddings argues: “…[T]he test of my caring is not wholly in how things turn out; the 
primary test lies in an examination of what I considered, how fully I received the 
other, and whether the free pursuit of his projects is partly a result of the completion of 
my caring in him.”302 
                                                 
301 Noddings (1984), 53.  Noddings here is referring to a specific (and realistic) 
example of a conflict between a woman caring for her child and caring for her 
husband.  The needs of all the participants are important, and an assessment of all of 
those needs must be a part of the process. 
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This “turning back towards the person for whom she cares” does not mean that 
rationality is not utilized at all. Noddings comments: 
 Instrumental thinking may, of course, enhance caring; that is, I 
may use my reasoning powers to figure out what to do once I have 
committed myself to doing something.  But clearly, rationality (in its 
objective form) does not of necessity mark either the initial impulse or 
the action that is undertaken.  If I care enough, I may do something 
wild and desperate in behalf of the other – something that has only the 
tiniest probability of success, and that only in my own subjective view.  
Hence, in caring, my rational powers are not diminished but they are 
enrolled in the service of my engrossment in the other.  What I will do 
is subordinate to my commitment to do something.303 
 
So rationality does have a role in the ethic of care, but it is a very different one from 
the role it has in an ethic of justice.  Instead of appealing to overarching principles and 
rules and rationally determining which course of action best fits in with those 
principles, in cases of conflict the individual who cares returns back to her initial focus 
on the needs of the cared for, and then proceeds from an understanding of what that 
entails. She could, of course, be wrong in her estimation, but as previously mentioned, 
the process of caring is more important than the product. This is because it is through 
the process of caring that we ascertain and meet the needs of the other much more than 
is evidenced by simply looking at the product of such deliberation.  The differently-
focused methodology is what is important, and ascertaining success or failure will 
appeal to the degree to which the individual has tried to meet the needs of the cared-
for. 
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 This is also not to say that an ethic of care is inherently and completely devoid 
of principles. It is simply the case that the principles that operate here (that it is right to 
sustain human relationships, for example) are different from those that are important 
in an ethic of justice,304 and also perhaps have a subordinate role to play. It is not in 
achieving correspondence with principles that is important, but rather in caring for 
others. 
This different focus will result in a different kind of thinking, according to 
Allison Jaggar. 
Justice thinking is impersonal and general because it regards both 
moral subjects and the objects of their moral concern in terms of their 
moral status as representatives of humanity or as beings capable of 
pleasure and pain rather than in terms of their concrete specificity; care 
thinking is personal and particularized in that both carers and those 
cared-for regard each other as unique, irreplaceable individuals.305 
 
This difference in thinking, then, will result in an ethic more focused on individuals, 
and more responsive to the needs of those for whom we care. 
 
Caring and Genetic Disease 
Jews are commanded to do what they can to preserve life and health, yet how 
that gets applied to real treatment decisions is far from clear.  What we get instead is 
an overall framework by which decisions get made: preserve life and health whenever 
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possible. Even the more specific principles discussed in this case, such as the notion 
that one’s body belongs to God and that mental anguish is a mitigating factor in some 
circumstances, fail to serve as sufficient action guides in treatment decisions.  When a 
woman approaches her rabbi uncertain about whether or not to engage in genetic 
testing, the rabbi has much work to do in the way of applying these general principles 
to her particular case. Precedent may help here, but with many of the issues in 
genetics, technology is requiring us to embark upon new ground.  Hence, it may be the 
case that genetic testing is permitted, or it may even be obligatory, as Rabbi Dorff 
argues. How is a specific rabbi to proceed to assist a specific woman? 
This focus on the individuals with whom we are in relationships will help us in 
approaching these issues, and in fact these are the kinds of considerations that the 
rabbis deliberate.  One issue present in all three cases discussed in the previous 
chapters is the importance of the knowledge gained from engaging in genetic testing. 
In order to make a decision that corresponds to the constraints of Jewish law,306 it is 
important to determine the motive or purpose for engaging in testing. For example, 
many authorities would prohibit a couple from engaging in genetic screening if the 
purpose of such testing was to abort a fetus that had Tay-Sachs disease.  If, instead, the 
purpose of engaging in genetic screening was simply to gain knowledge so that the 
                                                                                                                                            
305 Allison M. Jaggar, “Caring as a Feminist Practice of Moral Reason,” in Justice and 
Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics, ed. Virginia Held (Boulder: Westview 
Press, Inc., 1995), 191. 
306 It is possible that the constraints of Jewish law could be contrary to caring. For a 
discussion of such conflict, see chapter five. 
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couple could be prepared for the different demands and needs of their child, then 
testing would almost universally be permitted.  Certainly in the case of genetic 
screening for the genes associated with breast cancer, assessing the benefits and 
burdens associated with the knowledge gained is crucial for understanding the 
(im)permissibility of engaging in screening procedures.  This is because the 
assessment of the moral (im)permissibility of an action depends upon how it affects 
the important relationships in which the woman is involved. She must maintain her 
integrity, but also meet the needs of the others for whom she cares in order to be a 
genuinely caring individual.  Yet traditional Jewish bioethics will weigh in on her 
decision as well.  As with TSD, the principle of mental anguish would serve as a guide 
to determine under what circumstances screening would be sanctioned. A woman who 
has lost two immediate family members to breast cancer may suffer more from not 
knowing whether or not she carries the gene associated with the disease than she 
would from learning the results that she does in fact carry the mutation.  Finally, as 
previously discussed, the information itself had important value in the case of colon 
cancer screening.  Individuals might benefit from results of such screening because 
certain results would justify a reduction in the frequency with which they had to 
submit to invasive clinical examinations; alternatively, it was from the information 
gained that he or she might become lax in heeding the warning signs altogether. 
 What the ethic of care will do for these individuals is to refocus the discussion 
in terms of maintaining and preserving relationships rather than in identifying rules or 
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principles. To see how this works, we will begin by discussing some of the ethical 
issues that arose with TSD, and then move on to breast cancer and colon cancer. 
Tay-Sachs Screening 
A married couple’s obligation to procreate is important in Judaism, but this 
obligation also is importantly vague. Authority figures have interpreted various 
passages to conclude that the commandment has been filled when the union results in 
a boy and a girl; however, given the uncertainty of life it is recommended that the 
couple have more children “just in case.”  Hence, it is prohibited for a couple to 
choose not to have children, apart from any medical inability that might be present.  
Yet for those who are concerned about their risk for having a Tay-Sachs 
afflicted child, these guides are insufficient at best. It is not difficult to imagine a 
couple that wants nothing more than to have many healthy children, but who are both 
carriers of TSD and hence know that they are at risk for producing Tay-Sachs afflicted 
children. Whether or not they undergo genetic testing (and, perhaps more importantly, 
when they undergo genetic testing) seems to be more a function of their unique 
situation than it is a matter of conforming to principles. Aside from those in the ultra-
Orthodox community or those involved with Dor Y’shorim’s program, many 
contemporary Jews are simply unaware of their risk for TSD, or do not consider this 
issue prior to marriage. So while genetic testing prior to marriage -- with the 
corresponding understanding that two carriers will not go on to marry – may be the 
most desirable approach towards testing from an ethical standpoint, it may not always 
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be possible. Perhaps education on such subjects was not available to the couple, or 
because testing was prohibitively expensive or distant from their location they may not 
have been able to engage in testing.  It may well be the case that the subject does not 
arise until the couple is already pregnant, at which time different considerations come 
into play. Or if it does arise prior to marriage, the couple may not be willing to change 
their life plans in accordance with the test results.  Aside from the communities that 
still engage in arranged marriages (and perhaps even within those), the desire to marry 
another individual is often the culmination of a long-term relationship whose ties 
cannot be severed so easily.   
The right decision for couples like these seems to be one that is responsive to 
the needs and desires of the people involved. They would need to consider what it 
would mean to care for a child like this, what it would mean to be in relationships with 
others in this situation and, perhaps most importantly, what it would mean to care for 
each other in such a situation. It is a fact that different people would deal with this 
situation in different ways. For some people, caring for a special-needs child is simply 
more than they can bear, while for others, it is an opportunity to express their love to 
those who desperately need it.  The rule that says that a married couple must have 
children fails to capture the sentiments that go into such a course of action. What is at 
issue here, presumably, is not the desire to have children, but rather how best to fulfill 
this desire given the particular set of circumstances at hand. With some exceptions, 
parents do not desire or care for their children because they have an obligation to do 
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so, say from some ethical prescription. Rather, they care for their children because of a 
set of feelings they have about them or because they are in a special relationship with 
them that they are not in with other people’s children.   
Some would argue here that other ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, could 
meet these needs in relation to the family in question.  Utilitarians would take account 
of possibilities and risk, as well as the idea that different people evaluate different 
circumstances differently.  Ascertaining the morally right action in a particular 
situation relies both on the consequences of such a decision on all those affected as 
well as a determination of how the proposed action fits in with our life plan or other 
goals – hence, non-moral considerations are relevant as well. 
I will grant that that the outcome, that is, the decision eventually chosen, may 
be the same for an ethic of care and utilitarianism in this case. What is different, 
however, is the process by which such a decision is reached. Consequences of a 
proposed action are not evaluated according to utility, but rather according to how 
well an action maintains or continues the relevant relationships.  To enter into a caring 
relationship is to take responsibility for meeting the needs of the other as well as 
meeting the needs of oneself, and a decision such as this is simply a concrete 
manifestation of the commitments made in the context of the relationship.  Those who 
care have an obligation to meet the needs of the other in a way very different from that 
of utilitarians.  In fact, the very life plan and values that we hold emerge from this 
commitment to caring, and hence the assessment of how best to meet these goals is an 
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affirmation of the dedication we have to our moral ideals. To care genuinely involves 
more than simply choosing the best outcome, but instead requires the engagement in a 
particular kind of process along the way. 
It is this relationship of caring that is crucial for moral decision-making.  
Recognizing what it takes to maintain the relationship between spouses will, and 
should, factor into a decision about whether or not to abort a pregnancy that will result 
in a child with TSD.  Recognizing what it would mean to care for such a child is also 
important. Recall the four phases of caring and their associated ethical elements 
proposed by Tronto and Fisher. An individual must be able to work through all of the 
phases if she is to truly care for another. The crucial point here is that not everyone 
will be competent to care for such a child.  For those who are not, according to this 
schema, despite the best of intentions, it is impossible for them to truly give care to the 
recipient. “When a ‘carer’ can no longer respond adequately to the demands in her 
sphere of activity, she has to turn to those adjacent to her in a chain of caring.  The 
people to whom she addresses her request are then obligated to respond to her, just as 
she is obligated to respond to those who address her.”307  Noddings here does not 
specify what the response must entail, but simply that those with whom the couple is 
engaged in caring must respond.  It is conceivable that the caring response to the 
couple is the one that respects their decision to terminate a TSD pregnancy and then to 
act as a support system for them after making such a choice. 
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It is also important to remember that a crucial part of the caring relationship is 
the cared-for’s response to the caring. Recall that it was on account of this that 
Noddings argued that we could not really care for those distant from us, like starving 
children in Africa, since they could not respond to that caring in a way that would be 
meaningful to us. This seems to have significant implications for children with TSD 
who, after a certain point, will not be able to respond to caring at all (except at the 
most rudimentary physical level).  In such a circumstance, I argue that the truly caring 
response by parents would be not to subject a child to the pain associated with this 
degenerative disease by not bringing them into the world in the first place.308  These 
considerations must be balanced with other considerations, to be sure, but it is an 
option that must be considered. 
A couple’s decision to take advantage of any of the assisted reproduction 
techniques would also be assisted by the use of an ethic of care.  Some methods of 
combating infertility are clearly permissible (AIH, for example) given the importance 
of procreation in the Jewish tradition.  The permissibility of using other techniques, 
such as IVF, when infertility is not a problem is a bit more complicated. Authorities 
have ruled in both directions. Yet if we include in our decision-making process an 
                                                                                                                                            
307 Nel Noddings, “In Defense of Caring,” Journal of Clinical Ethics 3, no. 1 (Spring 
1992): 17. 
308 It may also be possible to justify this kind of caring response simply on account of 
the suffering that the child would endure, regardless of considerations of his or her 
ability to respond to care.  Because this action may contradict other important 
principles in Jewish bioethics that have not been discussed here, I will leave this 
consideration aside. 
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assessment of what it would mean to care for the individuals involved, we may have 
more guidance into what is the right decision for them.  A couple that desperately 
wants to have children but is concerned about bringing a child with TSD into the 
world has predilections that seem to coincide with Jewish law. A boy and a girl child 
are considered sufficient to fulfill the commandment to procreate so long as they live 
long enough to reproduce themselves. A child with TSD will not. Hence, having a 
child with TSD does not assist the couple in fulfilling the commandment. To help the 
couple conceive children free from this disorder, then, is both the caring response and 
the one that seems in sync with religious prescriptions.   
In fact, I contend that this is the preferable choice for couples that are 
committed to upholding Jewish law. After having and caring for one or perhaps more 
children with TSD, it is easy to imagine the emotional, psychological, and physical 
distress that a couple would suffer.  It is possible that under such conditions, the stress 
would be so great as to be destructive to their relationship and/or destructive to their 
ability to create or care for other children.  Given the focus on procreation in Jewish 
law, this situation is to be avoided. Hence, utilizing a procedure such as IVF which 
includes the couple’s own genetic material (and hence avoids many of the concerns 
that accompany donated material) is the most ethically sound way to solve this 
dilemma.309  This is the caring response to the couple that desires to comply with 
Jewish law and procreate but does not feel capable of caring for a child with TSD.  
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Remember that the way to evaluate whether or not we did the right thing according to 
an ethic of care is not only to evaluate the outcome, but also to assess how well we 
cared for others during the process.310  Hence, we will need to appeal to context, to the 
unique features of each situation, before we can know what it means to care for this 
particular couple.  The rules and principles involved can serve as a boundary, but do 
little to guide us to action. The caring response, then, will vary from couple to couple, 
from situation to situation.  
Finally, the duty to heal that is important in Judaism can be interpreted in a 
number of ways. As previously discussed, it was this principle that justified the 
physician’s profession and gave certain obligations to those who were competent to 
engage in such practices. With TSD, no “healing” in the traditional sense can take 
place; there is no cure for TSD, and little that physicians can do to ease the 
discomforts of these children and their families. I contend that this duty to heal can be 
interpreted in a broader way to include caring and compassionate responses to 
individuals as a part of the process. While we cannot offer a cure to the parents of 
children with TSD, we can care for them: we can offer our assistance in sitting with 
the child, in preparing meals for the family, in offering a sympathetic ear or a shoulder 
to cry on.  Since we now know that spiritual and emotional healing are important in 
                                                                                                                                            
309 I will grant, however, that IVF is far from perfect.  It is expensive, cumbersome, 
and unreliable, but may yet present the best possibilities for couples like these. 
310 However, if the outcome flouts Jewish law, it may be rejected. What will hopefully 
become very clear in chapter five is that I am not advocating a pure care ethic, but 
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physical healing, it stands to reason that the duty to heal can and should be extended in 
this way.  Since this demonstrates that healing includes non-physical aspects, then 
applying this expanded notion of healing to TSD is plausible.  Caring for the parents 
of Tay-Sachs afflicted children is a form of healing, and one that many (although not 
all) of us are competent to engage in. This suggests one way in which principles and 
caring can be combined; I will address this issue more fully later in this chapter. 
Breast Cancer Screening 
How would the perspective of an ethic of care change the way we answered 
the woman’s initial question of whether or not she should be tested for one of the 
mutations associated with breast cancer? Certainly we would investigate what 
religious principles apply to her situation; after all, this is still a member of the 
observant Jewish community, and the tenets of her tradition are important to her. But 
an important difference is that the discussion wouldn’t stop there.  The woman would 
also consider how having this test performed would affect those whom she cares about 
and those who care about her. One implication of a genetic test, of course, is that she 
will receive information not just about herself, but also about her relatives: if she has 
one of the mutations in BRCA1 or BRCA2, then it is likely that her sisters and 
daughters do as well.  As mentioned before, her family members may be uninterested 
in learning their own risk, and hence this knowledge could be a burden for the woman. 
If, for example, her sister resents her for finding out this information in the first place, 
regardless of the reason, the woman will consider that in her calculation. She may, of 
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course, have the test done and simply not inform her sister, but she will learn 
something about their shared genes regardless of the nondisclosure.  Since keeping 
this information to herself may psychologically affect her – and her subsequent 
relationship with her sister – this must be considered.  The primary focus here is on 
preserving and nurturing relationships, and if finding out the information from this test 
would likely harm an important relationship, then the woman might think twice before 
agreeing to be tested. 
Similar points can be made in reference to the woman’s daughters, but perhaps 
arguing from the other direction: the information gained might prove to be a real 
benefit to her children, as they can be vigilant early on for signs and symptoms and 
perhaps participate in experimental preventive therapies.  Recognizing the connection 
she has with her daughters in this particular way might guide her towards getting the 
test done.  Keep in mind her motivation here: it is because of the nurturing relationship 
that the woman considers her daughters here, not simply because of an obligation.  
Recall that “[t]he first thing we must do as ‘carer-thinkers’ is to recognize that our 
dilemmas are not ours alone.  They must be referred to a community or network of 
‘carers’”311 and recipients of care.  This involves not only the consideration of others 
in our decision-making, but also using others to help us achieve a resolution to the 
conflict at hand.  Often solutions can best be generated by working with others, and 
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given the fundamental assumption of connection with which the care ethic operates, it 
is reasonable to assume that it will take others to help us decide what to do. 
We could further detail the ways in which having the test performed could 
affect the relationship she has with her family (how will a positive test result and a 
decision to have a mastectomy affect her relationship with her husband, for example), 
but it is crucial to remember that the woman is not only concerned about her family. 
Rather, as one who is engaged in the process of caring, she is connected to many 
people.  If having this test done will provide valuable information for researchers who 
will then be able to help women in her daughter’s generation, even if she tests 
negative for the gene, then that will be considered as well. Some of her daughters’ 
friends might be benefited from the knowledge that she provided, and as this will 
enrich the lives of those she cares for, this facet is important.  
This type of reasoning is also useful when we expand the decision from the 
question of genetic testing to the one of the woman considering a radical mastectomy 
as prophylaxis. Considering how such surgery will affect the relationship the woman 
has with her husband, with her daughters, with her coworkers, and with her friends  
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will all be important. If her self-esteem312 will be so lowered by this procedure as to 
put some or all of those relationships in jeopardy, then it is clear that that is not the 
right action for her, regardless of the fact that it has some, maybe even a good, chance 
of prolonging her life.313  Recall that there was some debate within the principles of 
the tradition as to whether or not this qualified as a life saving procedure; here, the 
decision process is made a bit clearer.  
Notice the difference in language here.  Gone is a specific reference to the 
woman’s “right” to have the test done, or to the “obligation” she has to make the 
decision for herself.314 With an ethic of care, we get a different construction of the 
moral problem. The discussion shifts from a consideration of conflicting rights to one 
                                                 
312 I do not mean to imply here that we ought to evaluate such considerations in a 
vacuum. Perhaps the woman’s self-esteem is lowered because of expectations of 
beauty that have been perpetuated by a patriarchal society – expectations which I 
would clearly want to reject. It is possible, however, that the woman’s self-esteem 
issues are the result of the importance of bodily integrity to her, a consideration that 
deserves further investigation. What is required for a genuinely caring response is to 
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what her commitments require from me, as the one-caring. 
313 In instances where a mastectomy is crucial for saving the life of the woman, it may 
be the case that, according to the ethic of care, she should have the operation 
regardless of these types of concerns about her relationships.  In immediate life-saving 
instances, we would need to evaluate the harm to relationships that would ensue 
because of her death.  Regardless, the issue here is a question of prophylaxis, and 
hence the immediate life-saving consideration is not an issue. 
314 See Gilligan (1982), 21; Carol Gilligan “Moral Orientation and Moral 
Development,” in Women and Moral Theory, eds. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. 
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of conflicting responsibilities.315 Of course, a woman’s ability to make the decision for 
herself must be assumed – further consideration by the woman is moot if someone else 
is making the decision for her.  And for such foundational concepts, traditional Jewish 
bioethics serves her well. She learns that testing is permitted based on the grounds that 
the Jew has a duty to save someone’s life and to care for one’s body.  But that is a far 
cry from making the decision to engage in testing or not.  When it is time to decide 
what is the right thing to do, the context becomes increasingly important. 
Consider further the traditional role of the woman in Judaism: her primary 
obligation and concern is for the family. Traditionally, caring for individuals and 
maintaining relationships have been her domain.  In such a context, the language of 
rights and obligations is replaced here by words of emotion and compassion.  As 
Hume remarks, morality arises from our sentiments, our feelings about what is right 
and wrong. I endorse this view, as it nicely captures the notion that reason alone does 
not account for our moral dispositions.  Caring often involves putting oneself in the 
place of the other, as only in this way can she truly understand the needs of the one 
cared-for.    
Colon Cancer Screening 
 Focusing on caring and relationships is exactly what the individual who is 
considering not being screened for colorectal cancer is doing for the following 
reasons.  She is evaluating how the options available to her coincide with her goals of 
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maintaining the important relationships in her life.  Recall that the decisions in 
colorectal cancer screening revolved around the issue of risk, and specifically the 
amount of risk that an individual was permitted to assume.  Freedman argued that any 
risk undertaken by the individual must be counterbalanced by proportional gains.  
Ascertaining the benefit-to-burden ratio of not being screened, then, was one key 
factor in deciding if that course of action was allowable under Jewish law.  However, 
Judaism gave little guidance as to how such an assessment is to be made. What 
features of the decision are relevant to an assessment of the proportionality of the risk?  
It is difficult to see which details are important to consider and which are not, as well 
as how to rank them. 
Making such an assessment is, and should be, an exercise of caring for the 
individual. Understanding whether or not the risk is proportionate with the proposed 
gain from an action requires more than simply weighing the consequences and 
choosing that option that benefits the most as would be required by consequentialism 
or ensuring that the action could be universalizable as required by deontology. These 
schemes are still too general for the individual and fail to take account of the intuitions 
of the patient.  A decision either way in this case could result in significant harm to 
those whom the patient cares about (if, as a result of screening, she loses her health 
insurance which in turn affects her children, for example) and that is more important 
to her than the benefits that might accrue to others.  Our feelings of partiality are 
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important and give rise to the “natural sentiment of caring” of which Noddings speaks.  
Any moral decision-making process must take account of this. 
Hence, the choices made by the individual who is considering screening for 
colorectal cancer depend on how her decision could affect the important relationships 
in her life: whether or not the responsibility she has to her family requires her to make 
certain choices, both on account of economic and social considerations; how others 
who cared for her would be affected by a decision not to engage in testing, etc.  Once 
again, Jewish bioethics serves as a useful limiting factor: any risk assumed by the 
individual must coincide with her acting as a reasonable caretaker of her body.  Yet 
many actions would be acceptable under this schema, and hence it gives little real 
guidance to the individual who is unsure of what course of action to choose.  
Consider the three instances of allowable risk that Freedman discusses. A Jew 
is allowed to risk life to lengthen life, risk pain and life for quality of life, and engage 
in some amount of risk on account of the fact that “God protects fools.”  The quality 
of life assessment that is mentioned in the second instance is important in our 
discussion of colorectal cancer screening.  For the purpose of improving the quality of 
life, individuals are permitted to engage in some self-wounding. But the very 
assessment of quality of life is contingent upon many factors, some of the most 
important of which are the relationships one has with friends and family.  Recall that 
part of the assessment of the quality of life determination included the notion that 
risky action could be taken if it was in pursuit of some greater good.  Clearly a greater 
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good for many individuals is the well-being of those about whom one cares, and hence 
this would help to determine the level of risk that is appropriate to be taken.  Again, 
considerations of one’s social role are important: a woman’s role as a mother restricts 
her in certain ways, but leaves many others open to her. How she best meets that 
responsibility must be understood in terms of an ethic of care. 
Within the range of acceptable action that is specified by Jewish bioethics, 
then, an ethic of care serves as a better action guide for individuals as it provides a 
framework for moral decision-making.  An ethic of care gives the decision-maker a 
goal to focus on – preserving and nurturing relationships – that is both useful as an 
action guide as well as not too limiting on the patient’s ability to choose from among 
options. 
Combining Principles and Caring 
 What an ethic of care cannot do, however, is to completely replace the 
principles that are inherent in Jewish bioethics. We saw the reason for this in the initial 
discussion with the patient who was considering screening for one of the mutations 
associated with breast cancer.  Because of the way in which I defined the community 
with which I am dealing, by definition these individuals are committed to their 
religion in some way and may mold their action accordingly. That is, these patients are 
concerned with performing those actions that are sanctioned by Jewish law and strive 
to avoid those choices that would contravene such principles.  Hence, any decision 
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about which action to perform must include an assessment of the Jewish legal 
requirements that pertain to the situation. 
 What I have been arguing all along, then, is that such an assessment is 
important, but it is simply not a sufficient enough action guide. The principles 
involved in Jewish bioethics do serve an important role: they guide the individual 
away from action that is proscribed and towards action that is permissible. The 
problem, however, is that given the general nature of the principles and the vast array 
of options open to an individual at any given time, the principles of Jewish bioethics 
do not give enough of an action guide to be useful for a patient.  Instead, it serves to 
narrow the playing field, so to speak, without doing much positive work of helping the 
individual to choose an option. I am not arguing that a moral theory must always 
indicate a specific action and leave no room for individual discretion or whim. What I 
am saying is that a moral theory ought to specify a narrow-enough range of acceptable 
action so that an individual’s choice is made easier. I do not intend the resultant choice 
to be trivial, but rather a theory ought to present a reasonable range of choices for the 
individual from the vast number of those initially available.  It is not clear to me that 
an application of the principles of traditional Jewish bioethics alone can do that. 
 Traditionally, it is at this point that the rabbis entered the picture as authority 
figures, whose task it was to interpret these vague principles using both precedent and 
a knowledge of the individual and her situation.  However, such an application is 
problematic on a number of levels. First, identifying appropriate precedents will 
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require the authorities to abstract the features of the situation that make it sufficiently 
similar to others such that the paradigm matches. As previously discussed, such 
abstraction often obfuscates the very complexities of the situation that made it a moral 
dilemma in the first place. 
 Furthermore, it is not clear according to what scheme the rabbis will help the 
individual to decide what action to choose.  Apart from precedent application, the 
authorities typically use their knowledge of the individual to arrive at a course of 
action.  Many sources speak of the individual nature of this, such that a patient is 
encouraged to seek out her rabbi for such a consultation, as only he knows her and her 
family and hence can arrive at a decision that is well-informed. I contend that this 
focus on the relationship between the individual and the rabbi whom she seeks out to 
assist her with her dilemma arises because of an understanding of the fundamental 
connectedness of individuals. The rabbis know that any decision reached in these 
situations will inevitably affect other family members and individuals about whom the 
patient cares.  Reaching a good moral decision, then, will require accessing the 
process of caring of which Nodding speaks: a good moral decision is evaluated not 
only according to the resultant action, but also according to how faithful the 
participants were to the process of caring when making the decision. 
 Hence, since the focus on the individual situation of the patient is already a 
part of decision-making in Jewish bioethics, coupling this focus with an ethic of care 
should work quite nicely.  In fact, I argue that many authorities are doing this already, 
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whether or not they are aware of or can name this distinct focus of their procedure.  If 
not, it will not take much work to incorporate this ethic into the already-existing 
schema.  Given the importance of the family and community in Judaism, incorporating 
an ethic whose primary focus is these important relationships will complement the 
structure well.   
 There is precedent for combining principles and an ethic of care, although they 
are combined in different ways from the one that I am suggesting.  Regardless, 
thinking about these examples will be illuminating.  Chris Crittenden remarks that 
principles in and of themselves are “neither principles of care nor of justice;” what is 
important, then, is what the principles are and what one does with them.316  In fact, 
Crittenden argues that there are seven “principles of care” that correspond to the 
traditional principles of justice.317  He does this at least partly to demonstrate that it is 
not the structure of the moral tenet that is important (principle vs. rule, for example) 
but rather the character and use of the principle. According to Crittenden, any 
principle that furthers the oppression of women is an anathema, regardless of its 
origin. 
 Feminist philosopher Rita Manning also finds a place for the combination of 
principles and caring.  In fact, Manning argues that “rules and rights” serve the same 
purpose that I have argued principles do in Jewish bioethics.  I argued that the 
                                                 
316 Chris Crittenden, “The Principles of Care,” Women and Politics 22, no. 2 (2001): 
81-105. 
317 Ibid., 84. 
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principles and rules served as useful side constraints on action, or as limiting factors 
which narrowed the range of acceptable choices, yet failed to provide sufficient 
direction as action guides. Manning goes a step further: rules and rights serve as moral 
minimums, and as such are required in conjunction with an ethic of care.   
…[T]he rules do not have a life of their own, but are guides.  They help 
us to formulate a caring response because they speak to us of what most 
of us would want as a caring response in a similar situation.  If the one 
needing care does not want the response suggested by the appropriate 
rule, we should listen to them very carefully and be willing to ignore 
the rule.318 
 
This view may also be useful in addressing a common criticism of care ethics, 
that of “moral myopia”: caring only occurs for those who are closest to us and those 
who are morally more distant from us do not benefit from our caring actions.  Hence, 
we are nearsighted in the sense that we only care for those in our “inner circle” and do 
not address the (sometimes grievous) moral problems that affect those far away from 
us.  One response to this is to point to the network of relationships in which we are 
involved. Even if one agrees with Noddings that it is impossible to truly care about 
those at a distance from us – the starving children in Somalia, for example – both 
because we are not able to provide the real care that they need and because they 
cannot respond in kind, one is not committed to a view of morality as localized and 
narcissistic. Rather, envision the network of those with whom we are connected as a 
spider’s web, with us at the center. Those I am competent to care for are on the 
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spindles that are closest to me. Yet my caring for them facilitates their caring for those 
close to them, etc. Hence, since we are all somewhere on this web of 
interconnectedness, the children in Somalia will be cared for, just not directly by 
me.319 
Manning suggests another way to combat this objection.  Extreme moral 
myopia is centered around the notion that we only care for those who can help us in 
some way, or who are directly related to us: our family and closest friends, one could 
suppose.  It is more difficult to care for others who are not a part of this inner circle, 
and hence we treat others with a certain amount of distance.  This leads to the attitude 
that caring for helpless others is “someone else’s job,” since my responsibility is 
exclusively to those in my immediate radius.  Rules and rights, according to Manning, 
help to guard against this to an extent.  Manning argues:  
In a world infamous for its lack of caring, we need tools of persuasion 
to protect the helpless. This is one of the roles that rules and rights 
fill….Rules and rights provide a minimum below which none should 
fall and beyond which behavior is morally condemned.  Rules provide 
a minimum standard for morality. Rights provide a measure of 
protection for the helpless.320 
 
Hence, incorporating principles into an ethic of care may guard against the problem of 
distance as a challenge to morality. 
                                                                                                                                            
318 Manning, 51.  This may very well hold for the hybrid theory that I am proposing as 
well. This will be discussed in greater detail in chapter five. 
319 Recall that “caring” is a technical term, and does not merely refer to a “fellow 
feeling” we may have with those who are suffering. It is in this technical way that I 
cannot care for the children, but others can. 
320 Manning, 50. 
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 Another common criticism of the care ethic is that the one who cares is 
vulnerable to self-sacrifice and abuse.  One must be on careful guard against 
completely losing one’s own goals and needs in the process of fulfilling the needs and 
desires of others.  To help to ensure that this problem does not come to fruition, 
Crittenden posits a principle that requires the caregiver to first care for herself before 
caring for others.321  This is not inherently counter to the ethic of care, and plays an 
important role in the moral life of the caregiver. 
So far I have been arguing about why combining principles and the ethic of 
care are not incompatible with the motives of care. There is nothing inherently 
contradictory between the notion of care and that of principles, but rather it is which 
principles are used and the manner in which they are applied that is important.  There 
are some that suggest that principles themselves cannot stand alone, and require some 
other element for a complete moral theory.  As Lawrence A. Blum argues: 
…[W]hat it takes to bring such principles to bear on individual 
situations involves qualities of character and sensibilities which are 
themselves moral, and which go beyond the straightforward process of 
consulting a principle and then conforming one’s will and action to 
it….[K]nowing that the particular situation which the agent is facing is 
one which calls for the particular principle in question and knowing 
how to apply the principle in question are capacities which, in the 
domain of personal relations (and perhaps elsewhere too), are 
intimately connected with care for individual persons.  Such 
particularized, caring understanding is integral to an adequate meeting 
of the agent’s moral responsibilities and cannot be generated from 
universal principle alone.322 
 
                                                 
321 Crittenden, 99. 
322 Blum, 59. 
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This provides more evidence that such a combination of principles and the ethic of 
care make sense for Jewish bioethics.  This speaks to the issue of application, and 
argues that only by already having more (moral) information at hand will such an 
assessment of the role of principles be achieved. And since such application requires 
an additional moral assessment, given an individual’s “natural feeling of caring” and 
the focus on the family and the community in Judaism, adding an ethic of care is 
useful for this group of people. 
So the combination of a principled approach with one centered around caring 
and relationships is a nice fit.  Both are useful in shaping the individual’s decision in a 
medical context.  The principles lay a general foundation upon which the work of 
preserving relationships can build.   
Objections 
Some may object that by introducing an ethic of care, I have not aided 
traditional Jewish bioethics as an action guide; rather, I have simply made things 
worse by making it more general.  Instead of having discrete principles to guide our 
decisions, now we have to look at relationships and figure out how to preserve those.  
My reply is that looking at the context involved in the decision may make the process 
more complicated, but it also adds a particular focus that had been lacking. The 
presumably arbitrary nature of principle application can be addressed somewhat by a 
focus on the caring and compassion that are already present in Judaism. 
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A common objection to care ethics in general is that it is insufficient as an 
action guide when used alone because it fails to give a universal guide (such as the 
principle of utility) for agents to follow. Remember, however, that I am not suggesting 
we adopt care theory in place of traditional Jewish bioethics, but rather that we 
augment the traditional schema with this alternative approach.  This will allow for a 
richer moral theory on both counts. 
Some might argue that I am doing nothing new here. That is, Judaism already 
emphasizes the importance of family and familial relationships, and so introducing 
care theory into this tradition is redundant.  In fact, it is this understanding of 
relationships that drew me to this project. What the traditional schema does not 
typically do is to focus on the needs of the relationship in the way that care theory 
does.  Instead, it focuses on our obligation to those in the family – the duty we have to 
our children, etc.  What this project suggests is a way to bring to the surface elements 
that already exist in Jewish bioethics.  It is crucial to maintaining these important ties 
– not because we are obligated to, but because that is what it means to care for others 
and be cared for by them.  Only then can we act in a way that is true to ourselves and 
our convictions. 
Finally, there is a difficulty that I have not yet addressed. Augmenting Jewish 
bioethics with an ethic of care gives an individual a more specific action guide when 
facing a moral question. But what happens when the action guide conflicts with the 
principles? That is, suppose the principle in Jewish law that requires us to act to save a 
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life is the one that is appropriate in a given situation. Then suppose a situation where 
caring for an individual patient will require us to act in direct opposition to that guide. 
Perhaps a concrete example will be useful here, and will demonstrate how 
incorporating an ethic of care into traditional Jewish bioethics may alter moral 
decision-making.   
Consider the woman who refuses a radical mastectomy despite the fact that 
such a course of treatment has the best chance of saving her life.  Such an action 
seems to directly counter the principle of the sanctity of human life that is crucial in 
Judaism, and hence it is the rabbi’s role to counsel the woman against this course of 
action.  On the other hand, perhaps caring for the woman in question would require us 
to support her position: when we consider her reasons for refusing surgery, let us 
presume, we are convinced that the caring response to her problem is to support her 
right to refuse treatment. Now, however, there is a clear instance of conflict: the caring 
response is in direct opposition to the response prescribed by the principles of Jewish 
bioethics.  Our initial appeal to Jewish bioethics to narrow the sphere of action is itself 
in conflict with caring.  Now what? 
I contend that the way to understand such instances of conflict is to analyze 
them from a larger perspective, which is the task of the next chapter. Specifically, 
understanding the framework of principle and rule application that is the hallmark of 
Jewish bioethics includes an understanding of the values and priorities of this group of 
people.  Comparing their values and priorities with the values and priorities of the 
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physicians doing the genetic testing will be illuminating. For one thing, such a 
comparison will suggest a scheme of dealing with the aforementioned conflicts: I will 
show that agreement and disagreement can be assessed in terms of degrees, and any 
instance of conflict must be further refined considering this analysis.   
Finally, the other issue that has not been adequately discussed yet is the impact 
of dissent: dissent by those who reject the recommendations of the authority figures, 
and dissent among the authority figures themselves. What is the moral significance of 
the fact that two different rabbis may well give two very different recommendations to 
a woman considering breast cancer screening? As the answer to this question is 
fundamentally grounded in the analysis of values and priorities mentioned previously, 
this will also be discussed in chapter five. Once those issues are clear, I will suggest 
some future directions of research for those interested in this project, as well as 
specifying what consistency will require in future decisions. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION 
 
 So far in this project I have focused on specific applications of more general 
ideas in order to support my thesis.  That is, instead of looking at genetic medicine in 
general, I focused on three specific genetic diseases and the ethical issues associated 
with each. Then, rather than looking at Jewish bioethics in general, I focused on the 
particular rules and principles that could be consistently applied to the moral questions 
that patients with one of the three diseases might face, and then pointed out problems 
with that approach. Finally, in my discussion of the care ethic, I related it specifically 
to the group of observant Jews with whom my project is concerned and described how 
the ethic is both an appropriate orientation for this group, as well as how it offers a 
better action guide to the individuals involved in moral decision-making. 
 These very practical efforts, however, have led me into a sort of a trap: there 
will be instances when my augmented form of Jewish bioethics fails to specify a 
morally right course of action, specifically when the principles of Jewish bioethics and 
the action suggested by care ethics conflict.  I have defended the notion that Jewish 
bioethics and care ethics can work together because the rules and principles of the 
traditional schema lead one to an optimally acceptable action, while care ethics offers 
the appropriate focus for moral agents when making a decision. Yet in instances of 
conflict, it seems, this proposal breaks down. 
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 I contend that this is not a fatal flaw for my project.  What is necessary to solve 
this problem is a broader understanding of the values and priorities of the group in 
question.  Specifically, by understanding what the observant Jews in my project view 
as important – in fact, by creating a moral taxonomy of such values – we will be 
empowered to solve such an apparently fundamental objection.  My first objective in 
this chapter, then, is to elucidate such a taxonomy and then to use it to answer the 
objection suggested at the end of the last chapter. 
 Once that has been accomplished and this conflict has been resolved, however, 
my problems will not end. In fact, a larger issue may arise from rubble of the former 
one. The moral taxonomy that I specified from the observant Jewish communities 
mentioned may indeed conflict with the values and priorities of the scientists and 
clinicians engaged in genetic medicine. What is the appropriate resolution of these 
conflicts in moral priority?  I will describe and then analyze what I judge to be the 
motivational goals and values of the scientists and researchers, and then suggest both 
similarities and differences between these and the goals of my augmented Jewish 
bioethics. I then will suggest ways that these two groups of people can find common 
moral ground. What will become apparent is that it is unlikely that real instances of 
irresolvable conflict will arise, since, as I have argued, care ethics are a part of the 
application process of the principles of Jewish bioethics.  I will explain how the rules 
and principles might be thought to conflict, and then defend the notion that in fact the 
two approaches work together in a complementary fashion.  Finally, this chapter 
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concludes the discussion of this project with a recapitulation of the progress that I 
made and the claims that I defended. 
Values and Priorities of the Jewish Community 
 
 Judaism is a religion that focuses on the present rather than the future.  Social 
action is crucial for committed Jews, as it is through such interaction with individuals 
that morally right action can be initiated.  Morally right action is pursued not for some 
goal of life after death, nor for any future rewards,323 but because of a general 
requirement to act according to the laws of God. While an action may be performed in 
order to please God or to win God’s favor, it is not because of a fear for one’s eternal 
existence that the committed Jew engages in morally right action. Rather, the way we 
act towards one another determines the nature of our character, and it is this that 
motivates the committed Jew.  The goal is to be the best kind of person we can be, the 
kind of person whose actions are pleasing in the eyes of God. In other words, our goal 
in life is to live a life of holiness.324 
 Our choices determine our character, but there is a core upon which such 
choices imprint, and that is that the human is created in the divine image.  While there 
is debate over which feature of humans reflects this divine image,325 it is this notion 
that divides the human from animals.  This doctrine is more than merely descriptive, 
                                                 
323 There is a concept of the “world to come” in Judaism, but the character and origin 
of such a concept is still debated.  For a discussion on the after life in Judaism see 
Toby Schonfeld, “The Afterlife in Judaism, Including Christian Influences,” working 
paper, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, May 1994. 
324 Dorff (1998), 26. 
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however; it is also prescriptive. According to Elliot Dorff, “…because human beings 
are created in God’s image, we affront God when we insult another person.”326 Being 
created in the divine image, then, serves as a moral foundation for action.  If we are all 
alike in this fundamental way, then any differential treatment must be on account of 
actions that we perform rather than on account of a difference in intrinsic moral worth. 
We must treat others with respect for what they are: images of God.327 
 The goal of living a life of holiness also specifies ways in which we are to 
view our bodies.  Unlike Christianity, according to Judaism the body is “morally 
neutral and potentially good.”328  This means that bodily pleasure is “God-given and 
not to be shunned, for to do so would be an act of ingratitude toward our Creator.  The 
body, in other words, can and should give us pleasure to the extent that such pleasure 
enables us to live a life of holiness.”329   
 This is important to consider in relation to the duty to preserve life and health 
that is one of the primary moral requirements in Judaism.  What we see here is that 
this principle is not important simply because life itself is sacred and of infinite value, 
but also because an individual who is in pain or suffering is unable to pursue the life of 
holiness that God desires.  Dorff cites the following passage by Maimonides to 
support this view: 
                                                                                                                                            
325 Ibid., 18. 
326 Ibid., 19. 
327 Ibid., 20. 
328 Ibid., 24. 
329 Ibid. 
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He who regulates his life in accordance with the laws of medicine with 
the sole motive of maintaining a sound and vigorous physique and 
begetting children to do his work and labor for his benefit is not 
following the right course.  A man should aim to maintain physical 
health and vigor in order that his soul may be upright, in a condition to 
know God…Whoever throughout his life follows this course will be 
continually serving God, even while engaged in business and even 
during cohabitation, because his purpose in all that he does will be to 
satisfy his needs so as to have a sound body with which to serve God.  
Even when he sleeps and seeks repose to calm his mind and rest his 
body so as not to fall sick and be incapacitated from serving God, his 
sleep is service of the Almighty.330   
  
Understanding this foundation is crucial for understanding the values and 
priorities that committed Jews place on varieties of right action.  The individual has an 
obligation to engage in that action that is pleasing to God, or, more importantly, an 
obligation to refrain from action that is displeasing to God. But the attribution of 
“pleasing” and “displeasing” does not directly correspond to the specific precepts and 
laws that are specified by the ancient sources.  In chapter three I discussed the 
principle of mental anguish, according to which some laws were permitted to be 
broken in order to save a life. For example, there is the case of the individual who was 
so distressed at the prospect of following the dietary restrictions that the rabbis 
sanctioned his transgression of this obligation. This was because the well-being of the 
individual took priority over strict obligation to ritual law. Another example of such a 
violation was the woman in labor who desired that a lamp be lit, despite the Sabbath 
prohibitions on the kindling of fire. This was similarly allowed on the grounds that the 
laboring woman’s need, even if not a physical one, caused a certain amount of mental 
                                                 
330 Ibid., 26. 
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anguish that the rabbis determined might be detrimental to her health and/or the health 
of others – in this case, her child.  
What we see here, then, is an indication that there is an implicit ordering of 
obligations or requirements for the individual.  There are many actions that an 
individual is morally compelled to perform,331 and yet some of those obligations may 
be circumvented or even transgressed in the service of some higher goal. This goal, I 
contend, is that of being the “right” kind of person: one who cares for others as well as 
herself, one who tries to live her life according to the rules set forth in the various 
codes of law, and one who participates in the religious and ritual life that is a part of 
her tradition and hence attempts to live a life of holiness.332 
The first step in the creation of our moral taxonomy is the recognition that 
health and life take precedence over any purely religious obligation.  For example, 
while adults are required to fast from food and drink on the Day of Atonement, 
individuals whose health would be put at risk by this action are not required to engage 
in this action.  This is the principle that is exemplified in the previous cases of the man 
transgressing the dietary restrictions and the woman breaking the laws of the Sabbath: 
their health took precedence over observance of the religious laws. This is especially 
interesting in these cases because the threat to health described is mental or apparent, 
                                                 
331 Here I am referring to the 614 good deeds, or mitzvoth, that the Jew is required to 
perform during her lifetime. 
332 It is possible, of course, that these goals may conflict, or that the pursuit of such 
goals could lead to conflicting actions. It is the task of the remainder of this chapter to 
discuss the resolution of such conflicts. 
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depending on the interpretation. The laboring woman did not require light to 
physically accomplish her task, and neither did those who were assisting her. Yet her 
perception of such a need was sufficient for the rabbis to rule in her favor. 
So the priority of life and health is of crucial importance. It is also from here 
that the mandate to heal is derived. There is a famous saying from the Talmud that 
reads: “If you save one life, it is as if you have saved the whole world.”  Hence we are 
permitted some transgression of the rituals or laws in order to save a life ourselves, or 
in the service of healing. For example, Immanuel Jakobovits discusses how it is 
permissible to ignore the observance of the Sabbath and other religious observances in 
order to save a life, except for the three cardinal transgressions of idolatry, incest, and 
murder.333 
This last bit is crucial because it further defines our relationships to one 
another.  Previously we only discussed an individual transgressing the religious laws 
in order to preserve her own mental or physical health.  With the discussion about the 
mandate to heal, however, we learn of the importance of our responsibility to others.  
No longer are we simply permitted to transgress our obligations if our health is in 
jeopardy, but we are also given that permission if we can help someone whose life or 
health is in jeopardy. This is a key move because it speaks to our fundamental 
interconnectedness as individuals.  This is one way to see how the individual is not 
isolated in the community, but rather is joined to others in an important way. 
                                                 
333 Immanuel Jakobovits (1975), 42-58. 
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Other principles that were discussed in relation to the specific concerns raised 
by genetic medicine can be generalized into our taxonomy as well.  For example, in 
the discussion of risk in relation to screening for colorectal cancer, we learned that an 
individual was permitted to engage in certain risky behaviors in order to save or 
prolong life, in order to improve quality of life, and in pursuit of a goal that has a low 
level of risk and/or that many people engage in, heedless of the risk involved.  This 
discussion of risk gives us more of an insight into the priorities in Judaism once again 
because of the kinds of things for which failing to meet obligations can be justified. 
Important to this discussion was an understanding that an individual’s body belongs to 
God and is simply on loan to her, and hence she is obliged to act as a “reasonable” 
caretaker and avoid unnecessary harm to this property that is entrusted to her.  The 
amount of risk that is permissible for an individual to take is assessed in terms of the 
larger goal: the more likely an action is to save someone’s life, for example, the more 
risk you are permitted to assume in its pursuit.  The more improbable the risk and 
subsequent harm to the individual, the more likely it is that you will be permitted to 
engage in that action. 
It is important to remember here that there is no sanction, divine or otherwise, 
for failing to achieve one’s ends. A good faith pursuit of a life that is in accordance 
with the laws set down is sufficient for morally right action.  There is no fear that one 
will go to Hell or be punished in some way if, for example, one inadvertently 
transgresses a doctrine or fails to save the life of an individual despite repeated 
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attempts. Instead, the focus is on how to live a good life apart from any concern about 
punishment. 
The case of screening for the genes associated with breast cancer also reveals 
this priority of the sanctity of human life and the preservation of health. Once again 
the body as property was important, as was the principle of mental anguish: mental 
health is to be considered in addition to simply physical health.  This became 
especially important in the case of the individual who was considering forgoing life-
sustaining therapy in favor of some other course of action. 
It is with the case of Tay-Sachs disease that we see the greatest evidence of a 
prioritizing of moral principles at work. It is still true that human life is sacred and 
individuals are instructed to do whatever they can in order to preserve that life. Yet 
with a fatal genetic disorder such as TSD, other considerations become important. For 
example, other religious prescriptions and prohibitions must be considered for a 
couple that is considering some method of assisted reproduction to avoid TSD.  The 
prohibition against spilling seed, the obligation to procreate, and even rules about 
incest and infidelity become important in such cases.  Their importance and relevance 
to the decision must be weighed according to what is at stake in each case.  For 
example, the prohibition against “spilling of seed” is important, and usually justifies 
an absolute prohibition on condoms or other barrier forms of birth control. In certain 
circumstances, however, condom use is permitted: if, for example, that is the only way 
to harvest an ejaculate for the purpose of artificial insemination. It is possible that such 
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a permission is forthcoming because such an action does not properly fall under the 
rubric of “wasting seed,” since it is for the purpose of procreation. However, it is also 
possible that permission is forthcoming because such an action occurs in the service of 
a “higher” goal – in this case, the goal of procreation.  Yet such permission is only 
afforded on a case-by-case basis; the presumption is in favor of a prohibition unless 
the specific situation warrants special consideration.  Hence, the priority is clear. 
From what has been said, then, it appears that the moral taxonomy of Jewish 
bioethics consists of a series of prima facie obligations, all of which have relatively 
equal import, plus two overarching principles: the sanctity of human life, and the duty 
to preserve life and health. All other principles or duties (the requirement to ease 
suffering, the obligation to procreate, etc.) either stem from these two principles or are 
subsumed under them.  While the lower-level prima facie principles can be 
overridden, it seems that the two overarching principles take precedence over all the 
others. 
Since these two principles are the most important, it is worthwhile to spend 
some time figuring out why. Why are the sanctity of life and the preservation of health 
privileged over all the other principles? It is not because the punishment levied for 
transgressing the principles is any worse than for transgressing a number of other 
requirements.  It is also not because Judaism is a vitalist tradition, as is apparent from 
the permissibility of abortion and the permissibility of certain risky behaviors that 
might endanger one’s life. So why are these principles privileged? 
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I contend that there are two fundamental reasons why these principles have a 
privileged position over all the others. The first stems from the recognition that 
Judaism is a tradition focused on the present, rather than on the future.  There is a rich 
tradition of accounts of individuals acting in accordance with the ways of life that are 
pleasing to God, as well as accounts of the ill that befalls such individuals when they 
fail to live such a life.  This is partly on account of the fact that our bodies belong to 
God, and hence we must do what is necessary to care for and preserve what is on loan 
to us, until such time as God is ready to take it back.  Furthermore, because the 
primary concern in Judaism is living a life of holiness, and because this is our only 
chance to better the world in which we live, it makes sense that we are required to do 
what we can to preserve our lives here on earth so that we can accomplish that goal.334  
Hence, the lack of a certain afterlife is one reason that principles regarding the sanctity 
of human life and the preservation of such life are of crucial importance. We must be 
alive and well in order to pursue the goal of holiness. 
The second reason that these principles occupy a privileged position is because 
of the focus on the family and on the community that was mentioned at the beginning 
of this project.  The community is very important in this tradition: individuals are 
instructed to choose marriage partners from others within the community, religious 
obligations are carried out and rites of passage are celebrated within the community, 
and assistance in times of need comes from the community.  While the community is 
                                                 
334 See Dorff (1998), 26. 
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more than simply the sum of its members, sustaining those members remains an 
important component for the continuity of the community.  The principles and rules of 
Judaism help to specify our relationship to one another, and our actions in the 
community are representative of this.  It is a fact that these principles require each of 
us to care for other community members in some way.  Part of caring for others 
includes a recognition that we are all important and importantly different, something 
that is captured by the notion that we are all created in the divine image and the 
principle of the sanctity of human life.  We are each valuable, and our value cannot be 
compared or replaced.   
Furthermore, caring for individuals includes providing for others in their time 
of need, and that is the sentiment that is captured by the principle that requires us to 
preserve life and health. We are to do what we can for each other because that is what 
morality requires.  Babies are born in Judaism with a clean slate, and hence the 
development of character is similar to the process described by Aristotle, where we are 
responsible for the kind of person we become on account of our choices, which are 
also augmented by environment and the influence of others.  We are the kind of 
people we are, then, by the choices we make and the actions we perform. Being the 
best kind of people, those who are pleasing to God, and achieving a life of holiness 
means performing those actions that caring people perform.  Hence, the priority of 
these two principles is also supported by the kinds of relationships we have with one 
another.  
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From what has been said, it should be evident that these principles are 
foundational in the life of the observant Jew.  The principle of the sanctity of life is 
important not only because we are created in the divine image and hence are 
intrinsically valuable, but also because we must be alive in order to fulfill God’s 
commandments and achieve a life of holiness.  The principle that specifies our duty to 
preserve life and health, then, does so in recognition of the fact that we must preserve 
or restore our ability to perform God’s commandments and pursue the life of holiness 
whenever possible. And because it is this principle that is also fundamental to our 
relationship to others, it is important to consider this in relation to how we act in our 
community.  No other principle (e.g. the obligation to procreate, the principle of 
mental anguish, etc.) is as foundational to the life and well-being of the individual as 
are the two specified here. 
Conflicts with Caring 
With this in mind, we are prepared to discuss the issues of potential conflict 
between rules and principles and the prescriptions of an ethic of care. Suppose, for 
example, that the woman considering a radical mastectomy decides, for good reason, 
not to go through with the surgery. Further suppose that when we analyze the 
situation, we agree that the caring response is to honor her wishes and support her. Yet 
the principles of the sanctity of human life and the mandate to heal strongly suggest 
another action: insofar as the mastectomy has a good chance of saving her life, there is 
reason to assume that Jewish authority figures would counsel the woman that she is 
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required to undergo this surgery.  Hence, the caring response seems to conflict with 
the action suggested by Jewish law. 
What I propose here is that the adjudication of such conflicts must be 
accomplished from an understanding of the overall importance of these principles.  
This is where the perspective of care ethics does not conflict with the traditional 
schema, but rather enhances it.  There is a chance, of course, that the principles and 
the application of the care ethic lead to an instance of apparent conflict rather than real 
conflict. This result occurs because of a failure to understand the principles richly.  An 
example here may help to demonstrate this point.  We have previously mentioned that 
the requirement to preserve a person’s life and health includes mental health as well as 
physical health.  In the scenario provided regarding the mastectomy, one can assume 
that it was something other than the individual’s concern for her physical health that 
prompted her decision. Perhaps she has a psychological commitment to her bodily 
integrity that precludes even potentially life-saving physical deformity, or perhaps she 
has an understandable fear of surgery that stems from both the risks involved as well 
as a personal experience with loved ones dying on the operating table. Regardless, her 
quality of life would be severely compromised by engaging in the surgery, we can 
assume, and quality of life considerations are important in Jewish bioethics.  Recall 
that in the assessment of risk, we discussed that it was permissible to risk life for 
quality of life, and that seems to be what is at issue here. A rich interpretation of the 
principles includes an acknowledgement of the motivations behind the principles and 
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will lead to a more warranted application of the principle.  This procedure will likely 
illuminate and resolve any conflict that is merely apparent.  And in this understanding 
of the case, it is not at all clear that the principles of Jewish bioethics in fact do suggest 
a different course of action than the one suggested by care ethics.  Hence, as I have 
argued all along, the authority figures’ interpretations of the principles required an 
acknowledgement of the overall context in which the decision was taking place, and it 
is this that the care ethic has provided for them. 
However, there might be instances of real conflict, not merely apparent 
conflict. What are we to do in those instances? I contend that the right course of action 
for that individual will once again depend on the context. I stipulated initially that the 
group of people on whom this project would focus were those who would seek out the 
rulings of Jewish bioethics when making a medical decision. I deliberately avoided 
referring to a particular organized group, such as Orthodox Jews, both because of the 
diversity among such groups and because of the difficulty with such limitations. 
Because, then, these individuals have various commitments and are in fact only united 
by the fact that they seek guidance from Jewish sources when making a medical 
decision, we know little about the rest of their commitments.  More importantly, we do 
not know the extent of their commitment to the guidance that they receive from the 
authority figures.  For some individuals, we can assume, this information will be 
factored in with all of the other relevant considerations, and not carry any more or any 
  
  
228
less moral weight than other considerations.  For others, this information will be the 
primary ground for making a moral choice.  
The point is that the amount of moral weight that these principles have for the 
individual must be considered. If an individual ranks consideration of her family 
higher than adherence to principles, for example, then this instance of conflict will be 
solved in favor of an ethic of care rather than in favor of the principles. She may 
choose the option that best keeps her family’s interest in mind because that is also the 
option that is good for her. This determination that her family’s interests are very 
important in the decision process is not necessarily a rejection of autonomy, but even 
if it is, that is acceptable to a woman whose ethical framework is the ethic of care.  
Recall that it is a fundamental realization in this ethic that the self is not a separate and 
separable entity but rather is inextricably connected to others.   
On the other hand, perhaps what this example demonstrates is that real, 
irresolvable conflict is unlikely to occur. If, as I contend, an ethic of care really has 
become part of the rabbis’ application of the principles to the individual case, then in 
fact a care ethic serves to underscore the fundamental values of this community, 
regardless of their commitments. The point is that since these two approaches 
complement each other rather than stand in opposition to one another, real conflict is 
unlikely. This possibility will be discussed shortly. 
In the event that an occasion of conflict does arise, however, the overall idea is 
that the woman would need to ascertain where her commitments lie in order to 
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determine how to solve the conflict. And insofar as each person will have different 
commitments and different levels of commitment, such an assessment must occur on 
an individual basis, based on the context of the situation.  The values and priorities of 
the individual must be employed in interpreting the principles of Jewish bioethics and 
used to weigh the various commitments of the individual against each other. 
What I suspect, however, is that if we understand the rules and principles in 
Jewish bioethics in the way that I have previously argued, that is, according to the 
values and priorities which the principles represent, then conflict will either be easily 
resolved or will turn out to be merely apparent in the first place.  If the principles exist 
in order to afford individuals the opportunity to have a rich and fulfilling life, and if 
they include a recognition of the importance of the community in the development of 
the individual, then in fact courses of action specified by care ethics and those 
specified by Jewish bioethics will rarely conflict. This will require a broader 
interpretation of the principles, to be sure, but will yet be true to the foundations and 
spirit of the principles.  Understanding the importance and value of individuals to the 
Jewish tradition will require a correlative understanding of the regulations that specify 
the ways in which we should treat one another: we should act according to the notion 
that human life is valuable, and hence we ought to do what is in our power to preserve 
it.  The woman’s act of refusing a radical mastectomy may first appear to counter this 
goal of preserving life. But when we understand her reasons to include a 
fundamentally different idea of what her life means, and of what such surgery would 
  
  
230
mean to her quality of life, I would argue that the principle that requires us to 
recognize the value in human life carries with it a recognition that the individual is the 
only one qualified to make the determination about the value of her own particular 
life.  Preserving life and health includes mental health as well as physical, and that 
might be the most important factor in this case. 
This interpretation of the rules and principles does not run counter to the 
tradition of Jewish bioethics. In fact, I would argue that it is in better harmony with it 
than would be a rigid application of the principles to the case. Recall that traditionally, 
the authorities made their rulings based on particular cases; the model of casuistry 
applied here. My quarrel was with the lack of apparent clarity in how the rulings were 
applied to individual cases, not with the focus on cases themselves. In fact, I argued 
that moral dilemmas can only be solved from within the context of particular cases, 
and that care ethics helps us to specify the right action for individual patients.  This is 
in fact what the authorities do when presented with an individual with a decision to 
make: they try and determine how particular rules and principles can be made to fit 
with the individual’s goals and values, and this is the process of caring that I have 
described.  The importance of the individual case for traditional Jewish bioethics 
cannot be underestimated, as it stems from the fundamental importance of the 
individual in relation to her community. Hence, keeping this foundation in mind when 
evaluating a situation of apparent conflict will help the decision-makers to achieve 
some sort of resolution. 
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Values and Priorities of Researchers and Clinicians in Genetic Medicine 
 
 “Cracking the code” of the human genome has been hailed by the public as one 
of the most important advances in science and medicine in the history of the 
discipline.  The scientists and clinicians who have been involved with or benefit from 
the project are just as excited as the public, if not even more so. This is because of the 
promised benefits of genetic research.  Understanding the human genome will give 
insight into causal mechanisms of disease, which may then suggest treatment 
interventions for these ailments.  Indeed, the cure for cancer and the key to longevity 
may be found within the human genome. 
 It will be useful for us to specify and analyze the values and priorities of those 
involved in genetic medicine in order to compare and contrast them with those of the 
observant Jewish communities of whom I have been speaking.  There are five aspects 
of genetic research that are of value to clinicians and researchers. The first is that 
understanding the human genome will increase our knowledge of disease and illness.  
This is important for a number of reasons, which comprise the other four values held 
by this group. Such knowledge may allow clinicians to (2) save lives, by leading to (3) 
the development of cures for disease or methods of symptom suppression, which will 
lead to improved care for patients. Of course, some researchers simply (4) value 
knowledge for knowledge’s sake, because understanding more about the world we live 
in and the role that individuals play is one of the great mysteries. Finally, some 
researchers (5) value the economic potential that the human genome brings, either by 
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patenting this new knowledge (gene sequences, etc.) or by developing products that 
are in high demand in our market economy. 
 This list of values is neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, and there is a 
good deal of overlap among them. A clinician could be interested in knowledge for the 
sake of knowledge, and yet simultaneously recognize the benefit to patients that will 
result from her investigations.  In fact, this idea that understanding the human genome 
may get us one step closer to solving a great mystery should not be underestimated as 
a value.335 It is from such an orientation that we get the clinician who is a problem-
solver, one whose role it is to get to the root of the problem and then propose a way to 
deal with the mystery. We encourage our medical students to take on such a role, 
where medicine is a sort of discovery into the nature of disease and injury, and where 
the practitioner has an array of armaments at her disposal with which to attack the 
offending entity. 
 We encourage this role of the clinician-as-problem-solver because it furthers 
goals with which we largely agree. That is, solving the “problem” of heart disease, for 
example, will result in saving lives, or at least in helping patients. These are goals with 
which we resonate. Corresponding goals of increasing an individual’s quality of life or 
decreasing her amount of suffering are also noble.  Understanding the character of 
                                                 
335 Nor, of course, should it be overestimated, as such overconfidence in genetics 
might discourage a researcher from pursuing other research that might more quickly or 
directly benefit patients. I am grateful to Glenn Graber for pointing this out to me. 
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disease or injury is also necessary for the more fundamental goal of the physician – to 
do no harm. 
 Given that genetics is the science of heredity, researchers in this field have an 
even greater opportunity to achieve the goals or continue the values that were 
previously mentioned. Now they have the opportunity not simply to cure disease in 
one generation, but to carry that through to multiple generations.  We can manipulate 
our basic building blocks, our genes, to eliminate undesirable traits and to promote 
traits that confer some sort of social advantage.336 If one of our goals is to help 
patients, then certainly we would not want to limit our investigation to those 
procedures that fix deleterious genes, but we also want to give individuals every 
possible opportunity to succeed, and this can be achieved through genetic 
manipulation as well. 
 Or would we? One thing that is clear is that there is a certain amount of 
paternalism involved in many analyses of what it means to help people. Certainly 
there are degrees of such knowledge: we are hard-pressed to understand why anyone 
would be hesitant to eradicate lethal traits like TSD337 while we are much more 
dubious of efforts to enhance individual characteristics.  Yet paternalism in any form 
must be subject to scrutiny.  One relevant instance of the problem with paternalism is 
                                                 
336 Mahowald, 2. This claim may be a bit bold, but the spirit of the thought is valid. 
337 However, there may be some reason to be concerned about such manipulation, as 
discussed previously in relation to things like heterozygotic advantage and the like. 
Regardless, after a cost-benefit analysis is performed, many would still argue that 
disease eradication takes priority. 
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when a patient refuses treatment that is otherwise indicated, or when a family requests 
the continuation of an apparently “futile” treatment. It is in these instances that we see 
some of the problems with paternalism, notably that the physician is not always 
correct in her estimation of what is in the best interests of the patient. 
 The same kind of reasoning holds true for genetic medicine.  As previously 
discussed, the information gained from genetic research is of value to the clinicians 
and researchers for many reasons. Regardless of which one – or how many – of those 
reasons hold in a particular case, the information is always of value for clinicians. 
Such information can assist them in caring for the patient, in developing future cures 
or other treatment alternatives, etc.  
This points to the first main difference between the values of the researchers 
and that of the community of which I have been speaking. While the information 
gained from research is always of value to the researchers, the same information may 
be a disvalue for patients.  A good example of such a conflict is the case of the woman 
considering genetic testing for one of the mutations associated with breast cancer.  The 
information gained from the test would give her physician knowledge about her risk of 
breast cancer that might change the way in which he cares for her: perhaps she ought 
to come in for clinical exams every six months instead of yearly, or perhaps she ought 
to have a mammogram earlier than the normally recommended time.  These actions 
coincide with the goal of helping patients, and perhaps even with saving her life. 
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It is not clear, however, that such information would likewise be valuable for 
the woman herself.  As previously discussed, she may have compelling reasons not to 
find out the information: perhaps it would lead to more psychological distress for her 
or her family members; perhaps it would harm the relationship that she has with others 
insofar as gaining this information about herself would also give her information about 
her siblings and children, etc.  Especially if it is clear that the woman would take no 
action given positive or negative test results, it is not at all certain that engaging in 
testing for the purpose of gaining information is a value to her. 
This leads us to the second major area of conflict between the interests of those 
doing genetic medicine and those of this group of observant Jews, and this is a 
difference in priorities. Given the context of values previously discussed, it is 
understandable that the priority of genetics is to cure disease, or to understand the 
human genome so that diseases can be eradicated and individuals can live longer, 
healthier lives. The priorities of the observant Jewish community, on the other hand, 
are to live a life of holiness and to be the “right” kind of people in whatever time we 
are given. These priorities may conflict, as living the life of holiness may include 
performing actions that are contrary to the goals of those involved in genetics. For 
example, the woman considering testing for a genetic susceptibility to breast cancer 
may find that other things important in her life take precedence over finding out this 
information. Since the goals are different for this group than for the group doing 
genetic medicine, the value of engaging in such a test must be evaluated accordingly 
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by all parties.  The focus is on living a life that is pleasing to God, and curing disease 
or manipulating the genome is desirable only insofar as it assists the individual in 
achieving this goal. 
In the previous two cases, we mentioned the impact that the family has on an 
individual’s decision, and discussed how other considerations might supersede those 
specified by the geneticists. This points to the third major difference in values between 
those doing genetic medicine and the members of the group of observant Jews. While 
the family is important for both groups, its importance stems from completely 
different foci. For the geneticists, families are important as the foundation for the 
science of heredity. That is, it is through the study of pedigrees and inheritance that 
genetics is understood, and hence the family is an important locus of information.  For 
the group of observant Jews, on the other hand, family is important for entirely 
different reasons. The family is the locus of morality, where caring occurs and where 
our obligations to one another are both first learned and best applied.  The role of the 
family is initially to model and shape appropriate relationships and then to enable 
individuals to pursue relationships with others – it serves as the foundation for ethical 
interaction with others.  The family, then, does not have only instrumental value for 
this group, but rather has intrinsic value as well. This intrinsic value stems from the 
notion that we are all created in the divine image and as such we are required to 
respect one another as individuals. The interactions we have with one another, then, is 
supposed to presuppose this value. 
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The question then becomes: is there a way to solve these conflicts so that the 
two groups can find common moral ground? I argue that there is, and that is the 
subject of the next section. 
Conflict Resolution and Harmonious Living 
 
 The first conflict in values and priorities is in some ways the most difficult, 
that of the differing value of information.  Part of the problem here is that information 
is almost always viewed as a value to individuals, whether in the context of genetics or 
otherwise. For example, there are obstetricians who refuse to care for women who 
decline the triple-screen early in their second trimester simply because the physician 
feels that the information from this test is valuable to them.338  Furthermore, with the 
transition in medicine from an ethic of paternalism to one of autonomy, we now find 
ourselves counseling physicians on how to deliver information in a compassionate 
manner without being patronizing or holding too much back.  With this as a model, 
then, it is no wonder that information is viewed as especially important in medicine, 
with individuals more often than not erring on the side of caution by having as much 
information as possible. 
 It is important to note that the disvalue that may attributed by the Jewish 
community is not because of the information itself, but rather the different priorities 
and goals that this group has. It makes sense that in a field that depends on previous 
information in order to build knowledge, researchers will always value information. 
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Yet when the focus changes, as in this instance, then so does the value of the 
information.  
This also explains the fact that the information will likely differ in value 
depending on the individual and her situation. For a couple that is concerned about 
their risk of having a child born with TSD, the information about their risk may very 
well be beneficial. This could be because they are willing to abort an affected fetus, or 
because they are willing and able to engage in one of the alternative methods of 
reproduction, or simply because they want to be physically and psychologically 
prepared for their child. 
 What we see, then, is that the conflict that may result between those doing 
genetic medicine and the patients involved occurs not because of the information itself 
but rather with the use of such information.   Because this is the case, I do not think 
that this conflict is irresolvable.  What a solution requires is some measure of 
understanding both on the part of the clinicians and on the part of the patients. The 
kind of understanding I have in mind will be described below. 
 Bioethicists have been attempting to bring clinicians to an understanding about 
patient values almost since the discipline began.  One hallmark of respecting patient 
autonomy is in recognizing that patients may have different values than the clinician 
and this may result in differing ideas regarding treatment options. A treatment that is  
                                                                                                                                            
338 I know this from personal experience.  When one considers the lack of reliability of 
this test, it makes this position even more suspect. 
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recommended and seems perfectly reasonable to a physician may be absolutely out of 
the question for a patient with different values and goals. Respecting an individual’s 
right to refuse treatment, then, includes an appreciation for, but not necessarily an 
agreement with, the patient’s values.  
 We have attempted to accomplish this understanding on the part of the 
physician on a number of fronts: through different models of the physician-patient 
relationship,339 through a detailed discussion of “futile” treatment and a subsequent 
undermining of the fact-value distinction,340 and through descriptive accounts that 
explain different religious beliefs and cultural notions of patients so that an 
understanding can be reached.341 What all of these approaches have attempted to do is 
to give clinicians reasons why patients might disagree with their treatment 
recommendations. The idea seems to be that if the clinicians understood the reasoning 
of the patients they would be more likely to accept their decisions, if not agree with 
them. 
                                                 
339 For example, see Ezekiel J. Emanuel and Linda L. Emanuel, “Four Models of the 
Physician-Patient Relationship,” Journal of the American Medical Association 267, 
no. 16 (April 22/29, 1992): 2221-2226. 
340 The fact-value distinction refers to the notion that objective, scientific facts (i.e. lab 
results, prognoses, etc.) can be separated from the value judgments that people make 
about diseases, patients, and patient care. For an extensive discussion of this 
distinction and how and why it can be undermined, see Susan B. Rubin When Doctors 
Say No: The Battleground of Medical Futility (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1998). 
341 For example, see Anne Fadiman, The Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down (New 
York: The Noonday Press, 1997). 
  
  
240
 Insofar as this model has merit,342 I contend that it is applicable in the instances 
of conflict with which we are concerned here.  Recall that what is different about the 
value of information is the goals that each party has. Getting the clinicians to 
understand that this group of people has different goals for their lives and for the role 
of medicine and healing is crucial to resolving potential conflicts. It is possible to 
reach such an understanding in ways similar to those discussed above:  educating 
physicians about the priorities of this group will not only elucidate differences from 
“traditional” medicine but will also give them an understanding of the reasons why 
certain treatment options may not be acceptable.  In some ways, then, this group 
represents another instance of the overall importance of understanding patient values. 
And since not every member of the observant Jewish community will view the 
information in exactly the same way, approaching each case on an individual basis 
seems to be the best way to proceed. 
 It is important to remember, however, that this conversation must not be one-
sided. It is equally important for the patients in these cases to understand the modus 
operandi of the clinicians as well. Sometimes the physicians get “demonized” because 
it is presumed that they do not, and cannot, understand the differing values of the 
                                                 
342 This is not to say that this method is the best available, or even better than some 
alternatives. I am concerned, for example, with the presumption that a detailed list of 
reasons must always be given for such decisions to be acceptable; that is, I am 
suspicious of the notion that demonstrations of rationality always trump other 
considerations.  However, as this method has been influential and is currently the 
operant paradigm, I think it is still useful for conflict resolution.  Other methods may 
be better, but this one still works.  
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patients, and I think this is a mistake. Such assumptions lead to further conflict, not to 
resolution. Hence, continuing to appreciate the role of the clinician as a scientist, as 
one who has ostensibly good motives (to help patients), or as one whose role it is to 
solve mysteries, will be beneficial to the patient. The problem-solving mentality might 
be an asset here; what is necessary is a recasting of the problem. 
 Hence, this conflict can be resolved by engaging in a conversation about the 
goals of each party. There is a dual responsibility here: it is the responsibility of the 
clinicians to explain why the treatment they are suggesting is recommended, and what 
values and goals that presupposes, and it is the responsibility of the patients to explain 
what their goals and values are so that treatment can be evaluated accordingly.  Again, 
this is not likely to result in total coincidence of values (although that is possible); 
instead, what will result is an increased understanding of where each party is “coming 
from” so that they can continue together on a course of action.  In fact, a bit more may 
be necessary here: some overlap of values may be required for the physician and 
patient to agree on a course of action. A common goal might be reached, even if not 
all of the values are shared by all of the parties. 
 It should be evident, then, that the conversation model that I am suggesting 
will work to elucidate the different priorities that each group has, in addition to the 
differing value of information. In fact, it is not at all clear that these two issues are 
really separable.  The different priorities held by each group – living a life of holiness 
for the observant Jews and saving lives and solving mysteries for the genetic 
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researchers – largely determines the differing importance of information for each 
group.  By making these priorities clear and bringing them out into the open, different 
alternatives may present themselves and other courses of action will be better 
understood in terms of the larger worldviews of the two groups. 
 The final difficulty that might lead to conflict that was previously mentioned 
was the difference in importance that the family holds for each group. The genetic 
researchers value family primarily because this is how they get their information, and 
because the information that they are able to determine has medical implications for 
other family members. The observant Jewish community, on the other hand, places 
family at the center of importance for an entirely different reason: their tradition and 
community center around the family, and it is through interactions with family 
members that ethical behavior is first derived.   
 It is not entirely clear to me that this difference in focus on the family will 
always, or even most of the time, result in conflict between these two groups.  Instead, 
I contend that these two views can be complementary, where finding out information 
about family members may indeed help both clinicians and the patient himself to care 
for the other individuals. However, in cases where conflict does arise from such 
different priorities, I argue that this must be resolved in favor of the patient.  For 
example, once again consider the woman debating about genetic screening for her 
susceptibility to breast cancer.  It is true that information gained about her risk would 
give her and her physician important information about her family members as well. 
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But also important to this woman was what caring for her family involves, and this 
included the recognition that gaining such information might be harmful to her 
relationships. Insofar as preserving her relationships is one of her most important 
goals, it was not clear that receiving this information was the best course of action for 
her.  
 It is true that getting such information could be helpful for the clinicians. Not 
only does it indicate certain courses of action involved in caring for the patient and her 
family, but also the information would be important scientifically – the more that we 
learn about the way that mutations are inherited in families, the better we can get 
about predicting diseases and combating them by prevention and treatment 
alternatives. The problem is that these goals are not always the goals of the patients – 
medicine is many things to many people. And while it is true that if every patient and 
her family refused343 to engage in genetic testing we would get no data about 
inheritance and the development of diseases on account of mutations, it does not seem 
as though we are in immediate danger of such a consequence.  In fact, if anything, the 
                                                 
343 It would also be significant if every member of a genetically significant sub-
population refused to engage in testing, as our research might be skewed. However, 
the points that I make regarding the unlikelihood of this consequence for the general 
population hold here as well…for the most part. I am reminded of the problems with 
screening for sickle-cell anemia, however, where the problems with screening were 
almost exclusively caused by poor handling of the situation by the public and by the 
medical community. If this fear, that our research would be affected by certain groups 
failing to cooperate with screening, is real, then society should be willing to take the 
necessary steps to ensure that such discriminatory and negative consequences do not 
occur again. We have an opportunity here to learn from our mistakes, and we ought to 
do so. 
  
  
244
frequency with which society seeks out “genetic” answers to their problems suggests 
that scientists will be well supplied with data.  The public relies more and more on 
genetic information to give them answers to their questions, and hence it is possible 
that given our current state of knowledge about treatment, genetic science is being 
overused. 
 Hence, what I propose is that in instances where family considerations make it 
such that engaging in testing or in some treatment alternative is not the best course of 
action for the patient because of her other goals and priorities, the clinician should 
respect this decision and the reasons behind it. Some information may be lost, but 
something else important may be gained: trust in the provider-patient relationship. 
 The conflicts, then, that may have arisen because of the different values and 
priorities of the groups in question do not seem to be insurmountable after all. In fact, 
some amount of conflict is useful, as can be evidenced in this case: conflicts give the 
parties an opportunity to reach a greater understanding of each other such that a 
resolution can be found that will meet everyone’s needs. 
Conclusion 
 
 Thus, it is the case that these two groups, the clinicians/researchers and 
observant Jewish patients, can turn an instance of conflict into one of mutual 
understanding. More can be gained from such a productive encounter than is likely to 
be lost. Yet it is only through an understanding of the various goals and priorities of 
each group by the other that middle ground can be reached.  
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 Understanding the values and priorities of the observant Jewish community is 
not just useful for those who are treating them, however. Such an understanding helps 
all of us to appreciate the role that medicine and healing have within the tradition. This 
is at least partly because other religious groups have weighed in on issues in medicine, 
and understanding how one group has approached these issues may prove illuminating 
for other groups. It is also generally useful to understand how a person’s religious 
beliefs can impact all areas of her life, including medical decision-making. In this 
case, insofar as medicine restores an individual to her capacity to fulfill God’s 
commandments, to care for others and be cared for by them, and in general to live a 
life of holiness, medicine is an important part of her life.  Yet its value must be 
understood in terms of the larger goal, that of being the kind of person that she and 
God want her to be. 
 Part of being the right kind of person, I have argued, is being one who does not 
simply follow the principles and rules as they have been interpreted for her, but also 
one who cares for others and is cared for by them. This is important because not only 
is the family the center of the community in Judaism, but it also has practical value: it 
speaks to the actual experience of individuals. Medical decisions, especially life-
changing decisions, impact more than just the patient, but also her family, friends, 
coworkers, etc. An approach that serves as a guide to ethical action must take this into 
account. 
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 An ethic of care is particularly useful for this group because of the focus on 
family. In fact, when authority figures interpreted past decisions to apply to present 
cases, often the application of the appropriate rule was done in order to include 
considerations of the individual’s loved ones.  The problem, of course, was that the 
very determination of the relevant principles and rules was difficult to understand in 
its abstraction from the particular case, and in the way in which it often failed to offer 
specific direction for the agents. The rules and principles, I argued, served as side 
constraints on action, or were general guidelines within which a course of action could 
be chosen. For greater assistance in determining a course of action, an ethic of care is 
necessary to augment traditional Jewish bioethics. 
 This is not to say, however, that the traditional schema is unimportant, or is 
even second in importance to care ethics. Instead, I have argued that they are in fact 
used together, first to narrow the range of acceptable action and then to specify the 
right action from the choices that remain.  The difference between the negative and 
positive action guides I have specified may be the difference between principles of 
obligation and principles of responsibility.  The precedents that have been set by 
previous rabbinical decisions are illustrative and demonstrative, but perhaps not 
prescriptive for the reasons previously mentioned. Yet ascertaining how authorities in 
the past have interpreted the ancient laws and scripture and applied it to problems like 
the current problem is an important step for those who are concerned with aligning 
their actions with the demands of their religious tradition.   
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 The three cases in genetic medicine that I discussed presented certain 
challenges for the observant Jewish community, but offered new opportunities as well. 
As we increase our understanding of the human genome and the ways in which it is 
responsible for the development of who we are, investigating the relationship between 
that genetic identity and the other ways in which we identify ourselves – woman, Jew, 
American, etc. – will become increasingly important.  I focused on these specific 
genetic disorders because they are particularly prevalent in the Ashkenazi Jewish 
community, but I think that the analysis provided here could easily be exported to 
other issues in genetics, and, indeed, other issues in bioethics – and perhaps moral 
choices in other areas of life as well. Discovering my predisposition for developing 
heart disease will, of course, still tell me information about the same risk in my 
children, and hence many of the issues discussed here will apply.  
 Because of the wide-ranging implications of this, it is unclear where this 
discussion should stop. Another line of investigation would be to demonstrate how 
other genetic issues are related to the kinds of differences in values and understandings 
that I mentioned here. It also would be interesting to investigate the juxtaposition of 
genetics and other religious traditions to see if a similar approach would hold. I 
suspect that a focus on caring for individuals will be evident across religious and 
cultural barriers, but this is a claim that must be defended in a larger work. One thing 
is clear, however, and that is that as religion is an important part of people’s lives, and 
as the science of genetics has made us confront important issues about ourselves and 
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our relationships to others, understanding the relationships between these foci for 
individuals will be integral to any complete understanding of medical decision-making 
in the future.  
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